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Abstrac t 
The incubation effect refeis to the phenornenon whereby pmblem solving pedimmnce 
improves when a preliminary period of work on a problem is foilowed by a break b, 
rather than continued work on, the problem. To &te, the incubation literature bas been 
centered on investigating the rnost "testable* causal mecfianisms of incubation, including 
the ideas that beaefit accrues fiom incorrect ways of initially thinking about the problem 
fading over the incubation period before a return to the task, or f b m  a chance encounter 
with problem-relevant information present in the problem solver's sumunding 
environment. Atthough support for the latter hypothesis was indicated in the present 
thesis, little support for the former was evidenced hem, possiily due to methodological 
difficulties. Relatively unconsidered in the incubation literature to date has been the 
popular notion of the role of %nconscious processes." In the present thesis, the role of 
such unconscious processes in the incubation effect was conceptualized in the more 
contempotary t e m  of spreading activation, Uivolving the idea that a spread of activation 
related to initial work on a problem rnay continue for a period of t h e  after chectly 
attending to the problem. In two of the pesent studies, more sensitive measurement 
techniques were employed to directiy test for the presence of continued problem-related 
activation after an initial period of work; these studies indicated some support for the 
spreading activation hypothesis of incubation. 
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The Incubation Effect: Impücations for Underlying Mechanisms 
Then 1 tumed my attention to the study of some arithrnetical questions 
apparently without much succes and without a suspicion of any connection 
with my preceding researches. Disgusted with my failure, 1 weat to spend a 
few days at the sea side, and thou@ of something eise. One moming, 
waiking on the bluff, the idea came to me, with just the same characteristics 
of brevity, suddenness, and immediate certainty, that the arithmetic 
transformations of indeterminate temary quadratic forms were identicd to 
those of non-Euclidean geornetry (Poincaré, 1929 cf. Ghiselin, 1952, p. 37). 
An interesting and rather counterintuitive phenornenon in the area of problem 
solving is the incubation effect, a condition whereby the probability of successfully solving 
a difficult problem is increased when a period of intense work is foilowed by a p e n d  in 
which no active aftempts are made to solve the problem. Anecdotal reports of the use of 
an incubation period have been given by many creative individu& in the sciences and arts. 
as demonstrated in the intmductory quote of how Poincaré discovered the c b  of
Fuschian functions. Indeed, the beneficial effects of taking one's mind off a problem is a 
common expetience to many of US. Foiklore suggats we "sleep on it" when we cannot 
solve a difficdt problem. Many of the shidents who palticipated in the following studies 
reported using strategies such as laking a break when they codd not answer a difficult 
assignment question and leaving the most difficult questions on euuns until last, pennitting 
a p e n d  of time between their fim and final attempts. 
Despite the anecdotal evidence for incubation, its existence under more controlled 
conditions in the laboratory has been l e s  welï demonstrated. The findings of early studies 
(e.g., Dreistadt, 1%9; Gall & Mendelsohn, 1%7; Murray & Demy, 1969) were 
complicated by their methodology of providing incubation at the expense of continued 
work on the problem, rather than the currentiy more acceptable method of including 
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incubation in addition to matched working t h e  on the problem. Several studies have 
e m p i n d y  demonstrated incubation effects (e.g., Browne & Cruse, 1988; Dreistadt, 1969; 
Fulgosi & Guilford, 1968; Goidman, Wolters, & Whograd, 1992; Murray & Denny, 1%9; 
Patrick, 1986; Peterson, 1974; Silveira, 1971; Smith & Blankenship, 1989, 1991; Smith & 
Vela, 1991); however, in most of these studies, the effect is limitai to specific conditions, 
including participants' geneial ability level, the length of the incubation time and the type 
of activity filling the incubation p e n d  For example, Murray & Denny (1969) found 
positive incubation effects for only their low-ability participants whereas Patrick (1986) 
found only hi&-ability participants benefited h m  incubation. Fuigosi & Guilford (1968) 
found signifiant incubation effects for a 20-minute, but not a 10-minute incubation period 
whereas Goldman et ai. (1992) obtained positive results in a 24-hou, but not a two-minute 
incubation condition. Siiveira (1971 cc Posner, 1973) fond positive results in both a half- 
hour and a four-hour condition; however, these results were signifiant only for 
participants who had initially worked for a long, as opposeci to a brief, time on the 
problem before incubating. 
The demonstration of incubation in the laboratory has also varied depending on the 
nature of activity in which participants were involved d u ~ g  their break fkom the problem. 
Dreistadt (1%9) found positive effixts of incubation only when it was c o m b i  with a 
pictorial clue to the problem. Browne & Cruse (1988) found that incubation periods filled 
with either relaxation or a clue to the problem, but not with demanding mental work 
significantly impmved later performance. Patrick (1986), however, obtained positive 
effects only when the break fiom the pmblem was med with an activity unrelateci to the 
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problem king attempted. Finally, Smith & Blankenship (1989), Smith & Blarikenship 
(1991), and Smith & Vela (1991) demonstrateci positive incubation effécts when the correct 
solution to the problem was initially blocked or thwarted through experimentaï 
manipulation (see below). There have also been a nurnber of fded demonstrations of 
incubation (e.g., Dominowski & Jenrick, 1972; Gall & Mendekohn, 1967; Gick & 
Holyoak, 1980; Olton & Johnson, 1976; Olton, 1979). Thus, to date, the conclusions of 
empirical work on incubation have been inconsistent and the r d t s  of one study often fail 
to be replicated in other studies. 
Given the state of the previous incubation literature, one might corne to one of two 
conclusions. Considering the inconsistency of the r d t s  and the m e n t  failures of the 
results of one study to be replicated in other studies, one might conclude that incubation 
does not exist as an objective phenomenon and that the dramatic accounts of taking one's 
mind off a problem given by Poincaré and other creative individu& are due to cognitive 
mechanisms such as selective remembering and selective forgening. In Olton & Johnson's 
(1976) words: 
incubation may be something of an illusion, perhaps rendered impressive by 
selective recall of the few but vivid occasions on which great progress was 
made following separation fiom a problem and forgening of the many 
occasions when it did not (p. 629). 
On the other hand, it may also be possible that incubation represents a "tnie" and 
objective phenomenon, but one that is very ciifficuit to demonstrate in the confines of an 
artificial laboratory setting. Olton & Johnson (1976) d i s c d  the failure of the incubation 
laboratory expriment to sufticiently motivate participants, draw on extensive knowledge 
and experience in a specific area of expertise, and provide enough time off task, compared 
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to the anecdotal accounts of its use. Given this Merence in context of the laboratory 
experiment comprued to a %d world" problem solving setting, it may be tbat the 
measures of incubation employed in such experiments are insensitive to its &ly duced 
effects in the laboratory context. In this respect, note that the inconsistent d t s  are aiso 
the product of a variety of problems that have k e n  used in the incubation literature, which 
likely Vary in ternis of their daficulty and complexity, and therefore theù appropriateness 
to the incubation context- Of course, it is difficuit to know in advance what might be 
considered a more sensitive measure of incubation. A key to the answer to this question 
may relate to the mechanisms through which incubation is thought to operate. M e r  
investigation of the mechanisms by which incubation rnay occur wouid benefit fkom both 
(1) clarifying whethet incubation effects can be demonstratexi more reliably through the 
operation of a given mechanism and (2) providing a greater understanding of how such 
effects occur. However, the literature investigating the mechanisms through which 
incubation may occur is much more Iimited than the research investigating the presence of 
the effect itself, iikely due to the unreliability of the effm in the fint place. Several 
mechanisms have been proposed, however, and 1 shaU ha next to a review of these 
mechanisms. 
Prowsed Accounts of Incubation 
I begin this discussion with what 1 consider to be the two least interesting 
hypotheses for the reported beneficial effects of incubation. One such explanation might 
be t e m d  the "fatigue hypothesis" (Posner, 1973; Olton & Johnson, 1976). This 
hypothesis suggests that afier woricing on a problem for a while, mental fatigue builds up 
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and interferes with the problern solvei's ability to c o h e  to actively thinlr about and 
work on the problem. The fwiction of the incubation period, then, is to give the problem 
soIver a break, teduce fatigue, and re-generate energy to continw work 
A second Tiuiinteresting" hypothesis is that the incubation p e n d  simply dows  
more tune for additional work on the problem of the same nature as occuired before the 
break (Posner, 1973; Brome & Cruse, 1988). Although most inttospective reports of 
incubation deny that any active work on the problem continueci during the incubation 
period, the possi'biiity exists that such work did occur, but was forgotten on the emergence 
of the solution (Posner, 1973). Thus, according to this account, incubation is due to 
thinking about the problem, but not remembering that thinking. Of course, if this were the 
case, any benefit from an incubation p e n d  would simply be due to a longer time working 
on the probtem, an uninteresting hding. 
Generally, studies of incubation attempt to control for these two accounts. 
Participants are often required to work on some alternative task unrelated to the problem of 
interest during the incubation perid In this way, any effect of the break cannot be said to 
be due to a rest and reduction of fatigue or continued active thinking about the pmblem. 
With these rival hypotheses out of the way, we wül tum now to a discussion of the three 
main mechanisms p roped  to expiain the reported beneficial effects of incubation. 
Unconscious Processes 
Robably the most popdar assumption regarding the effects of taking a break during 
problem solving attributes the effects of doing so to unconscious processes, that is, that 
work on the problem somehow continues implicitly below the threshold of awareness while 
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conscious attention is directeci to other activities or to nothing at ail. Ahbough the role of 
unconscious processes is often stressai in anecdotal reports of incubation (Ghiseh, 1952), 
it has iittle or no empirical validation. Distinctions of cognitive processing have been 
made that ïnclude primary vernis sccondary, rationai vernis intuitive, serial vernis pardel 
(Neisser, 1%7), and automatic vernis controlled (Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & 
Schneider, 1977), but such distinctions have not yet been applied to the empincd study of 
incubation in problem solving. 
A large m a s  of anecdotal evidence, however, has testined to the role of the 
"unconscious" in creative production in generd. Ghiselin (1952) coilected and combined 
into one volume the writings of a number of creative individuals in fields such as arts, 
literahire and science on theu creative processes. Ghiselin noted that most of these 
creative individuals considered a signüicant part of theu work as due to uinvoluntary" or 
automatic processes. In fact, Ghiselin concludes in this review that creative production 
without some role of the unconscious is W l y  never to occur. 
Poincaré was one of the creative individuaIs included in Ghiselùi's review who 
saessed the role of unconscious mental work on the problem during the incubation period, 
as noted in the quotation at the beginning of this thesis. According to Poincaré, during the 
r a t  perïod, many different combinations of ideas are formexi in the unconscious. Ideas 
that are usefbi or relevant to the problem at band affect the scientist's "emotional 
sensitivity," which acts as a selection agent, and these ideas break through to 
consciousness producing the sudden ülumination effect. The process underlying this 
unconscious work is best demibed using Poincaré's own analogy: 
Perhaps we ought to seek the expIanation in that preluninary period of 
conscious work which always precedes a i i  fnlltful unconscious labor. 
Permit me a rough cornparison. Figure the future elements of our 
combinations as something Lice the hooked atoms of Epicuns. During the 
complete repose of the min& these atoms are motidess, they are, so to 
speak, hooked to the wail; so this complete rest may be Uidefinitely 
prolonged without the atoms meeting, and consequently without any 
combinations between them. On the other hanci, during a period of apparent 
rest and unconscious work, cettain of them are &tachd h m  the Wall and 
put in motion. They flash in every direction through the space . . . where 
they are enclose& as would, for example, a swann of gnats or, if you prefer 
a more learned comparison, Iike the moledes of gas in the kinematic 
theory of gases. Then their mutual impacts may produce new combinations 
(P- 41). 
Campbell (1960) presented a theoretical analysis which outlined the role of 
unconscious processes in creative thought as largely due to chance. Campbeli conceives 
creative thought to be the result of a "blhd variation and selective retention" process, in 
which random fusions of memory representations h m  different memory c e h  continuously 
and unconsciously make contact; when such contact fits some selection criteria, it is 
selected. In Campbell's view, uiis process underlying creative thought is similar to any 
trial-and-error leaming, including the variation process of mutation in organic evolution, 
with the most adaptable variations being selected. 
In conhast to Campbell, but perhaps not so different fkom Poincaré, more recently 
developed spreading activation theones pmvide a more ordered description of the role of 
unconscious processes. Spreading activation theories (Cohs  & Loftus, 1975) were 
developed to explain semantic priming effects and a variety of memory phenornena. Such 
theoria take as  their first assumption the proposition that memory is associative and tbat 
associations are accumulated in memory thtough experience. Concepts of anything, 
whether a noun, action, or whatever, are represented in cognitive space as nodes in a 
network There are relationai tinks betweeu nodes and these 11nks vary in strength 
depending on factors such as previous experience and m e n c y  and recency of activation 
of the particular lgrk Whenever a concept is processed, activation is released h m  its 
node and spreads to ail nodes linlced to that node and then to ail nodes linlUed to each of 
the secondary nades activated, and so on. This activation demases gradualiy over tirne. 
There are two important characteristics of this spreading of activation. Fht,  it is 
automatic; activation spreads to concepts linked to the activated concept without voluntary 
control. Thus, this spteading of activation is thought to occur very rapidly and below the 
threshold of awareness. Ail of the associations activated by one node do not enter working 
memory. In fact, a node requires a suffiCient amount of activation to cross the ihreshold 
of awareness. Second, although only one concept can be actively, or coasciously, 
processed at a the,  due to the serial nature of conscious processing, the spreading of 
activation between nodes occurs in paraliel; that is, when a node becomes activated, it, in 
tum, activates a nodes linked to it. In the case where more than one concept is actively 
processed in close proximity, the possibility exists for activation frmn different sources to 
summate or intersect. 
Recently, ideas of unconscious spreading activation have been applied to the role of 
insight in problem solving. For example, in Ohisson's (1992) theory of insight, activation 
spreads fiom knowledge structures that encode the problem to other related concepts (cf. 
Dominowski, 1995). Some empVicai support of the role of automatic spreading activation 
in insight problems has k e n  provided by Bowers, Regehr, Bdthazard, & Parker (1990). 
In Expriment 1, Bowers et al. developed the Wyadf of Triads Ta&" consisting of two 
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sets of three words. Within each dyad, one triad was coherent in that a l i  three of the 
words were associates of a solution w d  The second triad in each dyad was iecohetent, 
in that the tbree wor& were a i l  associates of different words. Bowers et aI. asked 
participants to generate solutions to the triad they judged to be coherent in each pair. 
When unable to solve a coherent eiad, participants wtxe asked to make a forcedchoice 
decision of which triad was coherent Results indicated that even when participants codd 
not solve the coherent tn'ad, they stül chose the coherent triad at levels significantly greater 
than chance. Bowers et al. interpreted these findings in ternis of spreading activation 
theory, such that, "clues that reflect coherence automatidy activate devant mnemonic 
networks in a graded and cumulative fashion" (p. 74). They proposeci that each of the 
stimulus words in a triad automatically activates related associates. When the three words 
activate an associate cornmon to each of them, this associate has a higher iikeiihood of 
crossing the awareness threshold. However, even when sunicient activation is not reached, 
partial activation of this 
which triad is coherent. 
In Expriment 3, 
common associate can still bias forced-choice decisions about 
Bowers et al. developed "The Accumulatecl Clues Task" (ACT), t 
which consists of 15 words, each a low associate of the solution word. The stimulus 
words were presented to participants one at a the.  M e r  the presentation of each word, 
participants recordeci their best guess as to the solution at that point in tirne. Bowers et al. 
then had independent judges rate the associative closeness of participants' guesses 
throughout their attempt to solve each ACT item. These ratings revealed a graduai 
increase in associative closeness of participants' responses to the solution word as they 
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proceeded h m  earlier to iater stimulus words. Again, Bowers et al. interpreted this 
finding as indicating that the automatic activation of associative netwotks, spreading h m  
the stunulus words and converging on the solution word, serves as the bases for people's 
intuitions in problem solving. 
Most recently, the role of such automatic spreading activation has ken kplicated 
in the incubation effect in problem solvîng. Dorfman, Shames, 8r Kihlstrorn (1996) have 
introduced the concept of "autonomous activation" to explain inneased performance on a 
problem after a rest period. According to Dorihan et al., on psentation of the problern, 
its components automaticdly activate re1ated information or nodes in memory. Then, 
dirring incubation, the activation spreads to other nodes rekted to the problem elements. 
Gradually, there will be a summation of activation on nodes most important to the problem 
solution. Activation may eventually converge on the problern solution, and, if sufficient 
intensity is reached, cross the awareness threshold To my knowledge, however, there has 
ken  no direct empirical investigation of autonomous activation in incubation. Although 
Dorfman et al. propose that previous empirical demonstrations of the beneficial effects of 
incubation (e.g., Fulgosi & Guüford, 1968; Goldman et al., 1992; Murray & Demy, 1%9; 
Peterson, 1974; Silveira, 1971; Smith & Blankenship, 1989) provide evidence for the role 
of autonomous activation in the incubation effect, without any direct investigation of 
autonomous activation per se, it is difficuit to know whether such effects are due to other 
factors, such as forgetting fixation (to be reviewed shortly). 
Nevertheles, given the role pro@ by many investigators of unconscious 
spreading activation in problem solving, an interestug question concenrs why unconscious 
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or "below-awareness" proceshg shodd be any more beneficial than llea and active 
conscious pmcessing- The answer to this question seems to involve a view of 
consciousness as a limited capacity system, capable of only processing, in contrast to 
the more unlimiteci paralle1 processing of uncoiscious activation (cf. Mander, 1995). 
Several empiricd investigations bear on this proposition. For example, Spence & Hoiiand 
(1962) presented the word 'kheese" to participants either sublirninally or supralunuiall . . Y- 
Participants were then presented with a word list containing ten associates of cheese and 
ten control words not relevant to cheese. Spence and H o h d  fowid the mail of cheese 
associates to be significantly greater in the subliminal than supraliminal group. They 
interpreted these findings as indicating that when a stimulus (e.g., &cheesen) is presented 
below awareness, it faw out to a wider range of associates. In contrast, awareness of a 
stimulus resttlcts its effects, as one's response to it becornes organized w i t h  only one 
partidar meaning. 
In a similar vein, Spence (1964) presented participants with a word list containing 
the word kheese'' and the ten associates and ten control words as just described and 
investigated recd More and after the stimulus word "cheese* was recalled, Spence found 
significantly more associations of cheese recalled before the word %heese" itself was 
recailed than afkr "cheesen was retrieved. Again, he concluded that a stimulus not in 
awareness activates a greater range of associates than the same stimulus in conscious 
awareness. 
More recently, Marcel (1980) aiso investigated how the processing of word 
meaning varies with awareness. Marcel presented participants with three successive letter 
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strings and measured reaction time to respond to the thud letter string. On control trials, 
the first letter string was assocïatively relateci to the mrd whereas the second was 
unreiated to either the first or third string (e-g., "hand . . . race . . . Wnst"). On criticai 
trials, the second letter string was a homogmph, a word with several meanings but 
identical spehgs, for exampie, "palm." On these triais, the homograph was associatively 
related to the thüd word, for example, "palru . . . d" In addition, the homograph itseif 
was also primed by the first letter string. This first word was reîated either to the same 
meaning of the homograph as the third word, for example, "hand . . . p a h  . . . wrist" 
(congruent trials), or to a different meaning of the homograph than the third word, for 
example, "tree . . . palm . . . wrist" (incongrnent trials). In addition, the middle 
homograph word was either masked to prevent participants from hlly consciously 
processing the word, or unmasked to allow Ml attention to the word 
Unsurprisingly, Marcel found that participants responded significantly faster on 
congruent trials han on control trials, both when the homograph was masked and when it 
was unmasked. Incongruence seemed to produce an interference effect, at l e s t  when the 
homograph was not masked; in this case, participants responded significantly slower on 
incongruent trials than on control trials. Surptisingly, however, Marcel found a facilitation 
effect for incongruent trials when the homograph was masked, relative to control trials. 
Thus, it wouid appear that when the homograph was unmasluxi and thetefore M y  
consciously processeci, prior context biased the meaning of the homograph talcen, as 
indicated by the slower response times on unmasked incongruent trials. However, when 
masked to prevent full attention to it, prior context did not appear to bias the homograph's 
interpretation to the same degree, as indicated by faster respoase rimes on the maskexi 
incongruent trials. Marcel hypothesized that when processed withwt awareness, al l  or 
many meanings of a word are a c c 4  regardless of context, as arpacity in this situation is 
relatively unlimited. However, in a comcious stage of processing, capcity is more limited 
and therefore only one interpretation of a word can be p r o c d  at a time; the meaning of 
the word that is accessed will be dictated by prior context. 
As already noted, there has been littie, if any, direct investigation of the role of 
unconscious processes or spreading activation in the incubation effect. Indeed, previous 
authors have cautioned investigators about duect empincal investigation of this explanation 
of incubation: 
The obvious theory - uncooscious work, whether conceived as mental or as 
cerebral - should be left as a residud hypothesis for adoption only if other, 
more testable hypotheses break dom (Woodworth & Schlosberg, 1954, p. 
840). 
I wül consider next one such 'testable hypothesis", namely the d e  of fixation or "set" in 
problem solving. 
Forrrettine Fixation Hmthesis 
Posner (1973) saw the mat  crucial time in the entire problem solving process as 
the first few moments, during which the initial problem representation takes place. Before 
any problem can be solved, it must be cognitively represented in the problem solver's 
mind, so that information relating to the problem can be organized and integrated. For l e s  
difficult and more familiar problerns, such problem representation proceeds easily; it wül 
reflect aspects of other representations aIready encountered. Such a problem representation 
contributes to the development of a rapid solution, as it inbibi& the problem solver fkom 
making observations unrelateci to the cumnt representation ot h m  developing other 
representations not useful to the cimem problem of interest. However, mch a prob1em 
representation can be quite Iimitiag in the case of diffidt or novel poblems where 
retrieving and applying oldet, o&n-used p d e m  stratepies wi l l  be less successful. 
Indeed, what is offen needed for difficult problems is to make new observations or to 
develop Metent problem representations. Unfortunately, as Posner notes, once a 
particular representation of a problem is adopted, people often continue trying to solve the 
problem within that representation, in a rather rigid manner, without Wng out Merent 
ways of looking at the problem. 
Duncker's (1945) concept of "functional fixity" provides a good example of the 
possible hannN effects of initial problem representatiom. Duncker coined this term to 
explain the phenornenon whereby people have trouble conceptualizing dBerent tùnctions 
for objects first obsewed fulfilling a particular bction. Duncker presented to his 
participants a problem that required a cork to be used as a wedge. To some participants, 
the cork lay free in the centre of the table. Others saw the cork as the stopper to a bottle. 
Duncker found that almost half of the participants solved the problem when the cork lay 
free, but only 14 percent of those who saw the cork as a stopper were succesnul in their 
problem solving. Thus, participants in the "stopper" condition becarne fixated on t h  
function of the cork. 
Woodworth & Schlosberg (1954) discussed the concept of initial problem 
representations in t e m  of what they called "set" and proposeci a relation between set and 
the beneficial effects of an incubation period. W d w o n h  and Schlosberg denned set as  a 
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readiness to respond, which "faciltates responses for wbich [the person] is prepared and 
tends to uihibit any competing respotlses'' (p. 830). They ptoposed that a set fimctioiis by 
reducing the person's range of a d a b l e  alternatives. Tnstead of having to select a response 
h m  an unlimited number of responses triggereâ by a stimulus, a set h i t s  the field of 
responses in advance, thereby increashg the speed and accuracy with which the person can 
produce a response that conforms to the demands of the situation. They noteci, as well, 
however, the detrimental effects on problem solving that a set c m  have in that the problem 
solver wiU adhere to only one line of thought despite continuai failure. Woodworth and 
Schlosberg pro@ that laying the problem aside during the incubation period allows 
time for an ermeous set to die out and therefore leaves the problem solver more able to 
make a fresh start at the problem. 
More recently, Smith and colleagues (Smith & Blankenship, 1989, 1991; Smith & 
Vela, 199 1) have empirically dernonstrated the effects of what they term "fixation" and the 
related advantages of incubation. They conceptuab fixation as the retrieval of 
inappropriate information or problem solving strategies from memory. The ied of this 
information bloclcs the emergence of more appropriate strategies. The incubation period, 
then, allows the problem solver to forget the initially recailed inappropriate information 
and strategies, allowing more helphil information to become more accessible. In their 
investigations, Smith and Blankenship have initially thwatted participants' attempts to solve 
a problem and then exarnined the role of an incubation period in undoing this originai 
fixation. Using this method, Smith and Blankenship have dernonstrated reliable, consistent 
incubation effects in the laboratory, a task of some dificulty as already seen. 
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Smith & Bhkensbip (1989) demonstrated the d e  of fixation and Wixgetting 
fixation" in the incubation &kt in a set of four studies. Participants were ptesented with 
rebuses, a type of picture-word p d e ,  the soIutions to which are common phrases that fit 
the word pictum. For example, the solution to the rebus "you just me" is between 
you and me." After working on rebuses to which helpful dues had been given, fixation 
was induced on later rebirses by priming the rebuses with misleading clues. For example, 
the misleading clue given to the rebus v o u  just me* was "beside." Participants either 
received no incubation period or a five- or ten-minute incubation period, that was either 
filled or unfilled, before king presented with the rebuses again. During this second 
presentation, the misleading clue was removed and rebuçes were presented with no clue, or 
in some experiments, with helpful clues. On this second presentation, participants were 
asked both (1) to attempt to solve the problem again, and (2) to recali the clue given with 
the rebus in the initiai attempt. Smith and Blankenship found that participants who had an 
interval between the fht and second presentation of an uasolved rebus with a misleading 
clue were significantly more likely to solve the rebus on the second presentation. They 
were also more likely to have forgotten the mislead'ig clue originally presented with the 
rebus than were participants who did not have an incubation period, supporthg their 
hypothesis that problem solving improves after incubation as a huiction of fixated 
information (i.e., the misleading clue) king forgotten. 
Smith & Blankeiship (1991) used the Remote Associates Test (RAT) as theu 
problem solving measure. The object of the RAT is to find one word that is an associate 
of three words on a given item. For example, given the words, "Family", "Apple" and 
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"House," participants are expected to generate the solution "Tree." h a series of five 
studies, fixation on RAT items was induced in some participants by pfiming each of the 
three stimulus words with a word that, while related to the stimdus word, was 
inappropriate to the conect solution. Fm example, the inappqriate primes for the 
stimulus words, Tamily", "Applel' and "House" were "Mother", '"Pie" and "Home," 
respectively. Incubation effccts were tested by retestllig participants on wsolved RAT 
items either immediately or after a &hy fiIled with cognitively demancihg task. Smith 
and Blankenship found that participants presented with a misleadhg clue did become 
fiated on the problem, as evidenced by poorer performance on the task. They also found 
that performance increased significantly after the incubation period for fixated participants, 
but not for nonfixated participants 
Smith & Vela (1991) shidied the phenomenon of reminiscence in the memory 
literature, which occurs when material not recalled on one memory test is later tecalleci on 
a subsequent test. One explanation of reminiscence suggests that output interference 
occus at the time of initial recdl, blocking the item to be recalled. and this output 
interference then reduces over time. Smith and Vela pro@ that reminiscence was 
conceptually related to the concept of fixation in problem solving, and they investigated an 
"incubated reminiscence effect" in t h e  studies. In these studies, participants were shown 
pictures of common objects which they were asked to memorize. They were then given 
two free recd tests that either foiiowed immediately after one another or were separateci 
by fiIled or unNled five- or ten-minute incubation intervals. Smith and Vela found greater 
reminiscence effects at longer incubation intervals. 
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In summary, both eatly theory and later empiricai evidenœ suppts the role of 
forgeaing fixation in the beneficial effkcts of incubation. In fach W l y  due to the 
consistent demonstrations of the incubation effeft in the just descn'bed studies, in contrast 
to earlier unreliable laboratory €indings9 some investigators consider the mle that a period 
of time off task piays in disrupting fixation on the problem to be the best explanation for 
incubation (e.g., Anderson, 1990; Smith, 1995). Other factors, however, bave also been 
implicated to play a role in incubation and it is to one such factor that 1 now tum. 
Irn~licit Che Hwthesis 
Perhaps incubation refîects not only the result of breaking up an incorrect set or 
fixation on the problem, but also the provision of an opportunity for the problem solver to 
find a more helpful set or direction to the problem (cf. Dreistadt, 1969). Atternpts to 
explain incubation have also suggested that the period of time off task may be beneficiai in 
that it allows the problem solver to be informed by chance encounters with stimuli and 
events in the extemal environment that may be related to the problem (Anderson, 1975; 
Olton, 1979; Posner, 1973). After noting the unreliability of the incubation effect in 
studies he reviewed, Olton (1979) suggested that the presentation of a ciue to the problem 
during the incubation interval may lead to a more stable effect, and that it may be this type 
of information, rather than the interval iîself., that improves performance on the problem 
after time off task Many scientists have reporteci that an analogy or stimulus event 
triggered their solution in making their discoveries. A weli-known example is the story of 
Archimedes, who was commissioned by King Hien, to detedne  whether his crown was 
made of pure gola as purporteci, or whether it &O contained some dver. Archimedes 
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p d e d  over the +lem for days until one &y when he stepped into his bath and noticed 
the water ninning over, king displaced This, of course, triggered the discovery of his 
technique of measuring the gold content of the crown by disphcement of water mistadt, 
1968). 
Conüary to the clear relation between the extemai event and the solution that 
Archimedes recognized in the above example, reports of other scien- and artists do not 
indicate any role of an extemal stimulus in theu discoveries. Neverthelas, the possibility 
exists that such a stimulus or event was im~licitlv noticed and im~licitlv informed the 
problem solver. In fact, this state of a f f i  has been previoirsly identifieci and labelled by 
Bowers (1987). Bowers distinguished between 9kti)rder consciousness," which involva 
the perception or noticing of events, and '%econd-order consciousnes," which involves a 
comprehension of how the events noticed in f~l~t-order consciousness affect and influence 
one's behaviour. When a person has noticed an event, but remains unaware of it having 
influenced his/her thought or behaviour, that person is said to be unconsciously influenced 
with respect to this second-otder consciousnes. In the context of incubation, the problem 
solver may notice the extenial event and have his/her thinking implicitly informeci by the 
event. In the end, however, slhe may be aware of only the solution suggested by the event 
and not the role of the event in this process. 
Maier's (193 1) classic study using the 'Two-Süing" proMem is an example of how 
an extemal stimulus can suggest the solution to a problem without the problem solver 
comprehending the connection between the stimulus and subsequent solution. This 
problem presents participants with the task of tyhg together two saings hung from the 
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ceiling. The strings are distant enough b m  each other that when one is held, the other 
cannot be reached at the same time. The participant is pennitted to use any of a variety of 
objects in the room, inciuding a table, chair, pole, and plies. Although there are several 
possible solutions to the problem, including anchorhg one string with the table or chair 
and extending or lengthening one of the strings, for example, with the pole, one unique 
solution îs of primary interest: attachhg a weight, such as the piiers, to one of the strings, 
thereby making the string a penduim that can be swung towards the other string dowing 
the two to be grasped simultaneously. After pedttuig participants sorne t h e  to work on 
the problem, Maier provided a hint to those who bad been unsuccessful: he uaccidentaiiy" 
brushed against one of the strings, setting it in motion. Maier found that participants given 
this hint were then often able to solve the problem. As weil, interestingly, when Maier 
asked his participants retrospectively what led to their solutions, few of them reportexi the 
hint. One quite obvious difficulty with Maier's study, however, is the lack of a conaol 
group to which the solution rates of participants given the hint couid be compared. 
There exists very limited research investigating the role of chance encounters with 
extemal events or information in the incubation effect. Any research of this sort must be 
disthguished by whether the information presented is explicit or implicit, with respect to 
the problem solver's knowledge of its "clue" value. When given explicit information, the 
problem solver is esentialiy told, ''This is a clue to the problem." In contrast, irnplicit 
information requires the problem solver to have no awareness of its clue value. To be 
ecologically vaiid, the role of chance encounters with u ~ l ~ e s "  in the incubation efféct can 
ody be informed by research investigating implicitly presented clues. In "rd life* there 
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is no one b d n g  h u g h  the clouds to explicitly inform the scientist, mathetll~itician, or 
artist that the nea stimulus s/he is to encornter wili be a and that s/he should pay 
special attention to it. There e&s, then, even more Iimited research investigating the role 
of events or encountered uifotmation in the incubation effect; fiirthermore, like Maiefs 
study, much of what exists is dated. 
Mednick, Mednick, & Mednick (1964) investigated the effects of providing impiicit 
hints during problem s o l h g  on a series of RAT items. During the incubation perîod, a 
subset of items that the participant had not previously solved were associatively primed by 
the completion of simple analogy problems for the target items. For example, when 
uwolved, an item consisting of the words "Family", "Apple" and t%Iouse" would be 
associatively primed by asking the participant to complete the following analogy: "Limb : 
Body as Branch : T - -". Mednick et al. found that msolved items that were 
specificaily associatively pnmed during the incubation period were significantly more 
likely to be solved on a re-test than items not primed during the intervening tirne. 
Dreistadt (1969) investigated the effects of pictorial analogies and an incubation 
period on the Farm problem, a problem which requires an L-shaped piece of land to be 
divided into four equal-shed and same-shaped parts, îhe solution of which is to use L- 
shapes for the four parts. The pictorial analogies provided ches to the problem by having 
similar shapes and divisions as the problem solution. When pnsent, the pictoriaf clues 
were available throughout the entire pmblem solhg duration. Participants were presented 
with either pictoriai analogies, an incubation period, or both. Dreistadt found signincant 
effects for both the pictorial analogies and the combination of the pictorial analogies and 
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incubation period. Participants who received both the pictorial analogies and the 
incubation period were significantly more likely to solve the problem than those who 
received the pictutes alone. Olton & Johnson (1976). howevet, were unable to repiicate 
Dteistadt's findmgs, even though they employed the same set of stimuli in nearly identical 
conditions and included an incubation p e n d  in addition to work on the problem, rather 
than instead of that work, as in Dreistadt's study. 
Browne Br Cruse (1988) also investigated the d e  of implicit hints in the incubation 
effect using the Farm problem and testing a considerable samp1e size. Participants were 
assigned to either a continuous work control condition or an incubation condition. hiring 
one of the five-minute incubation conditions, participants were asked to draw geometric 
shapes on graph paper, a task that was meant to unobtnisively suggest to them the Ushape* 
solution. In two separate experiments, Browne and Cruse found problem solving 
performance significantiy higher in the incubation group where the anaiogical hint was 
presented than in a continuous work control group that equated work t h e  on the problem. 
However, in contrast to Maier (193 l), Browne and Cruse concludeci that knowkdge of the 
shape-drawing task as a clue was an important innuence on its liilihood of effecting a 
solution. Browne and Cruse based this conclusion on the finding that 60 percent of 
participants solving the problem indicated that the analogid task was helpful, whereas 
none of the unsuccessful solvers did so. Apart fiom these few studies, however, there has 
been iittle empirical investigation of whether people can make use of implicitly (as 
opposed to explicitly) presented information that relates to a problem they are working on 
during an incubation period. 
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There is, however, a f i l y  substantial amount of iiteratwe investigating the use of 
analogies and transfer in pmblem solving independent of the incubation context Transfer 
in problem sohring occurs when exposure to some information or analogy related to the 
problem to be solved improves problem solving prfomance. Two types of M e r  are 
distinguished: spontaneous and informed transfer. Spontaneous, or uninfomed, transfer 
occurs when participants are not Iliformeci of any relation between the information or 
analogy and the problem to be solved; this situation tesembles the implicit clue in the 
incubation literature. In contrast, in infomed transfer, participants are explicitly told about 
the relation of the information or analogy to the problem, as in the explicit clue in the 
incubation literature. The results of most interest to the present discussion are the 
spontaneous or uninforrned aaisfer findings. Unfortwrately, a rather consistent hding in 
the trader literature is tbat people generaliy fail to make spontaneuus use of helpful 
information and analogies to solve related problems, or that they do so under fairly limited 
conditions (Beveridge & Parkins, 1987; Bowden, 1985; Catrambone Br Holyoak, 1989; 
Gick & Holyoak, 198% 1983; Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Judson, Cofer, & Geif'and, 1956; 
Lockhart, Lamon, & Gick, 1988; Landnim, 1990, Perfetto, Bransfotd, & Franks, 1983; 
Weisberg, DiCamillo, & Phillips, 1978). 
A rather striking example of the failure to spontaneously nansfer previously 
encountered relevant information to a current problem solving setting is Perletto et al.'s 
(1983) study which employed insight problems adopted from Gardner (1978). The 
problems were in the fonn of nddles, for example, "A man who üved in a small t o m  in 
the U.S. mamed 20 düTerent women of the same tom. Ail are st i l l  living and he has 
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never divorced one of them. Yet, he has bmken no law." Participants were first exposed 
to clues, in the fom of sentences, which they were asked to rate on a scale of truthfulness 
for the purpose of coilecting &ta for future studies. Apart h m  two mer sentences, 
which preceded and foUowed the due sentences, the statements were alI  blatant dues to 
the nddles presented immediately following. For example, the sentence clue to the above 
riddle stated, "A minister mames several people each week" Participants who were 
informed about the potential helphhess of the eariier sentences solved significantly more 
problems t'an did people in a baseline condition, receiving no ptior sentences. 
Participants who were uninformed about the potential helpfùlness of these previous 
sentences, however, did not spontaneously rnake use of the sentence clues; their 
performance was statistically no Merent h m  that of the baseline group. 
Two replications of Perfeno et al., however, have demonstrated significant 
spontaneous m e r  by varying some of the original conditions. Bowden (1985) allowed 
participants longer amounts of tirne to work on the problems and found uninformeci 
participants to impmve signif'icantly in problem solving performance over the basehe 
group. h k h a r t  et al. (1988) ais0 obtained positive results by varying the manipulation of 
the due presentation. They presented the sentence dues in either a declarative fom, as  in 
Perfetto et al., or in a "puzzle" fm, where the information was conveyed as a puzzle 
followed momentarüy by a word that solved the p d e .  For example, the puzzle form of 
the "clergymann clue read, The  man mamed several women each week because it made 
him happy" followed by Slergyman." Although Lockhart et al. replicated Perfetto et al.'s 
findings of no significant Merences between the groups receiving the declarative 
25 
statement clues and the ôaseline group receiving no clues, their pde-form group did 
solve signüicantly more of the riddles t h .  were solved by the baseline group. Lockhart et 
al. suggested that the d t s  codd be undetstd by the fact that when presenting the 
sentence clues in a p d e  form, the processuig quired for their comprehension was more 
akin to the proceshg required by the subsequent riddles for their successhil solution. In 
other words, when the analogy is more simüar in form to the problem, it is more l k l y  to 
be spontaneously applied. 
Weisberg et al. (1978) attempted to demonstrate spontaneous m e r  effects using 
Dunckefs (1945) C a d e  problem. The task here is to a f k  a candle to a wall so that it 
wiil bum properly without dripping wax. Participants are provided with a candle, box of 
nails and book of matches. The solution to the problem is to dump the nails out of the 
box and attach the box to the waii as a candle holdet; achieving the solution rquires 
participants to realize the box c m  have multiple roles. Weisberg et al. had uninformed 
and infomed participants lem "candle - box" as one pair in a list of nine verbal paired 
associates More attempting the Candle problem. Control participants leamed "candle - 
papern dong with the eight Nler pairs. Again, although participants who were informed 
of the potential helpfulness of the previous task to solving the Candie problem perfonned 
significantly better on the problem than did controls, there was no significant difference 
between the control group and participants who had read the due pair but were Wunformed 
about its potentiai helpfulness. 
Landnun (1990) attempted to replicate Maier's (1931) r d t s  using the Two-String 
problem. Landmm brushed against one of the strings whik giving uninformeci participants 
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instructions relating to the problem. Informeci participants were told to thuik of a 
pendulum before they began working on the problem. Landmm found that infotmed 
participants were significantly more ükely to solve the probIem than wen contd 
participants who received no hints, either implicit or expiicit. On the otbet han& 
uninformed participants, who simply viewed the süing in motion, did not perform 
significantly be- than conttols. 
An even earlier study employing the Two-String problem to study tramfer did 
indicate spontaneous trader could be demoll~ttated, however, but only under fairly 
specüic conditions. Judson et al. (1956) had participants memorize eight five-word Iists. 
In the experimental group, one of these eight lists was a series of words relevant to the 
Two-String problem: tope, swing, pendulum, clock, and tirne. In the control groups, some 
of the lists to be memorized also contained one of these LLcritical" words, but they were 
presented with other wods in associative contexts irrelevant to the pendulurn solution. 
When the üsts of words were leamed and practiced over four days and the Two-String 
problem attempted on a fifth consecutive &y after a recall of the lists, Judson et al. found 
the experimental group to perfixm significaatly better than the control group. However, 
when such l e d g  was restricted to one day, with recall and the Two-String problem 
conducted on the following day, Judson et al. found the expehental group did not 
produce significantiy more pendulum solutions than did their controls. 
Judson et al. (1956) also investigated transfer on Maier's Hatrack problem. The 
Hatrack problem requires participants to construct a stable hatrack using only two boards 
and a C-clamp and is solved by wedging the two boards benveen the ceiling and flmr and 
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holding them in place with the C-clamp, with the clamp also senhg as a ho& Again, 
participants leamed üsts of woids before attempting the problem. One of the iists for the 
experimental group contained the words prop, reach, ceilmg, and floor. Again, 
some of these worQ o c c d  in the contd groups' lists, but in different associative 
contexts. The entire experiment, hcluding memorizing and recaUing the lists and 
attempting the Hatrack problem, was completed within one class hour. Here Judson et al. 
found the experirnentaî group significantly more k l y  to produce the correct "ceilhg to 
flooi' solution tàan the control groups. 
The most often-used problem in the study of analogid reasoning and infomed and 
spontaneous transfer has been Duncker's (1949 Radiation problem. The problem depicts a 
situation faced by a doctot who must find a way to use rays to destroy an inoperable 
tumour in his patient's stomach without destmying the healthy tissue surounding the 
tumour. The solution of interest is to sllnultaneously direct multiple low-intensity tays 
toward the tumour fkom varying directions. Much of the research on spontaneous ttansfer 
using the Radiation problem has investigated whether previous contact with story analogs, 
that is, stories which depict situations with similar problem sdngs,  goais and constraints 
but in different domains, beneft performance on the Radiation problem. For example, one 
such story is "The General" and describes a general who vows to capture a fortress sihiated 
in the middle of a country. There are many roads radiating out from the fortress. AU of 
the roads are mined, so that only small groups of men can safely pass over them. The 
general's solution is to divide his army into srna11 groups and dispiitch each group to the 
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head of a meten t  road. On his signal the groups proceed toward the fimess, where they 
meet and overtake it. 
The paradigm t y p i d y  used first requires participants to read and memorize or 
summarize the story analog in the guise of a aory r e d  experiment and then attempt the 
Radiation problem. Mo& participants are cued about the possible helpNness of the 
story analog; uninformeci participants are not Whiie many of the informeci participants 
produce the convergence solution, signiticantly fewer utljnformed people spontaneously 
transfer the convergence solution to the Radiation problem, either when the story and 
problem follow one another imrnediately (Gick & Holyoak, 1980, Expriment nr), or after 
a time delay (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989, Experiments II and m). Furtherrnore, 
augmenting the story analog with a staternent of the abstmct principle undedying the 
similar solution or by a visual diagram demonstrating the convergence solution does little 
to significantly increase the abüity of d o m e c i  participants to spontaneously transfer the 
convergence solution (Gick & Holyoak, 1983, Expetiments II & III). Indeed, to &te, 
dernonstrations of spontaneous transfer usmg the Radiation problem have k e n  evidenced 
under only constrained conditions, for example, providing two or more story analogs (Gick 
& Holyoak, 1983, Experiments IV, V, & VI), presenting instructions with the analogs that 
help focus participants' attention on important features (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989, 
Experiments IV & V), providing analogs which share many salient d a c e  similanties with 
the problem to be solved (Holyoak & Koh, 1983, and providing a visual diagram tbat 
maximizes the presentation of the intensity and ammation features that are important to 
solving the problem (Beveridge & Parkins, 1987). 
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Overail, the d t s  of research investigating spoataneous d e r  are quite 
surprising. In most of the studies reviewed, the delay between the encountet with relevant 
information or an analogy and the target p b I e m  was minimai, and one might expect that 
even the dernand characteristics of the experiment would suggest an association between 
the f i t  and second parts of the studies. The resuits also leave the implicit clue hypothesis 
on more tenuous scientific grounds. 1t would seems obvious that pre-senting a rather 
blatant, although unannounced, due to a pmblem would result in impmved probiem 
solving performance, but such a tenet cannot be assumed based on the r d t s  of the 
spontaneous aansfer research. Thus, if the 'implicit clue" explmation of incubation is to 
be considered M e r ,  subsequent investigation of the hypothesis is in order. 
Given the "testable" nature of the implicit clue hypothesis and the need for its 
further investigation, 1 began the investigation of the mechanisms involved in incubation 
by attempting to empirically validate the benefit that an encounter with implicit 
information related to the problem might have in incubation. It is also important to 
consider whether the various proposecl accounts of incubation might interact with one 
another to produce the incubation phenomenon. Although the thee reviewed hypotheses 
(unconscious processes or autonomous activation, forgetting fixation, and encounters with 
implicit dues) represent separate accounts of incubation proposed by Merent 
investigators, it is conceivable that a combination of some or aU of these mechanisns 
would best account for the beneficial effects of taking a break h m  a problem. Thus, 
three of the four following experiments test fot interactions of the implicit clue hypothesis 
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with a second proposeci mecbanism of incubation. Given the ment empirical 
demonstrations of the forgetting fixation hypothesis, 1 begeg by eexamining what role the 
implicit clue and forgetthg fixation hypotheses, and any interaction between them, might 
play in the incubation effect. 
Experiment 1, then, investigated the role that fixation and "chance" encounters with 
irnplicit clues play in incubation using a multi-item problem set, namely, word fragment 
completion. The resuits of this expehent indicated that participants spontaneously 
benefitted fiom an implicit clue presented during problem solving. However, no support 
for the role of forgetting fixation was bdicated, possib1y due to rnethodological problems 
manipulating fixation. 
Experiment II continueci an investigation of the hpiicit clue hypothesis with a 
problem solving set that pennitted the presentation of implicit ches during an incubation 
period. As weli, any interaction an implicit clue might have with forgetting fixation was 
tested by employing methods of manipulating fixation that had been previously 
demonstrateci to be reiiable. Results indicated tbat an implicitly ptesented clue benefitted 
performance on some version of each problem. In contrast, again there was no support 
indicated for the role of fixation. 
nie support found for the implicit clue hypothesis in Experiments I and II 
contrasted with the results of the spontaneous transfer literature and motivated the 
investigation of a new combination of mechanisms ptoposed to underlie incubation, 
namely, impiicit dues and autonomous spreading activation. Experiment III investigated 
the role of both implicit clues and autonomous activation in incubation and found that an 
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interaction between an implicit clue and autonomous activation beuer accotmted for the 
benefit acaed  during a period of time off task over lhat of an implicit clue done. 
With the role of impiicit clues in incubation supported in the fiAt thtee 
experiments, Exprriment TV focused on a further investigation of the autonomous 
activation hypothesis, the subject of few, if any, empirid tests to &te. Evidence of 
continuing problem-telated spreading of activation after cotlscious work on a problem has 
ended was examined Furthemore, the pattern of such activation over time was obsewed 
for both solved and unsolved problems. 1 predicted that if autonomous spreading 
activation is involved in the incubation effect, one might expect that such activation should 
persist longer for unsolved than solved problems. The r d t s  of Expriment IV were 
consistent with this prediction, providing M e r  support for the role of autonomous 
activation. 
Heeding Woodwonh and Scblosberg's (1954) advice to begin the study of 
incubation with the mast "testable" hypotheses, Experiment I was designed to M e r  
investigate the role that fixation and encounters with implicit clues, and any interaction 
among these factors, might play in the incubation effect. As noted above, there appears to 
be evidence both supporting (e-g., Brome & Cruse, 1988; Dreistadt, 1969; Maier, 193 1; 
Mednick et al., 1964) and failing to support (e-g., Beveridge & Parkins, 1987; Catrambone 
& Holyoak, 1989; Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 1983; Landnim. 1990; Olton & Johnson, 1976; 
Perfetto et al., 1983; Weisberg et al., 1978) the role of chance encounters with helpful 
environmental input, necessitating M e r  investigation of this hypothesis. 
If consistent support were indicated for the implicit clue hypothesis, however, this 
might mise some additional questions about other mechanisms hypothesized to be involved 
in incubation. One important question coocerns how much any beneficial effect of 
incubation would be explained by exposure to the due itself and what, if any, effects are 
due to tirne away fiom the ta& In other words, c m  the incubation effect be explained by 
simply providing the opportunity for contact with information related to the problem that 
might be available in the extemal environment? If so, then a clue should be equally 
successful in benefiting performance whether presented with or without a break from the 
task Altematively, cclues and t h e  away h m  the task might produce benefits over and 
above those of simply receiving a clue to the problem alone. 
Given the previous diable demonstrations of the forgetting fixation hypothesis in 
the laboratory, one might also wonder how diis hypothesis might come into play here. 
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Periiaps the answer to the above question depends on whether the pmblem solver is 
incorrectly fixated on the pmblem. For example, it may be that when the pmblem solver 
is not Uicortectiy fixateâ, or is on the right track to solving the problem, relevant 
information is best presented during continuous problem solvhg with no incubation period. 
However, when the problem solver is incorrectiy fixateci on the problem, it might be better 
to take herlhis mind off the task for a penod of the,  to d o w  fixation to decrease, before 
coming in contact with dues fkom the environment. In this way, there would be more of 
an opportunity for relevant information in the environment to sperk different 
representations of the problem, rather than this uiformation becoming somehow integrated 
into the old incorrect problem representation. 
Expriment 1 compared the influence of an incubation period alone and an 
incubation p e n d  followed by incidental exposure to relevant clues under conditions where 
participants were either comtly or incorrectly fixated on the problem. The problem 
solving task employed was word fragment completion (e.g., given LIL1-r- ,et", participants 
were to respond with "clarinet"). F i t i o n  was manipuiated within-subjects by preceding 
each of the word fragments with either a relevant associate to the fragment solution 
(correct fixation) or a mis ldng ixcelevant word (i icomt fixation). In both cases, 
participants were led to believe that the preceding word would be related to the solution to 
the fragment. Incubation was manipuiated between-subjects; half of the participants took a 
ten-minute rest break afler atternpting al1 of the word bgrnents once, before attempting 
unsolved fragments a second the. Half of the participants also received irnplicit clues to 
the word fragments; the remaining half did not. The participants who were exposed to 
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implicit dues received them either after the incubation period or during continuous 
problem solving with no incubation p e r i d  The implicit clues were presented by having 
participants make lexical decisions to words and nonwotds while worhg on each 
fiagrnent The words presented were always helpful and teiated to the parti& word 
fragment; the nonwords, which closdy resembled words, were not relevant to the word 
fragments. 
X predicted a main effect of fixation; tbat is, participants should perform more 
poorly on trials where they were inconectly k t e d  than correctly fixated. 1 expected the 
effect of incubation to Vary with correct vernis incorrect fixation. The incubation pend 
should improve performance in cases where participants were originally i n c o m d y  fixated 
on the problem, based on the results of Smith and coileagues (Smith & Blankenship, 1989; 
1991; Smith & Vela, 1991). In cases where participants had been correctly fixated on the 
problem, the incubation penod should have l e s  of an effkct. With respect to the impücit 
clue, 1 expected that king ex@, even incidentaiiy, to helpfd infornation during task 
completion would improve performance on both comctly and incorrectly fixated trials. 
However, 1 also expected that whether an implicit clue was more helpful with or without a 
preceding incubation period wouid depend on whether the participant was correctly or 
incorrectly fixated on the word Fragment. In cases where incorrect kat ion had occurred, I 
predicted the hplicit clue would be most helpful after an incubation pend Here the 
incubation period should allow oid sets to "die out," permitting the participant to retum to 
problem solving with a €te& mind. The implicit chie might then help the person to think 
about the problem in a new, more correct way. In contrast, in cases where participants 
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were previously conectiy fixated, it would not be as important for the implicit due to be 
presented after an incubation period; it may help equally as much without the time off 
tas k 
f artici~ants 
Sixty University of Waterloo undergraduate students, 28 males and 32 fernales, 
volunteerd to participate to gain credit towards their Uitroductory psychology 
course. Participants ranged in age h m  18 to 54 years, with a mean of 20 years. To 
volunteer, participants were required to have nonnai or correcteci-to-normal vision and 
good famüiarity with the EngIish language. Thirty participants were assigned to an 
incubation condition and 30 to a no incubation condition. Half of the participants, 15 in 
each of the incubation and no incubation conditions, were asigned to the implicit clue 
condition; the remaining 15 in each of the incubation groups were assigned to a condition 
where no implicit information was received. 
Ma terials 
The problem solving task used was word fragment completion. The task involved 
filling in the missing letters to 50 graphemic word fragments to create wotds, for example, 
a -1-t- - et" for "clarinet" Many of the fragments were taken h m  Tulving, Schactet, & 
Stark (1982) and Gibson & Watkins (1988), both of which are sources of word fragments 
having unique solution words, that is, allowing oniy one legitimate cornpletion. Additional 
word fragments were also developed to have unique solutions using a 180,000 word- 
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To manipulate correct and incorrect fixation, an associateci word and a misleadhg 
word were developed for each of the word fiagments. The associates weie highly related 
to the completed w d  fîagments according to noms of w o d  d a t i o n s  (Palermo & 
Jenkins, 1% Postnian & Keppel, 1970). For example, the d a t e d  word for the word 
fragment "clarinet" was Wute." Incorrect fixation was manipuîated by using misleading 
words, which were associates of words other than the completed word bgment they were 
associated with, or any of uie word fragments used in the present study. The misleadhg 
word for "clarinet" was "stand." 
To manipulate exposure to implicit information related to the word fragments, clues 
and non-clues were also developed for each word fragment. The clue worcis were also 
associates of the completed word hagments, as reported in Palenno and Jenlans and 
Postman and Keppel. For example, the clue word for "clarinet" was "reed." The non- 
clues were nonwords, designed to closely resemble actual words, that were not relevant to 
any of the word fragments used The nonwords were developed by reversing two letteis of 
an actual word The nonword for "clarinet" was 3nernohe." Appendix A presents a List 
of the 50 word fragments as weil as each of their associated words, misleading words, 
implicit clue words, and non-flue nonwotds. 
Procedure 
On entering the laboratory, participants were asked to read over the idormation 
Letter and sign the Consent Form (see Appendix B). Participiuit~ were initially told that 
they would be asked to solve 50 diffïcult word fiagments and that they would see an 
associate of a solution to the word hgment  before each fragment was presented. They 
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were told to complete the fragment with any comctly spelied w o d  Participants were 
given five practice triais to familiarize them with the task; the procedure for the practice 
trials was identical to the main experiment (see below). The practice trials included only 
associated and not misleading words, and, if present, a non-clue rather than a due word. 
The practice trials and 50 word ftagments were completed on a 486 IBM compatible 
cornputer using a standard VGA monitor. AU stimuli were presented in lower case. 
In the main experiment, the order of presentation of the word hgments was 
randomized for each participant. Each trial began Mth a fixation symbol, placed centraiîy 
on the screen for 1500 rnilliseconds (ms). Foliowing the fixation symbol, the associated or 
misleading word was displayed for 700 ms. The presentation of either the associated or 
misleading word was randomized, except that in the k t  three trials related associations of 
the word fiagments were always presented. Forty of the 50 word fiagments were preceded 
by an associated word; ten were preceded by a misleading word. Because of the hi& ratio 
of associated to misleading words, participants were led to believe by experience that the 
associates preceding the word fiagments were accurate and helpful ai& to solving the 
fragments. It was therefore expected that participants would presimie the misleading 
associate as potentially helpfd and become "stuck" or incomectly lkated on it as a way to 
think about the answer for the word fragment. 
After the presenbtion of either the associated or misleading word, the word 
fiagrnent was displayed. If completed correctly, the fragment was removed fkom the 
screen after the participant pressxi [Enter]. If not completed accunitely, the hgment  
remained on the screen untiI the maximum time limit had been reached, at which time the 
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m e n t  was removed and a new trial begun. Both accuracy and reaction t h e  (RT) to 
complete the âagments were measiited 
The maximum working t h e  b i t s  permitted on the word hgments varieci with 
respect to participants' incubation condition. Hdf of the participants were assignecl to an 
incubation condition and the remaining haIf to a no incubation condition. In the incubation 
condition, participants worked on each of the 50 fragments for a maximum of 30 seconds, 
twk a ten-minute rest internai in which they played a simple cornputer garne, and then 
attempted again any unsolved hgments, each for another 3eSecond pet id  The second 
30-second problem solving period proceeded exactly as described above except that the 
word fragments were not preceded by their associate words. No preceding associated or 
misleading words were displayed in pst-incubation trials. Participants in the incubation 
condition were inforrned about it only at the point in time when it occurred. At this t h e ,  
they were told that another factor of problem solving being investigated was the 
helpfulness of an incubation period, or break in problem solving. They were told they 
would take a rest break for ten minutes and then r e m  to solving some more word 
fragments again. Participants were not told, however, that they would attempt again the 
fragments not initidy solved. Participants in the no incubation group simply worked on 
each word fragment for a continuous 60-second period with no intervening rest interval. 
Half of the participants, 15 in each of the incubation and no incubation conditions, 
were exposed to implicit clues to the word fragments by fesponding to a lexical decision 
task mid-way through their attempt to solve each word fragment. This clue was designed 
to be implicit in the sense of participants coming across information without having any 
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prior reason to suspect it may be he1pfi.d to the paaicuiar problem, similar to wbat might 
happen in everyday He. Participants assigneci to the implicit due condition were told, in 
their initial instructions to the task, tbat one factor of probiem soiving being investigated 
was the effect of disniptions on problem solving performance and that they would receive 
some disnrptions while w o r h g  on some of the word fragments. They were informeci that 
either a word or a nonword wouid flash on the screen at some point while they were 
working on the fiagment. They were asked to respond as quickly as they could to iden* 
the letter string as a word or nonword and then get back to solving the main problem, the 
word fragment. Participants were never explicitly infonned of the potentiai helpfulness of 
the lexical decision tasks. 
The letter strings presented for lexical decision were always presented at 32 seconds 
into the problem solving on a particular word fragment, regardles of whether an 
incubation perioà occuned or not. Thus, for the no incubation group, the letter string 
occurred 32 seconds into their 60second continuous attempt at solving the word fiagment, 
provided the fiagment had not been solved by this the. In the incubation condition. the 
lexical decision task occurred two seconds into their second attempt at solving originally 
unsolved fragments. The letter strings were disphyed for 700 ms and appeared in various 
locations on the screen. Participants responded by pressing "Y" for a word and W" for a 
nonword. Once the letter string had been displayed on the screen, the 'Y" and "N* were 
the only chatacters accepted untii one or the other had been pressed. At this point, 
participants couid resume working on the word fragment. Haif of the letter strings were 
words and half were nonwords for hgments originally presented with both associateci and 
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misleading words. Besides this constraint, the assigrnent of a word or nonword to a 
particular word fragment was random. The words were implicit clues telated to the 
particular word fragment the participant was working on. The nonwords, which cIose1y 
resembled words, were not helpfd or relevant to the paaicular word fiagrnent Both 
accuracy and RT to the letter strings were measured. The 30 participants not assigned to 
the implicit clue condition simply attempted the word fragments with no intervening 
lexical decision tasks. 
Participants took, on average, about one hour to complete the entire task On 
completion, participants were debriefed about the purpose of the study, hcluding the 
deception that occmed, and received a written description of the study (see Appendix C). 
During the debriefing, participants were asked for theV perceptions about whether they 
found the associateci words he1ph.i and the incubation p e n d  helpfid (if asçigned to the 
incubation condition). Participants were also asM if they ever noticed that the words in 
the lexical decision task wete sometimes related to the word fragments. 
Results 
Tables la and lb display the mean percentage of corredy and inconectly h t e d  
fragments solved before and afler 30 seconds, the point before which both incubation and 
the lexical decision "distracter" tasks were introduced. Analyses tested the predicted 
effects of fixation, incubation, and implicit clues, as weil as the interaction between these 
factors. 
Table la 
Mean Percentage of Fragments Soked Before JO seconds 
UicorrectFixation 13.3 11.5 
C o m t  Fixation 60.3 14-4 
Table lb 
Mean Percentage of Fragments Soived APLer 30 seronds 
- - - - - -- 
No Incubation incubation 
No Lexical L e x i d  No Lexical Lexical 
Decision Task Decision Task Decision Task Decision Task 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Incorrect Fixation 6-7 9.0 6.0 6.3 8.0 8.6 7.3 8.8 
Correct Fixation 5.8 4.2 7.5 5.3 4.3 3.3 4.3 2.6 
Fixation 
To investigate the success of the fixation manipulation before the introduction of 
either the incubation or implicit due manipulations, the proportion of incorrectiy fixated 
fragments solved before 30 seconds was compareci to the proportion of cotfectly fmted 
fragments solved before 30 seconds (see Table 1). Recall that conect and incorrect 
fixation were manipulated with the associated and misleadhg words. A MANOVA 
contrast revealed a significant effect of fixation, F (1,59) = 824.4, MS, = 80.4, p < .0001, 
with correctly fixated fragments king significantly more likely to be solved in the fht 30 
seconds of problem solving than incorrectly fixateci hgments. 
Incubation 
Analyses involving the incubation variable tested Uopvement scores. 
hnpmvement scores were proportion scores dculated separatdy for correctiy and 
incorrectly fixaed fragments as: 
the number of fragments solved o n i ~  after 30 seconds lie.. between 30 and 60 secondsl 
the nwnber of hgments yet uiisolved at 30 seconds 
As predicted, a MANOVA with h t i o n  as a with-subjects factor and incubation as a 
betweennibjects factor revealed a signifiant fixation x incubation interaction F(1,58) = 
6.2, MS, = a . 5 ,  p c -021. As shown in Figuie 1, however, this interaction was largely 
due to decreased performance on correctly fixated fragments after an incubation period, 
rather than to the predicted increased perfomance on incorrectly fixateci fragments after 
incubation. Separate one-way ANOVAs comparing perfomuince with and without an 
incubation period were computed for correctiy and incorrectly fixated fragments. A 
significant difference wss indicated between the incubation and no incubation conditions 
for correctly fixateci fragments F(1,SS) = 7.0, MS, = 1 1 1.8, p c .01], with sipnincantiy 
more correctly h a t e d  fiagments solved in the no incubation tban in the incubation 
condition. Counter to predictions, however, there was no sigDificant difference in the 
proportion of fragments solved after 30 seconds between the incubation and no incubation 
conditions for incorrectly fixated fiagments [F(1,58) c 1, MS, = 93.3, p c .54]. Thus, 
providing a break in problem solving had the most effect on fiagrnents that had been 
comectly fixated by sipificantly decreasing performance after incubation; in contrast, 
intempting problem solving with an incubation period had linle effect on fragments on 
which participants had been originally incorrectly fixated. 
No Incubation hcub ation 
F i i  1. Meaa improvement scores for percent of 
correctly and incorrectly fixated hgments solved 
in the no incubation and incubation conditions. 
Im~licit Clue 
Simüar to the incubation factor, analyses involving tests of exposute to implicit 
clues to the word fragments were tested using improvement scores. Again, improvement 
scores were proportion scores caicuiated separately for conectly and incomctly fixated 
fragments 
as: 
the number of framnents solved onlv after 32 seconds (i-e.. between 32 and 60 seconds) 
the number of fragments yet uasolved at 32 seconds 
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The effect of receiving irnplicit information about currently attempted word 
fiagments was tested in two ways. Fht, this effkct was tested by comparing the lexical 
decision condition to the no lexical decision condition. Compatisons were made between 
participants assigneci to the lexical decision condition, and thus exposed to both clue words 
and non-due nonwords, and participants not assigneci to the lexical task condition, and 
therefore receiving no clue or non-due words. A MANOVA with fixation as a within- 
subjects factor and lexical decision task condition (present vernis absent) as a between- 
subjects factor Uidicated no signifiant main effects due to participating in the lexical 
decision task F(1,58) = 1.0, MS, = 104.4, p < .31], and no interaction between fixation 
and lexical decisions [F(1,58) c 1, MS, = 100.2, p < -611. 
Second, predictions about the effm of being exposed to implicit clues were tested 
using within-subjects cornparisons of performance on word fiagments where clue words 
were flashed for lexical decision to performance on hgments where non-due nonwords 
were presented for lexical decision. A MANOVA with the two within-subjects factors of 
fixation and clue type (word versus nonword) revealed a significant main effect of due 
type p(1,21) = 6.8, MS, = 233.1, p c .02], with fragments having an implicit clue word 
flashed for lexical decision king more Likely to be eventually solved than fragments in 
which the non-clue nonword had been displayed (see Figure 2). No fixation x irnplicit 
clue interaction was found F(1,21) < 1, MS, - 152.2, p e -691. Thus, regatdless of 
whether participants were correctly or inconectly fixated on a fragment, an implicit 
encounter with information related to that hgment increased the likeliiood of evenhially 
solving it. 
Non- Clue Nonword Che lord 
Figure 2. Mean impmvement scores for percent of 
ftagments sdved when a nondue nonword v e m  a 
due word were presented as stimuius words in a 
lexical decision task, presenteà as a distrscter task 
to participants workiiig on word frsgrnents. 
Fixation x Incubation x Imolicit Che Interaction 
To test the piedicted fixation x incubation x implicit due interaction that the effect 
of an implicit clue would vary when presented with vernis without a preceding incubation 
period depending on participants' fixation status, a MANOVA with witbin-subjects factors 
of frxation and due type and a between-subjects factor of incubation was computed. No 
significant the-way interaction was revealed, however p(1,20) < 1, MS, = 158.7, p c 
-7 11. 
Discussion 
Foreettine Fixation Hmthesis 
Incorrect Fixation 
Expriment 1 failed to provide empirical support for the forgetting fixation 
hypothesis of incubation. This hypothesis explains the problem solver's initial inability to 
solve the problem as due to incorrect "sets" or fixations in cognitively representing the 
problem and the beneficial eff- of incubation as due to a forgetting of this initial 
incorrect set. The ciifference between the percentage of incorrectly fixated ftagments 
solved in the incubation condition (9.2 percent) and no incubation condition (7.7 percent) 
was minimal and nonsignificant. 
This result, of course, stands in contrast with a number of previous studies by 
Smith and coileagues that have demonstrated improved performance after an incubation 
period for problems on which participants had been initiaily inconectly fixated. The 
finding is particularly perplexing in light of even more recent work by Smith, Cam, & 
TindeU (1993 cf. Smith, 1995) tbat also used word fragments and demonstrated incubation 
effects. Here Smith et al. manipulateci correct and incorrect fixation by exposing 
participants to a preceding incidental ta& containhg both solutions to some of the 
subsequent word fragments (correct fixation) and words orthographicaily similar to 
fragment solutions that were not the solutions themselves (incorrect fixation). In 
cornparison to the proportion of hgments solved after king exposed to neutral words that 
were unrelated to the fragment solution, performance on fragments where correct fixation 
had been induced was eievated and performance where incorrect fixation had been 
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manipuiated was decreased. Smith et al. fond an incubation effect for the inco~tectly 
fixated cases; more of the fiagments where participants had ptevioudy seen the 
orthographicaltysitnilar word were solved on a retest that o c c d  after a delay than on 
an immediate retest, 
ûne explanation for the failme to find increased perEomuuice d e r  incubation on 
originaily incorrectly fixated fragments in the present study is the possibility that the 
difficulty level of the word fragments created a type of low ceüing level on the total 
potential percent of fiagments solved that could not be surpasse& regardles of whether 
incorrect fixation was present or absent. In the case where the participant had been 
originally incorrectly fixated on the fragment, received an incubation period, and then 
faced the hgment again, this tirne with no misleadhg word, perhaps the participant's 
failure to solve the fragment had nothing to do with whether they were incorredy k t e d  
or not, but rather had to do with the high difficuity level of the fragment Note that losing 
one's incorrect fixation does not necessady implicate gaining correct fixation; rather the 
individual is left without either incorrect or correct fixation, alch to what we might c d  a 
baseline level. It is possible that the fragments were very di"cdt to solve at such a 
baseline level, with no helphil associated word for guidance. 1 did, in fact, specificdy 
attempt to select difticult word fragments for the study to ensure that many of the 
fragments would not be solved during the first 30 seconds of problem solving, so tbat the 
manipulations of incubation and implicit due could be assesseci during the later 30 seconds 
of problem solving. The difficulty level of the word hgments is m e r  supporteci by the 
low solution rates of incorrectly fixated fhgments. Across aU conditions, participants 
48 
solved a mean of only 13.3 percent of incocrectly fixateci fiagments in their initial 30 
seconds of pmbIem solving and 203 percent over the totai 60 seconds. Thus, it is possible 
that, despite loshg the incorrect fixation, participants couid not find the correct fixation to 
solve significantly more of such ciifficuit word fkagments. 
A second possible explanation for the iack of signincmt incubation effixts for 
incorrectiy fixateci hgments is the prospect that the incorrect fixation manipulation was 
not powerful enough. Although there was a signifiant ciifference between the percent of 
correctly and incorrectly fixated fiagments sulved in the initial 30 seconds of problem 
solving (60.3 vems 13.3 percent, respectively), this difference could, conceivably, be due 
solely to the relevant associate word increasing performance above a hypotheticai baselme 
level, rather than the irrelevant misleadhg word decreasing performance below badine. 
Because there was no condition with no associate word, this badine level cannot be 
ascertained and compared to these values in this study. 
There were several ciifferences between the way fixation was rnanipdated in the 
praent study as compared to the Smith et al. study, which did demonstrate positive 
incubation effects using word fiagrnents. Smith et al. attempted to manipdate "implicit 
fixation;" participants were not told of any relation between the prior incidental task where 
they saw the fragment solutions and onhogtaphically--simüat "blockers," yet king exposed 
to these stimuli affected their later performance. The fixation manipulation here was more 
explicit: Participants were specifically told that the preceding woids should be helpful in 
solving the fragments. Peshaps it is &et to "do away with" this more expücit type of 
fixation, after one's initial attempts at the ptoblem yield no gains. hplicit fixation may 
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affect participants' representation of the problem wne subtly, perhaps without their 
complete awareness, and may therefore be more dificuit to discard. 
A second Merence between the Smith et al. study and the present experiment in 
the way fixation was manipulated is the use of orthographie vernis semantic fixation. 
Smith et al. attempted to mate incorrect fixation by blocking the correct fragment solution 
by an orthographically-similar w o d  In the present study, incorrect fixation was 
manipulated sernanticdy by preceding fiagments with misleading associates to theu 
solutions. It is posible tbat manipdating fixation on word fiagments is more potent 
orthographically than semantically b u s e  of the "data-driven" nature of the problem 
solving task 
Correct Fixation 
Although incubation made no signifiant clifference for cases where participants 
were incorrectly f i e d  on the word hgments, it did significantly alter performance for 
correctly fixated cases. When participants had k e n  previously conectly fixateci on the 
fragment, the incubation condition significantly decreased performance compared to cases 
where no incubation pend occurred and participants were permitted to work continuously 
on the fragment. In the incubation condition, participants would originally be given a 
relevant and helphil associate to the problem solution and sometbe later, after attempting 
other word hgmenîs and spending ten minutes off task, they attempted the word fragment 
again. By this time, participants likely had difficdty remembering the associateci word 
and, without it, had more difficulty solving the fiagment; in essence, participants here 
forgot their correct fixation. 
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This bding may have implications for previous work on incubation. It is possible 
that when the poblem solver is conectly fixated, or is on the "right tracl? to solving the 
problem, taking a break ftom the problem may achially impair perfotmance. Revious 
literature on incubation, includuig the îiterature investigating the influence of fixation on 
incubation, however, has not discussed any possible detrimental effects of incubation when 
conedy fixated on a pmb1em. h is possible that some of the previous faaura to 
empiricdy demonstrate incubation may be partially explained by invoking this 
exphnation: Perhaps the beneficial and &trimental effects of incubation, for problem 
solvers who are respectively incorrectly and correctly fixated, cancel each other out. The 
multi-item problem solving task used in the present study, however, wodd seem to 
increase the probability of finding impaired perfomance afier incubation when correctly 
fixated; here it would be very difticult for participants to recall the 50 associate words 
afier working on intervening fragments and taking ten minutes off task In anecdotai 
reports of incubation, individu& are mast often working on one main larger and more 
cornplex problem. It would be interesting to investigate whether sùnüar results of 
incubation impairhg performance on conectly fixated problems occur when using one 
main problem type, where there is l e s  to "forget" as opposed to a 50 multi-item problem 
set. 
Im~licit Clue Hnmthesis 
When participants received the due word during the lexical decision "distracter" 
task, they solved significantly more worâ fragments than when they teceived the nonclue 
nonword. Thus, participants in ihis study did spontaneously make use of implicit 
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information in their environment, a finding which stands in contrast to the buk of the 
literahue on spontaneous h i d e r  in problem solving. The clue presented was meant to be 
implicit in the sense of participants not king told of any relation between it and the word 
fragments; inSead they were told it was part of a distracter task Participants' retrospective 
subjective reports pmvide support for this implicit quality; when asked afterwards, many of 
participants did not recognize any relation between the lexical decision words and the word 
fragments they were working on and were quite surpriseci that there was indeed such a 
relation. 
The reports of k ing  unaware of the lexical decision letter strings as clues are 
consistent with Maiet's (1931) finding that few participants reported the "swinging" hint as 
heipfd in leading them to the solution. Such reports support a conclusion that participants 
have been unconsciously influenced, in the sense of theù being unaware of the influence of 
the lexical clue word on their problem solvhg behaviom (Bowers, 1987). This finding, 
however, is inconsistent with Browne & Cruse (1988), who found that knowledge of the 
due-value of the implicit hint did affect its IüceLihood of leading to a solution. Although 
the implicit clue hypothesis itseif does not depend on whether participants are conscious or 
'unconscious' of the influence of the clue, the mechanisms through which an implicit due  
may affect behaviour pose an interesthg question. A p t - h o c  analysis was computed 
comparing the percentage of fragments solved with the implicit due  word for participants 
who later reported noticing a comection between these words and the word hgments and 
participants reporthg king wlsiware of such a connection. A MANOVA of percentage of 
fragments solved with a clue word as a wiuiin-subjects factor and noticing versus not 
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noticing as a between-subjects factor indicated no sisnifiant main effect of noticing 
[F(1,20) c 1, MS, = 337.1, p c -821. Participants solved rehtively equal numbers of 
fragments with the help of the implicit clue r e g d e s s  of whether they noticeâ or did not 
notice the relation of the clues to the word hgments. Thus, dissuailar . * .  to Browne and 
Cruse, the d t s  of this exploratory anaiysis seem to indicate tbat kmwledge of this 
relation is not necessary for its e f f m  
Although the generalized conclusion h m  the spontaneous trander literature 
suggests that people are unable to spontaneously benefit h m  an implicit clue or analogy 
(Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 1983; Landrum, 1990; Perfetto et 
al., 1983; Weisberg et al., 1978). the present study seems to Uidicate that participants did 
just that. Several differences exist between the present study and the research on 
spontaneous tramfer that might help explain these dinerential findings. One difference 
concems the context of presentation of the implicit clue. In the present study, the implicit 
clue was received in the problem solving context itself, that is, wnile participants were 
working on the word fragments. In other studies finding nuii effects, the clue or analogy 
is presented in a separate context. The manner of clue presentation in the present study 
makes it difficdt to draw strong conclusions about the implicit due hypothesis, as it is yet 
unknown whether a clue presented during a period of time off the problem will also 
significantly benefit performance. Note, however, tbat the presence of an implicit clue did 
not interact with incubation; it was equally beneficial to receive a clue with no incubation 
as afier a period of tirne off task, suggesting tbat an implicit clue can be helpful even when 
not presented during continuous problem solving. 
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Aithough this study laid some groundwork by demonstrating that, undet some 
conditions, people can spontaneously make use of impiicitly-presented, problem-related 
Uiformation, M e t  iesear~h is necessary to investigate whether this process can occur 
during an incubation period. The problem solvïng task used in the present study, of 
course, is Iess amenable to this design; it would seem a lot to expect tbat flashhg 50 clue 
words to participants during an incubation pend would significantly benefit their 
performance. Again, it would seem that using larger more complicated problem types 
would be more usefiü for this purpose, as implicit clues to the problem couid then be 
presented during the time off task with realistic expectations that memory traces of the 
dues would be present on retuming to the problem. 
The context of the ptesentation of the clue word in the present study may also have 
implications for the finding, diiussed above, that the effect of a due word on word 
fragment performance did not depend on a priori knowledge of its flue stanis. Because of 
the temporal proximity of the clue word to its associateci word hgment, it is very likely 
that some representation of the clue word, even if faded, persisteci after the participant 
retumed to working on the fragment. In Browne and Cnise's study, the implicit due was 
presented diirllig the acnial incubation period, that is, during a break away h m  the 
problem. In this case, it rnay be more important for the problem solver to be a w m  of the 
potential helpfulness of the stimulus on encomtering it, so s/he can maintain its 
representation in active memory, thereby making it avaiiable upon retum to the problem. 
Counter to predictions, the presence of an implicit clue did not interact with 
fixation or incubation. Thus, both correctly and incmectly fixated participants benefited 
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e q d y  h m  the clue word with no incubation period or Unniedîately after an incubation 
period The explanations discussed in the Incociect Fixation' section above, with respect 
to the diffidty level of the fiagrnents and the possible failure to a d y  manipulate 
inconect fixation, may also be impiicated in the fdure to find that impiicit dues are best 
presented after an incubation period fot inc0~ect.l~ fixated -en& but with no 
intervening incubation for correctly- fixateci fragments. 
In summary, M e r  research is requited to clarify several teSul& h m  the present 
study. For one, M e r  investigation of the role of forgetting fixation in incubation is 
necesary to determine if the fdwe to validate the beneficial role of incubation for 
incorrectly fixated problems (which stands in contrast to previous work by Smith and 
colleagues) in Expriment 1 was due to the difficulty level of the word fragments or 
diffculties manipuiating incorrect fixation with this pmblem set, or whether such results 
Uidicate that forgetting fixation fails to improve performance after incubation in some 
cases. Secondly, the possib1e detrimental effects of incubation for problems on which 
participants aie conectly fixateci requires further investigation on tasks other tban muiti- 
item problem sets which help to guarantee the forgetting of multiple fixations. F M y ,  to 
furthet investigate the implmt clue hypothesis, it wodd be necessary to determine if 
people can make use of irnplicit dues that are presented during an incubation pend rather 
than duMg problem solving. Experiment II attempted to address these issues. 
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ExDeriment II 
ExpeNnent Il contùiued an investigation of the role of fixation and implicit clues in 
the incubation eEect Experiment I's fdure to replicate the red i s  of eatlier studies 
demonstrating impmved pefiomance aftet incubation when participants are incorrectly 
fixated necessitated m e r  investigation of the role of incorrect fixation in incubation. 
This was attempted in Experiment II by employing, in most cases, previously empirically 
demonstrated methods of manipulating fixation on freqipently used problems. As welI, 
following from the d i s  of Experiment I, the role of incubation in cases where 
participants are "on the right track," or comtly  fixated, in theu problem solving was 
investigated using, in most cases, problems not involving a succession of multiple items. 
The implicit clue hypothesis was M e r  investigated by determinhg whether impücit 
information presented in a separate context during time away fnmi the problern, rather than 
in the context of the problern solving itself, affafted later performance on the problem. 
The word fiagrnent completion task of Experiment 1 was replaceci by insight 
problems. Three well known imight-type problems were d: Dunckefs (1945) Candle 
problem and Radiation problem, and a series of ten Remote Associate Test (RAT) items. 
The task in the C d e  problem is to affk a candle to a waU so that it wül bum proprly 
without dripping wax using only a restricted number of abjects that includes a box of mils. 
The solution to the problem is to dump the naüs out of the box and attach the box to the 
wall as a candle holdet. The Radiation problem depicts a situation faced by a doctot who 
must find a way to use rays to destroy an inoperable tumour h a patient's stomach without 
destroying the healthy tissue surtounding the tumour. The solution of intenst is to 
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simultaneously direct multiple low-Uitensity rays toward the tumour h m  varying 
directions. The RAT items each consist of thne w o d ,  with the object being to find one 
word that is related to al l  three. 
Participants were either initially correctiy or i n c o d y  fixated on each problem. 
As much as possi'ble, this fixation was based on manipulations used in prior -ch. For 
exampie, an early study by Glucksberg & Weisberg (1966) investigated factors affecthg 
fùnctional fixedness on the Candle problem. Using a paper-and-pend group form of the 
Candle problem, in theu first experiment, Glucksberg and Weisberg had participants 
attempt the pmblem in one of three conditions that vaiied with respect to labels that were 
provided for the objects in the problem. In one condition, Glucksberg and Weisberg 
provided labels for al l  of the objects in the picture, including the c a d e ,  tacks, box, and 
matches. In another condition, only the label "tacks" appeared on the box. F M y ,  in a 
third condition, which presented the original fom of the problem, no labels were provided. 
Glucksberg and Weisberg found signifiant ciifferences between the "all labelleci" condition 
vernis the 'tacks" only and no labeiiing groups with a higher number of correct solutions 
given as the initial solution to the problem in the "all labeiied" group. No significant 
ciifferences were found between groups in the nurnber of total cowct solutions given, 
however, as most people did eventually solve the problem given enough time to do so. 
Similarly, their second experiment, w k h  used time to solve, rather than percent solved as 
the dependent variable, and a manipulative, rather than paper-and-pencil problem form, 
ais0 fond the "ail labelledn condition solved the Candle problem significantly taster than 
did the ''tacks" only and no labehg groups. Thus, it would appear that labelhg all the 
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objects in this problem helps to direct participants' attention towaids the box, the criticai 
object necessary for its solution, tbereby inducing comct fixation. In contrast, providing 
no labelling, or labellimg the box only with %ch,," maintains participants' incorrect 
fixation on the box as only a %ol&r" of the tach, rather than as an object to be used 
independently in the pmblem. 
Each problem in the present study was ais0 presented in a different condition that 
varied with respect to incubation, and included: (1) a no incubation period, where 
participants worked continuously on the problem for the fidl arnount of tirne dotteci, (2) 
an incubation period during which participants worked at an unrelated activity (no clue 
incubation), and (3) an incubation perîod in which participants worked at a task containhg 
helpful information relevant to the problem at hand (clue incubation). The related and 
unrelated activities developed to administer to participants during the incubation period 
also relied heavily on previous work, in areas such as spontaneous tfaasfer in problem 
solving. To assess the importance of participants recognuing the due-value of the 
incubation activity in benefiting their hter performance, participants were in te~ewed  post- 
experimentally about their awareness of the clues presented during incubation. 
Simüar to Experiment 1, 1 was interesteci in the effects of an incubation penod, in 
and of itself, vernis an incubation petiod containhg an implicit clue to the problem. 1 
expected the effect of the incubation period alone (i.e., the incubation period that did not 
inchde the implicit due) to vary depending on whether the participant was initially 
correctly or incorrectly fixated on the problem. Again, according to the forgetting fixation 
hypothesis, the incubation period, alone, or without a clue, should benefit participants who 
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were originaüy i n c o d y  fixated, because it allows time off task to lose one's fixation. 
With respect to correctiy fixated participants, based on the d t s  of Experirnent I, 1 was 
interested in whether the incubation period alone wouid impair peifbmance by intempting 
participants when they were on the Wght traclc" to prob1em solwig. 
According to the implmt due hypothesis, however, the d r e s u l t s  shouid be different 
in cases where participants receive a task containhg a clue during theV incubation petiod. 
Here, it might be expected that the incubation period would be helpful regardles of 
whether the participant was correctly or incorrectly fixated, due to the facüitating effects of 
coming in contact with the implicit clue. According to Maier (1931) and the r d t s  of 
Experiment 1, participants' awareness of the connection between the implicit clue and the 
problem shouid be unrelated to the clue's impact on their performance. However, 
according to Browne & Cruse (1988) whose study more methodologidy resembles the 
present expriment, the clue's ability to benefit performance should depend on an 
awareness of it- 
Method 
Partici~ants 
Eighty-nine University of Waterloo undergraduate students, 56 males and 33 
fernales, volunteered to participate to gain partial credit towards their inaoductory 
psychology course. Participants ranged in age h m  18 to 44 years, with a mean of 21 
years. Participants were randomly assignai to one of nine different uordes," which varied 
with respect to the presentation ocder of the problems and the incubation conditions (no 
incubation, due incubation, and no clue incubation). 
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Materials 
The paper-and-pend version of DuncWs (1945) Candle pmbiern (Glucksberg & 
Weisberg, l%6), Gick & Holyoalr's (1983) version of Dimcker's (1945) Radiation problem 
and a series of ten RAT items, takem from Smith & Blankenship (1991), sefved as the 
problem solving tasks. 
Correct and incorrect fixation were manipulated separately for each problem. 
Based on Gluckrberg and Weisberg's study, fixation was manipulateci for the Candle 
problem by labelling either a l l  of the objects in the problem, including ucandle*y "box*, 
%ails", "hammer" and "matches" (correct fixation), or providing ody the label on 
the box (incorrect fixation). A neutrai form of the problem, admwstered to participants 
after their incubation period, was also developed and consisted of the exact same problem 
description and visuai picture, but included no labels on any of the objects in the picture 
( s e  Appendices D, Ey and F for the correct and incorrect fixation and neutrai f o m  of the 
Candle problem). 
The correct and incorrect fixation forrns of the RAT items were taken directiy from 
the previous work of Smith & Blankenship (1991) and essentially sewe as an attempt to 
replicate part of this work Correct fixation was manipuiated by proviâing the h t  letter 
of the solution word for each RAT item, which previously has been found to significantly 
irnprove performance on these RAT items (Expriment II, Smith & Blankenship, 199 1). 
The wiitten instructions on these! problems alerted participants that the initiai letter of the 
solution was provideci. Inconect fixation was induced by placing, in parentheses, next to 
each of the dvee RAT stimulus words, a word tbat was an associate to that stimulus word, 
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but unrelated and inappropriate to the correct solution word. Here, the written instructions 
made note tbat the wods in parentheses were examples of the b d  of ass0clCates h t  were 
correct solutions to the problems, as pet Smith and BIankenship. The neutrai version of 
the RAT items presented the three stimulus words with no -ated words or initial 
solution letters (see Appendices G, H, and 1 for the correct and incorrect fixation and 
neutd versions of the RAT items). 
To my knowledge, there has been no previous work manipulating correct versus 
incorrect fixation on the Radiation problem. In the present study, €ixation was manipulated 
on this problem by directing participants' attention to a single word to % S c  ot" as they 
worked on the problem. In the correct fixation fom, the statement, 'Think of: Multiple* 
foilowed the problem description; in the incorrect fixation version the word %tensity" 
replaced "Multiple." "Multiple" was selected to represent correct fixation because it is a 
concept critical to the convergence solution, the solution of interest here. "Intensity" was 
chosen to induce incorrect fixation because it is quite unrelated to the convergence solution 
and reinforces the incorrect idea that hi& intensity rays must be used to kill the tumow. 
In addition, employing high-intensity rays in some way was a solution generated by a 
nwnber of Duncker's original participants, and thenfore may be proficient in "hooking" 
participants into this line of thinking. In the neutral version, the problem was presented 
alone with no "Think OP statement (see Appendices J, K, and L for the correct and 
incorrect fixation and neuaal f o m  of the Radiation problem). 
To manipulate exposure to impiicit clues during the incubation period, several taslcs 
were developed for participants to work on during their tirne off the problem. These were 
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based on tasb used previously in the spontaneous transfkt iiterature. To preserve the 
implicit qualjty of clues presented, the tasks were designeci to be self-contaùied and to 
have as liale mani f i  cortespondence with their asociated pmblems as possible. 
The incubation task for the Cade problem telied on an earlier study by Weisberg 
et al. (1978) investigating aansfer fiom leaming the paired associate Ucande - box" to 
performance on the Candle problem (see above). In the present study, participants 
receiving a clue incubation period were asked to commit to mernory a list of 20 paired 
associates, with the last associate king the criticai "candie - box" pait, during their break 
fiom the Candle problem. In the no clue incubation petiod, where participants received an 
incubation penod but no implicit clue to the problem, a ta& identical to the one above was 
completed, except that the last pair on the list was "candle - paper," rather than "candle - 
box." Twenty paired associates were wd, rather than the nine used in the Weisberg et al. 
study, to ensure a certain level of difficuity and, thetefore, a minimum amount of time to 
complete the ta&. Because the incubation period was eight minutes long, it was necessary 
for participants7 t h e  to be Nled for the entire eight minutes. AU of the pairs were fairly 
highly associated (for example, 'table - chair"), except for the final pair. Both the lower 
level of association of this last pair and its position in the üst were expected to increase its 
salience to some extent (refer to Appendices M and N for the clue and no due Paired 
Associates Tash for the Candle problem). 
"The General" story (Gick & Holy* 1980), which depicts how a generd 
dispenses multiple s m d  groups of men down several different roads tbat intersect at a 
fortress was used as an implicit hint to the Radiation problem. Participants were first 
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asked to read the story and h n  to give a summary of it and make ratings of its 
plausibility and comprehemiity on a seven-point scale. h the no clue incubation, 
participants foiIowed an identical procedure, but with a diffetent story unrelated to the 
Radiation problem. The story used in the no clue condition was The Identical Twins" and 
was also taken fiom Gick & Holyoak (1980) (refer to Appendices O and P for the clue 
and no clue story incuhtion tasb for the Radiation problem). 
To expose participants to hplicit clues to the RAT items, 1 employed a procedure 
akin to the early work of Mednick et al. (1964). Simple analogy problems for each of the 
RAT item solution words were developed. In each case, the solution word was the word 
to be completed in the analogy. Ten "critical" analogies were developed. An example of 
a critical analogy is, Timb : Body as Branch : - - - - ", as "Tree" is a solution of one of 
the RAT items. Intersperseci with these critical analogies were d o g i e s  unrelated to any 
of the RAT items tbat served as "buffer" items. Several buffer items were included at the 
end of the Analogy Task to ensure participants' incubation time would be filled. Most 
participants, however, did not solve a i l  of the untelated b s e r  items at the end of the task 
A similar Analogy Task was developed for the no clue incubation group, consisting of the 
buffer items included above, as well as additional analogies unreiated to the RAT items 
(see Appendices Q and R for the clue and no clue Analogy Tasb for the RAT items). 
Desim 
Each participant received each of the t h e  problems in different conditions that 
varied with respect to the fixation and incubation factors. in each case, the correct fixation 
version of the first two problems was presented and the incorrect fixation form was the 1st 
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probiem attempted. This was done to avoid participants becouhg suspicious about 
misleadhg information king presented d y  in the expehent. Each problern was also 
presented in one of three different incubation conditions: (1) no incubation, which involved 
only continuous work on the problem, (2) no clue incubation, where performance was 
intempted to work at a task unrelateci to the problem, and (3) due incubation, where work 
on the interpolated activity containeci the impiicit clue or analogy related to the jxobiem 
k ing  attempted The order of these incubation conditions was counteibalanceâ, so that 
each condition appeared equaiiy as the fmt, second, and third problem attempted. As 
well, the order of the problems themselves was counterbalanced, so that each problem was 
presented equally as the first, second, and third problem to be solved This design resulted 
in nine different orders (see Appendix S) to which participants were randomly assigned. 
Procedure 
On entering the laboratory, participants were asked to read over the Mormation 
Letter and sign the Consent Form (see Appendix T). Participants were initially told that 
the study was investigating dierent factors involved in problem solving and that they 
would be asked to try to solve a few different problems. As well, participants were told 
that some of the problems would give them hkts about how to think about the problem so 
as to solve it. Participants were asked to signal the experirnenter as soon as they thought 
they had a possible solution to the problern, before recording it on paper. They worked 
individuaily and independently on the problem at a separate table while the experirnenter 
remained in the rmm. When they indicated having a solution, they were asked to verbally 
explain their solution to the experimenter. If the solution was incorrect, participants were 
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informecl of this and asked to continue wodàng to find the correct solution. if not solved 
before the time lirnit fot the pmblem had been reached, participants were sirnply told that 
they would move on to the next problem at this the. If participants' verbal descriptions 
indicated a correct solution, they were asked to record it on the page and tirne to solve was 
recorded by the experimenter. Because participants' verbal explanations of their solution 
twk varying amounts of time to descrii, time to solve was recorded at the participants' 
first mention of a possible solution. 
Participants were assigned to one of the above nine uor&rs" and solved each of the 
problems in a diiffereut condition, with respect to the fixation and incubation factors. Each 
person attempted the füst two problems in a correct fixation form and the final problem in 
an incorrect fixation version. As weU, participants solved one problem in each of the three 
incubation conditions, aamely, no incubation, due incubation, and no due incubation. 
When incubation occurreù, participants were infonned of it at the point of their break k m  
the problem, if,, of course, they had not previously solved the problem. At this point, they 
were told that one factor of problem solving being investigated was the effect of an 
incubation period, or taking one's mind off the problem, and that they would be asked to 
perform another task to take their mind off the current problem. Subsequently, either the 
problem-related (iiplicit clue) or unrelated (no clue) activity was aciministered during an 
eight-minute incubation period. After either the no clue or due incubation, participants 
retumed to the neutral veision of the problem and continueci working for the remahing 
time. Participants not receiving incubation were involved in continuous work on either the 
incorrectly or correctly fixateû version of the problem for the duration of the allotted the .  
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The maximum tirne permitted on the pmblern and the exact procedure tbat occurred during 
each of the incubation peiiods varied with the pmbrobiem king attempted, as follows. 
In the case of the C a d e  pmbIem, participants in both of the incubation groups 
initiaily worked on the pmblem for one minute. Because G1uchbetg & Weisberg (1966) 
found that most participants wül eventuauy solve the Candle pmblem given SLlfficient t he  
so that the most sensitive measure of petformance on this problem is time to solve, 1 gave 
participants a relatively short initial workirtg period before incubation was inttoduced so 
that factors relating to incubation might be evaluated using measutes such as time to solve. 
During the eight-minute incubation period, participants were involved in either the due or 
no clue version of the Paired Associates Task During the first three minutes, people were 
asked to r a d  over and memorize the 20 paired associates. After three minutes, the 
experimenter took the iist h m  the participant and read, as the stimulus words, each of the 
f i t  words in the pair, in a random faShion, with the critical pair, whether "candle - box" 
or "candle - paper" always coming k t .  Participants responded to each stimulus word with 
the target word, the word they recalled it being associated with. If no response occurred 
after approximately three seconds, the experirnenter went on to the next w o d  
Mer this fist memory test, participants were banded the iist of paired associates 
again and asked to take one more minute to study the pairs and prepare for a second 
memory test, "the other way around," that is, with the stimulus word of the previous test 
now king the target word and vice-versa. In achiality, participants' second study period 
varied in time, with the end of this pend occurring one-and-a-half minutes before the end 
of the eight-minute incubation period, to ensure that participants were actively involved for 
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the fidi eight minutes- At this point, the second and final memoty test accurred. Here, the 
experirnenter read as the stimulus words the second words on the list, in a random f a o n ,  
again with the exception that the critical pair came last. Participants were then told they 
would r e m  to the problem they had begun work on pteviousiy and were again reminded 
to signal the experirnenter as soon as they had a possiile solution. They were then given 
two more minutes to work on the neutral version of the Candle problem. Participants in 
the no incubation condition worked on either the correct or incorrect fixation version of the 
C a d e  problem for three continuous minutes. 
In the case of the Radiation problem, which has been found to be a more difficult 
problem (Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 1983), participants were given five minutes to work on 
the problem before king presented with either "The General" (implicit due) or T h e  
Identical Twins" (no due) story. In either case, they were asked to read over the story and 
were told they wouid be asked to summarim and recall the story aftet reading it. Each 
participant signaiied the experimenter after reading the story. At uUs point, a second page, 
with instructions to give a summary of the story and make ratings of its plausibility and 
comprehensiiility, was administered The story itself was placed to the si& of the 
participant so that s/he could refer to it if needed. Participants were asked, however, to 
complete the summary of the story in their own words. 
After eight minutes had passed, participants were informai of the end of incubation 
and their summaries were collected, regardles of their progress. Most participants were 
able to finish the Summaries, but not always the two ratings by this tirne. If participants 
did finish their sumaries before the end of the eight-minute period, they were asked to 
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read over their summaries and provide some more detaüs The justification given to 
participants for this concemed the need to spend a certain amount of time thinking of 
something other than the problem, and the nquirement that such a t h e  perid be 
consistent for a i l  participants. After incubation, participants were given anotber five 
minutes to work on the neutrai form of the Radiation problern. Participants in the no 
incubation condition worked continuously on the correct or incorrect fixation forrn of the 
Radiation problern for ten minutes. 
The ten RAT items were each inïtiaily attempted, consecutively, for one minute. 
During incubation, participants were asked to complete either the clue or no due form of 
the Analogy Ta& which they were told involved completing the blanks with the 
appropriate word and providing a brief explanation underneath for why the word "fit" in 
the space. Before beginning, participants were also given an example of an analogy. 
People rarely completed al l  of the analogies in the space of eight minutes, although most 
often the "critical" analogies were finished by this tirne. Again, the task was removed 
from participants at the end of the eight-minute time Mt, regardles of their pmgress. 
The Analogy Task was the only task presented duting incubation that relied on participants 
to generate the critical implicit due word thernselves. Thus, it was very important that 
participants responded with the correct words on critical trials on the due form of the task 
1 attempted, on such trials, to make the analogy solutions rather obvious, and, for the most 
part, participants completed the analogies as expected However, in some cases, 
participants chose words other than the critical words to complete the analogies. This, 
after removing the task h m  participants, the experimenter quickly scanneci the critical 
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items on the task In cases w h m  critical words were not uidicated, short periods of 
discussion e m e d  in which the experimenter curiously wondered about the person's 
reasoning on the particuiar d o g y  and then commented that another word for that analogy 
might be . . . (the cntical word). Directly d e r  finishg the Andogy Task, participants 
were given another minute to re-attempt each RAT item not solved on fifit attempt. 
People in the no incubation group simply worked on each RAT item for two continuous 
minutes in either the correct or incorrect fixation fonn. 
Both accuracy (solved versus unsolved) and solution time were measured for all 
problems. Mer attempting al l  t h e  problems, participants were asked if they had ever 
heard of or seen any of the problems they had worked on during the experiment. 
Additionally, they were questioned about their impessions of the incubation period, 
whether they found it beneficial, and if so, how it may have been helpfùl. If participants 
did not spontaneously mention the helpfulness of an implicit due  ptesented during 
incubation, they were specüically asked whether they noticed any relation between 
incubation task and the problems they worked on and whether they ever found the 
incubation task to be helpful in solving a problem. On average, participants took about 50 
minutes to complete the experiment. On completion, participants were debriefed about the 
purpose of the study and the nature of the deception that occurred and were given written 
feedback about the expriment (see Appendix U). 
R d t s  
Table 2 presents the mean percentage of total problems sdved before and after the 
points at which incubation would occur when presented, cohpsed acros the fixation and 
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incubation conditions. Analyses were completed to test the predicted effects of fixation 
and implicit dues in incubation. 
Table 2 
Mean Pemntage of Problems Sotved Befom and M e r  Points of Incubation 
C a d e  Radiation RAT 
Problem Roblem Items 
M SD M SD M S D  
Before 51.1 47.1 42.7 49.7 47-4 29.9 
Fixation 
To evaluate the success of the fixation manipulation, the percentage of correctly 
and incomctly fuated problems solved during initial problem solving (i.e., before the 
point at which incubation would be intrcxiuced) was comparai for each of the problems. 
Table 3 displays the mean percentage of problems solved in the correct and incorrect 
versions in each of the three problems 
Table 3 
Mean Percentage of Correctly and Incorrectly Fixated Roblems Solveà 
Before Points of Incubation 
Correct Fixation Incorrect Fixation 
Radiation Problem 5 1 -9 50.4 28.6 45.8 
RAT Items 62.6 23.1 19.0 18.3 
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Surprisingly, the means for the percentage of inconectly and correctly fixated 
Candle probIems solved initially did not M e r  [P(1,87) c 1, MS, - 2238.4, p < .80]. This 
result is surprisiag when contrasteci with the d t s  of GIucksberg and Weisberg discussed 
earlier. One factor possibly influenced this remit, As noted in the 'Procedunt section, at 
the conciusion of the study, participane were asked whether they had seen or heaid of any 
of the problems they had worked on during the study. Participants almost unifody 
responded negatively to this question untii approxhately thteequarten of the way through 
the experiment. At this point, many of the participants began solving the Candle problem 
more easily and quickly. Some of these participants also reported reading about it in their 
inaoductory psychology text in the course of studying for exams. Thus, it would seem 
that the problem appeared in students' textbooks, but, for the m a t  part, went unnoticed 
untii the latter part of the tenn when students began reviewing materid for exams. 
Obviously, when notice4 it significantly increased the participant's Iikeiihood of solving 
the problem before the point of incubation. A second evaiuation of fixation that compared 
the percentage of correct and incorrect €ixation Candle problems solved after eliminating 
participants who acknowledged seeing the pobllem in their text (N-5) also found a 
nonsignificant difference between these groups p(1.82) c 1, MS, = 2222.2, p c .74]. 
However, it is possible that other remaining shidents had read about the problem and had it 
influence their performance without having an explicit memory for the problem. If this is 
the case, participants who completed the study earlier in the tem and did not initiaiiy 
solve the incorrect fixation version of the problem codd be considered "incorrectiy 
fixated." The means of percent of problems solved for the comct and incorrect fixation 
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€omis of the Radiation problem and RAT item did d B i  sisnificantiy, F(1,87) = 4.9, MS, 
= 2370.6, p c .03, and F(L,87) = 82.6, MS, - 464.2, p < .O00 1, te~pectively, with 
significantiy more problems solved initially on the conect fixation than incorrect fixation 
forms of the pproblems in both cases. 
Incubation 
Differences in percent solved between the incubation conditions (no incubation, 
due incubation and no clue incubation) were tested by comparing Unpiovement scores. 
Similar to Expriment 1, improvement scores were calculateci as the difference in the 
solution score before and afier the point on the problem where incubation would occur, 
that is, after one minute for the Candle problem and each of the RAT items and after five 
minutes for the Radiation problem. More specifidy, improvement was calculated as 
follows: 
(Solved after Incubation) - (Solved More Incubation) 
Not Solved before Incubation 
Differences in time to solve between the incubation groups were also compared in cases 
where the problem was eventually solved. T h e  to solve is mpresented here as the time to 
solve the problem after the point at which incubation occurred For each of the three 
problems, ANOVAs with percent solved or time to d v e  as the depenhnt variable and 
incubation and fixation factors wete computed to test the hpthesized effects of 
incubation alone (incubation with no irnplicit clue) and incubation involving an implicit 
clue, and their interaction with fixation. 
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Candle Problem 
Tables 4 and 5 present the mean impmvement scores and tune to solve correctiy 
and incortectiy fixated Cande pmblems in each of the incubation conditions. 
Table 4 
Mean Percent of C a d e  Pmblems Soived M e r  Point of Incubation 
Correct Fixation lncomect Fixation 
M SD M SD 
No Incubation 66.7 45.0 42.9 34.5 
No Clue incubation 30-0 44.7 28.6 39.3 
Clue Incubation 75.0 37.8 71.4 48.8 
Table 5 
Mean T h e  to Soive (in seconds) Candle Pmblem After Point of Incubation 
Correct Fixation ~ncom&t Fixation 
No Clue Incubation 102.3 34.8 91.8 41.5 
Clue Incubation 74.5 42.2 21.8 22.5 
An ANOVA contrast of percent of Candle problems solved revealed a significant 
main effect of incubation p(2,43) = 3.5, MS, = L79 1.8, p c .CM], but no incubation x 
fixation interaction F(2,43) < 1, MS, - 1791.8, p < -711. One-way contrasts of the 
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incubation factor indicated two signüicant differences between groups: (1) more C a d e  
problems were solvd in the no incubation condition (59 percent) than in the no clue 
incubation condition (29 percent) [t(46) = 2.0, p c .Oq, and, (2) more problems were 
solved in the clue incubation (73 percent) than in the no clue incubation condition (29 
percent) It(46) = -2.7, p c .009]. No reliable ciifferences, however, were found between 
the clue and no incubation groups, although the means did dafer, especiaily in the 
incorrect fixation condition (çee Table 4). 
An ANOVA contrast of time to solve the Cande problem revealed a signifiant 
main effect of incubation [F(2,32) = 7.1, MS, - 1 146.3, p < -0031, and a fixation x 
incubation interaction p(2,32) = 6.7, MS, = 1146.3, p c .004]. One-way contrasts 
clarified the main effect of incubation as paralleling the percent solved resuits: Participants 
in the no clue incubation condition took significantly longer to solve the Candle problem 
than both those in the no incubation group [t(35) = -3.2, p < .O31 and the clue incubation 
group (t(35) = 2.5, p < -021. Again, the clue incubation condition did not differ reliably 
fiom the no incubation condition. 
This main effect of incubation for time to solve the Candle problem was moderated 
by a fixation x incubation interaction, however. The incubation condition yielding the 
fastest performance on the C a d e  problem depended on whether the problem had 
originally been presented in the correct or incorrect fixation fom. For incorcectly fixated 
cases, participants solved the problem significantly faster when given a clue incubation 
than no incubation [t(12) = 2.4, p c .03], or no clue incubation D(12) - 3.2, p c .008]. In 
contrast, when correctly fixated, participants solved the problern signiflcantly faster when 
they received no incubation than when they weie given either a clue incubation [t(20) = - 
2.8, p < -011, or a no due incubation It(2O) -3.7, p 4 -00 11 (see Table 5). 
Radiation Problem 
Tables 6 and 7 present the mean improvement scores and time to solve c o r r d y  
and incorrectly fixated Radiation problem in each of the incubation conditions. 
Table 6 
Mean Percent of Radiation Problems Soived After Point O€ Incubation 
Correct Fixation Incorrect Fixation 
M SD M SD 
No Incubation 22.2 44.1 25-0 46.3 
No Clue Incubation 250 46.3 25.0 46.3 
Che Incubation 44.4 52.7 55.6 52.7 
Table 7 
Mean T h e  to Solve (in seconds) Radiation Problem After Point of Incubation 
Correct Fixation Incorrect Fixation 
No Incubation 26 1 .O 8.5 91.5 92.6 
No Clue Incubation 235.5 77.1 33 .5 23.3 
Clue Incubation 57.7 96.6 80.8 97.7 
Aithough the percentage solved in the due incubation condition differed in 
magnitude fiom the other incubation conditions (see Table 6), an ANOVA contrast of 
percent solved on the Radiation problem yielded no significant effects for incubation 
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p(2,45) = 1.6, MS, = 2333.3, p 4 -201 or the incubation x fixation interaction [F(Z,4!5) < 
1, MS, = 2333.3, p < -941. 
An ANOVA contrast of t h e  to solve the Radiation problem revded no main 
effect for incubation p(2,11) = 2.1, MS, - 7393.9, p e .17], but a tendency towards 
significance for the fixation x incubation interaction F(2,11) = 3.1, MS, - 73939, p c 
.08]. Given this saong tendency towards significance and my a priori predictions 
regarding the interaction between fixation and incubation, further one-way contras& of 
incubation were computed separately for the to solve coftectly and incorrectly fixated 
Radiation problems. R d t s  of these contram indicated no signifîcant differences between 
any of the incubation groups when participants were incotfectly fixated on the problem. 
When conectly fixateci, however, they solved 
problems in the clue incubation condition signiiïcantiy faster than in the no incubation [t(S) 
= 2.8, p < .O41 and no clue incubation [t(5) = 2.5, p < .05] conditions (see Table 7). 
RAT Items 
Tables 8 and 9 present the mean improvement scores of RAT items and the tirne to 
solve correctly and incorrectly fixated RAT items in each of the incubation conditions. 
Table 8 
Mean Percent of RAT Items Solved Afkr Point of incubation 
Correct Fixation Incorrect Fixation 
No Che Incubation 18.8 29.0 17.2 14.8 
Clue Incubation 19.5 23.8 25.3 21.7 
Table 9 
Mean Time to Sohre (in seconds) RAT Items Attu Point of Incubation 
Correct Fixation Iiicorrect Fixation 
No Clue Incubation 18.9 15.2 24.8 12.2 
Clue Incubation 19- 1 14.0 22.3 11.5 
An ANOVA of percent RAT items solved revealed a noasignificant main effect of 
incubation [F(2,81) < 1, MS, = 6349, p < .78] and a nonsipnincant fixation x incubation 
interaction F(2,81) = 1.5, MS, = 6349, p < .23]. One-way contrasts of incubation for 
correctly and iacorrectly fixated problems revealed a tendency for participants incorrectly 
fixated on RAT items receiving the clue incubation condition to solve more items than 
participants receiving no incubation [t(28) = -1.7, p < .IO]. No significant Merences 
between the incubation conditions were indicated when participants were correctly fixated 
(see Table 8). 
An ANOVA of time to solve RAT items also indicated no signïficant main effect 
of incubation F(Z,4 1) c 1, MS, = 206.1, p c -971 aor a fuation x incubation interaction 
p(2,41) < 1, MS, = 206.1, p 4 .78]. 
Noticinn the Im~licit Clue 
Analyses were also completed to examine the effects of recognizing vems not 
recognizing the due value of the implicit-clue incubation activity on subsequent 
performance on each of the three problems. Following theV participation, participants 
were uite~ewed about whether they hsd aoticed that the activity presented during 
incubation was sometimes reIated to or helpful in solving the problem they had ben 
working on. Answers to this question weie scoreci dichotomously; that is, any report of 
awareness of the incubation task as a clue was scored positive, whereas reports of no 
awareness of this dation were scored negative. Tables 10 and 11 display the mean 
percent solved and t h e  to solve (&et the point of incubation) for participants who were 
both aware and not aware of the incubation activities as a due to each of the three 
problems. 
Table 10 
Mean Pemntage Solved APter Points of incubation for Participants Aware 
and Not Aware of incubation Task as a Che 
- - - - -  
Aware Not Aware 
M SD M SD 
Candle Problem 78.6 39.3 68.8 45.8 
Radiation Problem 80 44.7 38.5 50.6 
RAT Items 16.7 0.0 21.6 23.3 
Table 11 
Mean Time to Sohe (in seconds) After Points of incubation for Participants Aware 
and Not Aware of Incubation Task as a Che 
Aware Not Aware 
Candle Problem 53.4 49.7 55.2 40.5 
Radiation Roblem 28.8 5 1.5 103.8 108.3 
RAT Items 22.0 0.0 20.4 13.1 
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Candle PmbIem 
ANOVA contmsts for the C a d e  probiem revealed no effects of recogninng the 
"candle-box" pair as a clue to the pmblem on the percentage of problems solved @?(1,13) 
< 1, MS, = 1844.1, p < -671 or t h e  to solve [F(1,11) c 1, MS, 20%.2, p c .9q. RecalI, 
however, the problem of a high level awareness of this problern m generd (see above). 
Radiation Problem 
Participants who ieported finding 'The Oenerai" story helpful in solving the 
Radiation problem solved a pa t e r  nwnber of problems, but this difference was not 
significant p(1,16) = 2.6, MS, = 2423.1, p < .l3]. No signifiant ciifference was indicated 
in the mean time to solve the Radiation problem between participants who recognized the 
story as a clue and those who did not F(1,7) = 1.6, MS, = 7840.8, p c 251. 
RAT Items 
Only one participant reported noticing any relation between the Analogy Task and 
the RAT items. Thus, no significant differences were found in percent solved p(1,îS) c 
1, MS, = 543.9, p < -841 or time to solve p(1,14) < 1, MS, = 171.9, p c .91] between the 
participant who noticed the clue quality of the task and those who did not. 
Discussion 
Forgetane - Fixation Hmthesis 
Incorrect Fixation 
Minimal support was indicated for the forgetting fixation hypothesis. This 
hypothesis predicîs that a break h m  the problem, in and of itseif, serves to d o w  
originaUy incorrect ways of thinking about the problern to be imgotten, thereby resuiting in 
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improved performance on a retest. None of the thiee pmbIems studied here indicated 
inaeased perfomiance, with respect to either percent d v e d  or tirne to solve, on 
incorrectly fixateci problems afier an incubation period filled with activity inireiated to the 
problem. Of course, interpretations invoking the mle of incorrect fixation on the Candle 
problem are complicated by the failure to demonstrate differentid initial performance on 
the correct vernis incorrect versions and therefore questions about whether incorrect 
fixation was ever manipulateci. Note, however, that several 0th- hdings were indicated 
between incubation groups within both the incorrect and correct versions of the Candle 
problem, suggesting that then is some empincal merence between the two versions. 
Furthennote, the results in the no clue incubation condition for the C a d e  problem are 
consistent with r d t s  fkom the other two problems: In no case did participants' 
performance benefit fiom receiving an incubation period aione. 
Again, the r d &  of no impmved performance after an incubation period alone 
stand in smk contrast to ptevious work by Smith and coiieagues. Especially suiprising is 
the failure to replicate Smith & Blankenship (1991) using their same materiais. One 
possibility aiways prevdent in failures to replicate is a difference in the power, which is 
influenced in part by number of observations. Smith and Blankenship used 20 RAT items, 
whereas the present study employed only ten. However, 1 also more tban doubled the 
sample size used in the Smith and Blankenship study (89 versus 39 participants, 
respectively). Although the method of the present study very closely paralleleci that of 
Smith and Blankenship, some slight clifferences in methoéology were present. One such 
difference concemed the nature of the task completed during the incubation period. 
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Participants in Smith and Blankenship's study read a science fiction story during incubation 
whereas participants in the present study completed the unreiated Analogy Ta&. The 
Analogy Task designed for the incubation period in the present study is, in many ways, 
quite similar to the RAT items, as both are associate word probtems. This simüaiity, in 
fact, was noted by severai participants. It is possible that incubation activities competing 
for the same types of cognitive processing required by the problem itseîf a c W y  interfere 
with the beneficial effects of the break fkom the problem. This, of course, wouid 
especially be the case when the incubation period was not helpful in the sense of 
containing an implicit clue to the poblem. 
Consistent with this possibility, Patrick (1986), using the RAT as his problem 
solving measure, studied the effect of incubation periods fiiied with either other RAT 
problems or with unrelated spatial rotation taskî for high- and low-ability participants. 
Patrick found a significant effect of incubation for high-abiiity participants when they were 
given the unrelated spatial tasks during incubation, but not when given the sirnila. RAT 
problerns. Note, however, that an interpretation that si& incubation activities compete 
with cognitive processes related to the original problem and thereby lessen the incubation's 
beneficial impact leads to a different way of thinking about the fiinction of the incubation 
period than does the account given by the forgetting fixation hypothesis. According to 
this hypothesis, aii that occurs over incubation is forgetting; the more one forgea, the 
better. Therefore, cornpethg incubation activities that "block" one's initial work on the 
problem shouîd only benefit later penonnance, according to this explanation. If, however, 
incubation tasks simüar to the problem compete and thereby impair later petformance on 
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the problem, it would appear that it is important for some things not to be forgotten, or to 
be maintained ovet incubation. 1 wil l  return to this idea in E-ent IiI. 
Although peif~~nance did not improve on incorrectly fixateci problems after an 
incubation period alone (that is, a break f î k d  with an unrelateci activity) in two of the 
three probIems, it did irnprove afw an incubation petiod c o n m g  an implicit hint. The 
due incubation period significantly decreased the time taken to solve the incorrectly 
fixated version of the Candle problem and had a tendency to increase the percent of 
incorrectly- kateci RAT items solved. It is possible, then, that a hint embedded in time 
away fkom the problem is especiaüy helpM when one is incorrectly k t e d  on the 
problem. Perhaps the break allows old sets to be forgotten so that the due rnight spark 
new and more corrects sets to the problem. Of course, to maintain such a conclusion, it 
would be necessary to compare an Unpikit clue condition both with and without an actual 
break fiom the problem, a cornparison the present study did not make. Inconsistent with 
this interpretation, however, is the result that due incubation benefitted problem solving 
performance the rnost on the Radiation problem when participants were correctly, rather 
than incorrectly fixated. Integrating this last finding into an understanding of the benefit of 
the due incubation might suggest its impact varies with problem Mcul ty ,  rather than 
with correct or incorrect fixation. It wodd appear that on easier problems (the Candle and 
RAT problems) the implicit clue incubation was most helpful on the incorrect f d o n  
fonn of the problem. The correctly fixated version of these problems made relatively easy 
problerns even easier and they benefited little or not at all fiom clues. However, on a 
more difficuit problem, the Radiation problem, the due incubation signiiicantiy benefitted 
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perfomance on the correct but rot on the incorrect fixation version. Hem, cotrect fixation 
Likely brought d o m  the dinculty level of the proHem to an average level but not to such 
an easy level that it codd not benefit k m  clue incubation. 
Correct Fixation 
Some, aibeit inconsistent support was indicated for the proposition tbat an 
incubation period may a c M y  impair performance when the problern solver is on the 
'right track" Correctly fixated C a d e  pmblems were solved significantiy faster when 
participants worked on the problem continuousty than when they were intempted with 
either a no clue or clue incubation p e r i d  Of course, again, the resulîs conceming correct 
and incorrect fixation on the Candle problem must be interpreted with caution due to the 
failure to empirically demonstrate initial differences in performance between the two 
versions. The fact that even an incubation period containing an implicit clue to the 
problem impaired performance, however, strengthens the idea that, for some problems, the 
problem solver is really better left working than interrupted for a break Participants' 
performance on correctly fmated problems was not signifïcantly impakd by incubation on 
either the Radiation or the RAT problems, although the meam for both the percent solved 
and tirne to solve weie in the right direction for the no clue incubation vernis no 
incubation conditions on correctly fixated RAT items. 
Im~licit Che H-mthesis 
Some support was also indicated for the implicit clue hypothesis. Incorrectly 
fixated participants solved the Candle problem significantly faster when given an 
incubation pend containing an implicit clue than when no incubation occurred. The 
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means for the percent of Candle problems solved were also in the predicted direction, for 
both correct and incorrect fixation, with more pmblems solved Mth chie incubation than 
no incubation, but the Merences here did not reach significance. On the Radiation 
problem, correctly fixateci participants reached a solution significantly fastet when given a 
hint during incubation than when they simply workeâ continuously. Again, the meam for 
both the percent of correctly and i~correctly fixated Radiation problems solved were in the 
predicted direction, but were not sigmficantly dif5erent Finally, there was a non- 
significant tendency for participants incorrectîy fixated on the RAT items to solve more 
problems when given a clue incubation period than when no incubation occurred. 
Thus, on some versions of the above problems, participants bene- fiom the 
presence of an implicit clue presented during a break nom the problem. Participants were 
uninfonned about the clue; they had no awareness or reason to suspect that the filler 
activity pefionned during incubation containeci a clue to the problem. Thus, any use of the 
due on their part was spontaneous. Finthemore, uniilce Expriment 1, this spontaneous 
use occurred in the context of a break nom the problem rather than during problern 
solving, increasing its generaiizability to 'reai He' settings. It would seem that a clue 
presented even during a period of tirne off the problem can significantly benefit 
performance. 
Similar to Expetiment 1, noticing and reporting the devance of the implicit clue 
did not significantly improve its Muence on problem solving performance. ANOVAs of 
percent solved on all three problems indicated no signifiant differences between noticing 
and not noticing the relation of the clue to the problem. Resuits were similar using t h e  to 
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solve, even though diis is the variable on which significaat differences between the implicit 
clue incubation and no incubation were found. Uafothmately, the d t s  of these anaîyses 
for the Candle Roblem are thwarted due to the high level of awmaess on this problem 
overall, as knowledge about the solution to the problem itseif eliminates the usefiilness of 
any clue. However, the results of the Radiation Roblem and RAT items contrast with 
Browne and Cruse's (1988) findings, and indicate that even when the impiicit clue is 
presented in a context separate h m  the problem, awareness of the relation between the 
due and the problem is not necessary for the due's later influence on problem solving 
performance. This, of course, is not to say that king aware of that relation would not 
improve such performance, but only that benefits to performance can also occur when the 
problem solver is reportedly unaware of the relevance of the clue event to the problem. 
Although ail of the problem types indicated a higher percentage of problems solved 
in the clue incubation than no incubation conditions on either the incorrectly fixated or 
both the incorrect and correct fixation versions, the differences were never signifiant. The 
failure of most of these Merences to reach significance is surprising, considering the 
magnitude of dietences between conditions often involved. Likely contributhg to this 
null finding is a small sample size. Although 89 students patticipated in the study, each 
participant contributed only one of six possible observations to each problem 
(incorrect/correct fixation x no incubationln0 clue incubation/clue incubation). 
Furthennoce, many of the problems were solved before incubation, eIiminating them fiom 
further analysis. The finai sample size per cell averaged =und eight. It would appear 
that time to solve, however, is a more sensitive variable, as reiiable differences between 
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groups on this variable were indicated despite such small sample siæs. 
The effect of the impiicit clue did not reach significance on all  three pmblems; as 
noted above, there was ody a tendency for clue incubation to improve perEormance on the 
RAT items. Tnis constitutes a non-replication of Mednick et al. (1964), who fond that a 
subset of lmsolved RAT items that was associatively primed, using analogies, during an 
incubation period, was significantly more likely to be solved on a retest than items not 
pnmed Of course, Mednick et al. did not attempt to origioally incomftly fixate people 
by presenting rnisleading words with each stimulus word. However, it is diacult to 
conceive how this would diminish the effects of a clue incubation, as according to other 
theorizing (Smith & Blankenship, 1989; 1991; Smith et al., 1993 cf. Smith, 1995; Smith & 
Vela, 199 l), incorrectly fixated participants should benefit most from this. Mednick et al., 
however, chose only five originally unsolved items to associatively prime, and presented 
participants with only five analogies to complete, aîi of which related back to earlier 
unsolved RAT items. In contrast, in the present shidy, participants had up to tea items 
associatively primed by the analogies, dependiig on the original number left unsolved. 
Furthemore, these items were embedded in a number of buffer analogies, that is, anaIopies 
unrelated to the RAT problems altogether. Tt seems, then, tbat receiving implicit hints for 
multi-item problems is l e s  Uifiuential than receiving a hint for one main larger-type 
problem and that embedding clues for multi-item tasks in non-relevant material weakens 
their effect on performance. 
In addition, the implicit clue did not sisnificantly benefit pedmance on all 
versions of all three problems; instead it was specific to either the correct or incorrect 
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versions, &pending on the perticuiar pmb1em. Che way of understanding these d t s ,  as 
mentioned above, invokes the concept of pmblem difficulty. It would seem that an 
implicit due embedded in an incubation period is most beneficial to problems of medium- 
level difficulty, which here represent the incorrect fixation version of the easier problems 
(the Candle and RAT pmbiems) and the correct fixation form of the more ciifficuit 
Radiation problem. Providing a due incubation to very easy problems has the potentiai of 
disnipting performance, whereas very difticult problems wii i  &y be solveâ, even with 
the help of clues. Thus, it wouid seem that in laboratory investigations, people can 
spontaneously make use of ielated and helpful infotmation they encounter in their 
environment on a break h m  solving larger, more complex-type problems of medium-level 
difficulty. 
It is aiso interesting to consider whether the r d t s  regarding the eEect of an 
implicit clue ciiffer fnnn those of the spontaneous transfer fiterature. Although the meam 
of percent of problems solved were in the predicted direction, only the d t s  of tirne to 
solve were signifiant in the present experiment Revious investigations of spontaneous 
transfer on the Candle problem (Weisberg et ai., 1978) and Radiation problern (Gick & 
Holyoak, 1980; 1983; Catrarnbone & Holyoak, 1989) have similarly failed to h d  that 
ches or analogies signitiantiy improve the percent of problems solved, but these shidies 
did not make such evaluations using tirne to solve. As noted above, the tests of percent of 
problems solved between the implicit clue incubation and no incubation groups in the 
present snidy may have failed to reach significance because of small sample siza. 
Furthemore, a cornparison of the means of percent of problems solved reported by these 
investigators to the means obtained here suggests some ciifferences. For example, 
Weisberg et ale's uninformed implicit-hint p u p  solved 15 percent more Candie problems 
than their control group; in the present shidy, a gain of 28 percent was made in the clue 
incubation versus no incubation conditions for the incorrectly fixateci version, the f o m  
most W a r  to the problem p~e~ented by Weisberg et al. Sidady, Gick & HolyoaKs 
(1983) uninfonned irnplicit-hint participants improved 20 percent over their baseiine 
control; in the present study, inconectly k t e d  participants improved by 31 percent with 
clue incubation over no incubation. 
If the differences between the means reported by Weisberg et al. and Gick and 
Holyoak and those obtained here do represent m e  ciifferences between the studies, it is 
possible that some methodological difference between the studies accounts for these 
differences. A number of plausible explanations exist, including clifferences in problem 
presentation, slight dwerences in the wording of instructions to participants, smaü 
variations in the time allowed to work on the problem, and so on. However, for the most 
part, the methodology used in the present experiment paralleleci quite closely that used in 
the earlier studies, except for one main difference: the timing of the clue or analogy. The 
typical paradigm in research on spontaneous tratisfer - and the one used in both the 
Weisberg et al. and Gick and Holyogk studies - is to present participants with the implicit 
clue or analogy before they are given the problem. Because my interest was in studying 
the relevance of contact with helpfui information in the incubation effect, this information 
was presented after some initial work on the problem in the present study. Perhaps the 
effect of implicitly presented information relevant to a problem is different when the same 
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information is presented aftet some initial stni$gle with the ptob1em than before aay 
contact with i t  Tt is to this question that 1 tum ne- 
89 
Emriment III 
Expriment II LI the question of whether an implicitly presented due pvided 
in an incubation-type setting afker an initial @od of working m the problem wouM 
produce greater benefits than the same due presented before contact with the problem. 
A h  unconsidered to this point has been the 'spreading activation' hypothesis of incubation 
(Dorfhm et al, 1996), the idea that, after an initial working period, problem-related 
activation may continue to sptead during an interval in which the problem solver is w 
longer actively thinlring about the problem. 
Yaniv & Meyer (1987) proposeci an exphnation of incubation that relates to both of 
the above issues. They based their hypothesis on r d &  frmn a labonitory study using a 
rare-word defuiition task Participants fust attempted to genenite a rare word fiorn its 
definition and made confidence ratings and feeling-of-knowing judgments. Some time 
later, participants were presented with defùiition words they had answered correctly, 
incorrectly, or never-retrieved, as weU as other words and nonwords, in a lexical decision 
task Expectedly, Yaniv and Meyer found faciiitation effects for the correctiy-renieved 
words on the lexical decision task hterestingly, however, they also found priming effats 
for the never-retrieveû, but not for the uicorzectly-retrieved, words. These priming effects 
varied with participants' feeiiig-of-knowing judgments, with greater prirning effects for 
never-retrïeved words that had higher rated feelings of knowing. Such r d t s  were 
indicated when the lexical decisions were made both one and four minutes &et ongindy 
working on the definition. Furthemore, Yaniv and Meyer (Experiment 2) a h  included an 
'Olcl/New' recognition task, in which the definition words and other words were presented 
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for recognition discrimination 30 minutes after exposine to the originai &finitions, and 
again found prirning effkcts for the unretrieved definition words. 
Based on these resuiîs, Yaniv and Meyer developed the Memory Sellsitization' 
hypothesis of incubation. This hypothesis proposes that initial work on a problem partially 
activates memory traces appmpriate to solving the problem. M g  an ensuing incubation 
period, this partial activation then sensitizes the person to encounters with events or inputs 
in theù environment tbat relate to the problem. Contact with such information can result 
in the initialiy activated memory traces king raised above consciois thresh01ds. Note that 
this description of events places a good ded of emphasis on the residual partial activation 
that relates to the problem and implies that environmenta1 inputs wül have vaqhg effects 
depending on the timing of their presentation. This is because the residual, partial 
problem-related activation plays a role by sensitizing the problem solver to Upick up" on 
relevant information available in his or her mundings. Such residuai activation, of 
course, is available ody aftet some initiai work on the problem. 
To my how1edge, there are very few s t u d i a  directiy investigating the effkct of the 
timing of due presentation on problem performance. Of the studies that do, most deal 
with explicitly-presented hinîs rather than the implicitly-presented clues of interest here. 
Burke, Maier, & Hoffman (1966) investigated the importance of the timing of explicit 
hints on Maier's (1945) Hatrack problem. Burke et al.% hints consisteci of informing 
participants tbat either the ceiling is part of the construction or that the clamp is used as 
the h w k  in the correct solution. These hhts were given either at the outset before initial 
problem presentation, or after 30 minutes of pmblem solving. Burke et al. fond a 
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nonsignifiant trend, for bolh bts, fm better perfomÿince in the Wm' than in the 'afier' 
condition- 
Maier & Burke (1 %7) also investigated the effectiveness of the above ceiling and 
clamp hints on the Hatrack problem when presented at different points during problem 
solving. Participants were ùifonned about the d e  played by the ceüing or clamp either at 
the outset, or 5 or 15 minuta afkr working on the problem. Participants in the delayed 
due conditions who solved the problem before d u e  presentation were eLiminated h m  the 
analysis. Each participant was allowed 20 minutes after receiving the hint to work on the 
problem. The performance in each of the three experimental groups was compared to a 
control group that equated the tirne spent on the problem. For the ceilhg hint, the five- 
minute delay clue condition showed the most gain compared to its control, but the 
differences between this group and the 15-minute delay aml outset clue groups were not 
significant. No differences in performance were evident a m  the different tirnes of 
presentation for the clamp hint. 
In both of the above studies, the hïnts given were expiicit a s  opposed to implicit- It 
is quite possible that the timing of hint presentation interacts with hint expücitnas. 
According to Yaniv & Meyer's (1987) Memory Sensitization hypothesis, residuai activation 
h m  initial work on the problem serves to sewitize problem solvers to problem-relevant 
information in theh environment. Of course, the mle of such 'sensitization' is considerably 
downplayed when one knows, quite explicitly, tbat certain information is related to and 
wili be helpfid for solving the problem. Instead, such partial sensitizhg activation will be 
most important with implicit hints where the problem solver is not aware of the relevant 
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information in the environment and must spontanwusly make use of it. Expiicitiy 
presented hints may be most effective when presented at the outset of the problem where 
they can guide early thinking about the pmblem. Gick & Holyoak (1980, Experiment V) 
directly compared the effect of presenting The  General" story analogy More and afker 
some initiai period of work on the bdiation problem when participants were not explicitly 
informeci that the story provideci a due to the pobllem. They found no signifiant 
differences in performance in the before and after conditions. However, participants in the 
delayed-clue condition who solved the problem before clue presentation were eîiminated 
from the analysis, whereas no simüru adjurmients were made in the beforeclue condition. 
Such an adjustment d t s  in a biased comparison in favour of the beforeclue condition. 
Here, the beforeclue condition includes both participants who would have solved the 
problem on their own with no due as welI participants who solved the problem with the 
help of the clue; the delayed-clue condition includes only participants who solved the 
problem with the help of a clue, and excludes participants who solved the problem on their 
own before the clue presentation. Furthermore, as discussed above, laboriatory 
investigations of the implicit clue hypothesis seem most amenable to medium-level 
difficulty problems. In conttast, the originai form of the Radiation problem is a very 
difficult problem, with only ten percent of controk reaching a solution. 
Antonietti, Cerana, & Scafidi (1994) investigated the effects of mentally visualizing 
a problem before and after attempting the problem on the penorrnance of arithmetic, 
geometric, and practical problems. In an 'imagery-before' condition, participants were 
asked to visually imagine the situation and stimuli that they were then presented with in 
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the problem they subsequentiy attempted. In an 'imagery-a. condition, participants 
were presented with the pmblem and then asked to vimalue the problem befm attempting 
a solution. In general, Antonietti et ai. found stroager effects of mental visualization in the 
irnagery-after than in the imagery-before condition; this effect was most pronouncd for 
problems which originaîly induced fiincrional kedness, such as the C a d e  and Two- 
String problems. Antonietti et ai. dso found tbat the effdveness of the visuabation was 
modulated by the dficulty of the problem; positive effects of mental visualization were 
greater when the problem was less difficuit. 
ut Expriment III, I attempted to clarify the above mhed results conceming the 
timing of an implicitly presented clue and its implications for the mechanisms of 
incubation. Using a within-subjects design, irnplicit hints presented before and &er 
contact with the problem were compareâ to a no-hint contml condition. Participants 
attempted three insight probiems, one in each of three clue conditions: clue before, clue 
afier, and no clue. Again, the hints to the problems were presented in the guise of separate 
tash, and were o h  nferred to a s  problems themselves. 
If sub-awareness activation relating to the problern sensitues the problem solver to 
relevant information or clues in the environment, an implicitly-presented due  wül benefit 
performance most when presented after some preliminary wodc on the problem has 




Suty-three University of Waterloo undergraduate students, 17 d e s  and 46 
fernales, volunteered to participate to gain partial credit towards their introductory 
psychology course. Participants ranged in age fkom 17 to 25 y-, with a mean of 19 
years. Participants were randody asdgned to one of nine different "orciers," which varied 
with respect to the presentation order of the problems and of the clue conditions. 
Materials 
A paper-and-pend version of Maier's (193 1) Two-String problem and Maier's 
(1945) Hatrack problem (here termed the Coat-Rack pmblem; see Appendices V and W) 
and the correct fixation version of the Radiation problem used in Experiment iI (see 
Appendix J) served as the three insight problems in Expriment m. Although 1 had 
initidy intended to include the Candle problem, the Hatrack problem was substituted afker 
discovering that three of the four introductory pychology classes' assigned textbook 
included a discussion of the Candle problem. Introductory psychology professors were 
contacted and indicated no plans to discuss the above three problems in clas. 
Again, exposuie to implicit clues was rnanipulated by developing separate taslcs 
with embedded clues. As in Experiment II, The Gened* story (Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 
see Appendix O) serveci as the implicit hint to the Radiation problem. Participants were 
asked first to read the story and then to give a summary of it and make ratings of its 
plausibiiity and comprehensibility on a seven-point scale. 
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Analogies, simüar to the analogies presented for the RAT items in Experiment II, 
were developed to present implicit hints for the Two-String @lem. Based on Iudson et 
ai. (1956). which measwed participants' performance on the Two-String problem after they 
memorïzed a critical word üst containing the words, %peB, 'kwing", "pendulum", 
"clock," and m e " ,  among other word lists (see above), six critical analogies were 
developed for the present study and had as their solution the worâs, "two", "stringsn, 
"hang", "tie", "swing," and u~lock". Additiody, the iast analogy containeci the word 
"swing" within the analogy, although its answer was a non-critical word Also included in 
the task were three additional "buf5ef' analogies (see Appendix X). 
The hint to the Hatrack problem was s a i l a r  to the paired associates task used with 
the Candle problem in Experiment II based on Weisberg et aL (1978). However, in the 
present study, the paired associates task was structured as a rating task; participants were 
asked to rate the degree of relatedness of 15 word paim, the 1st of which was the pair, 
"boards - ceiiing." AU of the pairs were fairly highly associateci, except for the final pair 
(see Appendix Y). 
D a i m  
Each participant received each of the problems in one of three Metent  conditions 
that varied with respect to clue presentation: (1) clue before, where the task containing 
the implicit clue was completed before its related problem, (2) clue after, where the task 
containhg the implicit clue was completed after some initial work on the problem in an 
incubation-type setting, and (3) no clue, where the task containing the implicit due  to the 
problem was rot completed. The order of the clue conditions was counterbalanced, so that 
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each condition was represeated equally as the h t ,  second, and third problem attempted 
As weil, the order of the pmblems themselves was counterbalanced, so that each problem 
was presented equaiiy as the tirst, second, and third problem to be solved. This design 
resulted in nine different orders (see Appendix 2) to which participants were mdomly 
assigned. 
Procedure 
On entering the laboratory, participants were a s k d  to read over the Monnation 
Letter and sign the Consent F o m  (see Appendix AA). Participants were initiaily told that 
the study was ïnvestigating different factors involved in problem solving and that they 
would be asked to try to solve a few different problems and work on some tasks that 1 was 
developing for future research. Again, participants were asked to signal the experimenter 
as swn as they thought they had a possible s01ution to the problem, before recordhg it on 
paper. They worked individuaüy and independently on the problem at a separate table 
while the experimenter remallied in the mm. When they indicated having a solution, they 
were asked to verbally explain theu solution to the experimenter. If the solution was 
incorrect, participants were infonned of this and asked to continue working to find the 
correct solution. Although a number of possible solutions exist to the Two-String problem, 
including extending or anchoring one of the ropes, the solution of interest here was the l e s  
frequent "swinging" solution. Thus, when participants noted other plausible solutions to 
the problem, they were encoutaged to continue to find another way to solve the problem. 
Participants were given a maximum of ten minutes per problem; if not solved after ten 
minutes, they were simply told that they would move on to the next problem. If 
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participants' verbal descriptions indicated a correct solution, they were asked to record it 
on the page and tirne to solve was recorded by the experimenter. Again, time to solve was 
recorded at the fiist mention of a possible solution. 
Participants were assigned to one of the above Nne "ordelsb and solved each of the 
problems in a Merent clue condition, namely, clue before, clue after. and no clue. In the 
due-after condition, participants were intempted after three minutes of initial work on the 
problem if they had not alreacly solved the problem. ?bey were told that one factor of 
problem solving king investigated was the effect of an incubation perïod, or taking one's 
mind off the problem, and that they wouid be asked to perform another problem or task 
and then retum to the present problem. At this point the due activity for the problem was 
administered. In both the case of "The General" story and the analogy task, the activity 
was referred to as a "problem." The paired word associates were referred to as a task 
On rehuning to the probIem a€ter completing the due activity, participants were given a 
maximum of seven more minutes to attempt a solution. 
The m e  administration procedure was followed regardles of whether a clue 
activity preceded or foliowed initial work on the problem. When administered 'The 
General* story, participants were asked to read over the story and were told they would be 
asked to sumrnarize and  the story after reading it. Each participant signalleci the 
experimenter after finishing reading the story. At this point, a second page, with 
instructions to give a summary of the story and make ratings of its plausibility and 
cornprehensibility, was administerecl. The story itseif was placed to the side of the 
participant so that fie couid refer to it if needed. Participants were asked, however, to 
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complete the swnmary of the story in theü own wads. 
When administered the paired-wd -ates ta&, participants were înitiaüy asked 
to rate the degiee of relatedness of each pair- After completing the ratings, they were 
given a surprise recaü test of the pairs and told that the expehenter was interesteci in 
whether the semantic processing of words resuits in their being committed to memory. 
The experimenter rad  each of the first words in the pair as the stimulus words in a 
random order, except that the criticai "boards - ceiling" pair aiways came last- Participants 
responded to each stimulus word with the target word, the word they recdied it king 
associated with. If the participant had not memorized the critical pair, they were given the 
list of associates to study again and were retested one minute later. 
Similar to Expetiment II, participants completing the Analogy Problem were told to 
complete the blanks with the appropriate word and to provide a brief explanation 
undemeath for why the word %t" in the space. They were given an example of an 
andogy before beginning. Again, it was important that participants responded with the 
correct words on criticai analogies. Thus, in cases where critical words were not indicated, 
short periods of discussion ensued in which the experimenter wondetecl aloud about the 
person's reasoning on the partic* analogy and then commentecl that another word for 
that analogy might be . . . (the critical word). 
Participants were given as long as reqyid to complete the clue activities. On their 
completion, they immediately began or retumed to the related problem. In the case of the 
no due condition, participants attempted the problem with no presentation of the related 
activity, before or after. 
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Both accuracy (solved vemis ~so lved)  and solution thne were measured f a  ail 
problems. After attempting ai i  three ptoblems, participants were asked if they had ever 
heard of or seen any of the problems they had worked on during the experiment. Second, 
they were asked about whether they found anything helpfd in solving the problems they 
were able to sdve. Finally, participants were explicitly questioned about whether they 
found any of the taskr or problems they worked on helpful in solvïng other problems they 
attempted On average, participants took about 45 minutes to complete the enperiment. 
On completion, they were debriefed about the piirpose of the study and were given written 
feedback about the experiment (see Appendix AB). 
Results 
The percentage of Radiation, Two-String, and Haaack pmblems solved were 
relatively equal, with 35, 33, and 3 1 percent of pmblems solveà, respectively. For the 
purposes of data analysis, problems were grouped into the no clue, before clue, and after 
due conditions. Table 12 presents the mean percentage of problems solved and time to 
solve for the tbree conditions. 
Table 12 
Mean Percentage of Pmblems Sdved and Time to Sdve (in minutes) for the Before 
Afbr and No Clue Conditions 
No Che Before Clue After Che 
Percent Solved 23.8 42.0 36.5 48.5 38.9 48.7 
T h e  to Solve 8.8 2.6 8.4 2.9 7.8 3.1 
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Percent Solved 
To test the facilitation of a clue presented before versus after contact with the 
problem, paired-sample t-tests compared the before- and aftet-clue conditions to the no 
clue control condition, and subsequentiy directly to one another. Ciues presented before 
working on the problems had only a tendency to ~ig~ficandy incnase the percent of 
problems solved compared to the base1ine no due condition [t(62) = -1.9, p c .07]. Clues 
presented after some preliminary work, however, did significantly increase the percent of 
problems solved [t(62) = -2.0, p < .0a. There was no Merence, however, in a direct 
cornparison of the before- and after-clue conditions in terms of percent of problems solved, 
p < -74. 
Tirne to Solve 
Similar to percent solved, there were no Bgnificant dflerences in the tirne taken to 
solve problems in the clue-before versus no clue conditions, [t(62) = 1.0, p < -331. 
Participants who were presented with the due after initial problem solving, however, did 
solve the problems significantly faster Lt(62) = 2.1, p c .M]. Because there was no 
signifiant ciifference between the no due and before-due groups, these two conditions 
were collapsed and compared to the after-clue condition. The results of this analysis 
indicated that when presented with a clue after initial work on the problem, participants 
solved the problerns significantly faster than when inaoduced to the same due before their 
work began, or when no clue was presented at any point of problem solving [t(62) = -2.14, 
p < .Ml. 
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Time Smnt on Che Activities 
Because @cipan& were permitted unlimiteci arnounts of tgae to complete the clue 
activities, it is possible that any differences in the effects of the cfues are related to 
differential arnounts of t h e  spent on the clue task Thas, it is important to compare 
perfomance on the problems with the the spent on their associateci clues. An ANOVA 
contrast revealed no significant differences in the tune spent on %foren clues for solved 
vernis unsolved problem p(1,60) c 1, MS, = 19.7, p c 911. Simiiarly, there was no 
significant correlation between the t h e  spent on a chie presented before the probiem and 
the time taken to solve the problem [r = -. 141. An ANOVA conhist of the t h e  spent on 
"after" dues also indicated no significant ciifferences between s01ved and unsolved 
problems F(1,58) = 1.6, MS, = 19.8, p c .20]. However, there was a significant 
correlation between the tirne spent on the ''after due" and the time to solve the problem, r 
= .31, p c .OS. It wouid seem, however, that the more tirne spent on the %ter" clue, the 
longer it twk  to solve the problem. Finaily, there were no differences in the amount of 
time participants spent on a clue when presented before vernis after the problem was 
originally administered [t(58) c 1, p c .69]. 
no tic in^ the Clue 
Again, 1 was interesteci in the effects of noticing the clue-value of the implicit clue 
activity on problem performance. 1 fust tested whethet there was any difference in 
noticing the relation between the clue task and the problem when the clue was given 
before versus after problem presentation. A paired-samp1es t-test did reveal a significant 
difference in recognizing the clue [t(61) = -2.3, p < -021, with the "aftef' clue significantly 
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more likely to be recognized as a clue to the problem than the %forem due. An ANOVA 
con- revealed no sipnificant differences of noticing a due piesented before the problem 
on the percent of problems soived F(1,60) c 1, MS, = 2405.6, p < .71], or the thne to 
solve p(1,60) < 1, MS, = 8.6, p < .43]. In contrast, however, when the clue activity was 
completed after some initial work on the problem, recognizing the relation between it and 
the problem was significantly related to the percent of problems solved p(1,61) = 5.6, MS, 
= 2210.2, p c .O21 and the time to solve the pmblems F(1,61) = 10.1, MSe = 8.0, p < 
.O21 (see Table 13). 
Table 13 
Mean Percentage and Time to Sdve (ii minutes) for Participants Aware and Not 
Aware of Clues When Presented Before and Afbr Problems 
Percent Solved Time to Solve 
Aware Not Awate Aware Not Aware 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Clue Before 50.0 70.7 36.7 48.6 10.0 0.0 8.3 3.0 
Ctue After 78.6 39.3 34.0 47.8 4.6 2.4 8.2 3.0 
Discussion 
Expriment ïlI represents a test of the Memory Sensitization hypothesis (Yaniv & 
Meyer, 1987) and indicates some support for this explanation of incubation. The Memory 
Sensitintion hypothesis conceptualizes the incubation effect as due to an interaction 
between a spread of activation that continues for some tirne after the problem has been put 
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aside, and some related information, or cl=, in the problern solver's environment The 
residual activation sensitizes the pezson to the clue and, in tum, the clue fiirther enbances 
the problem-relateci spread of activation in a way that may eventualîy converge on the 
problem solution. The results of the present study indicated that clues presented ahet 
some prelïminary work on the problem significantly incnased the pmbability that the 
problem would be solved compared to problems pesented with no clues. In contrast, 
differences in the percent of pmb1ems solved between problems for which clues had been 
preMously presented and problems with no clues failed to reach significance. The results 
of the time-to-solve data revealed a more clear-cut facilibtion for the role of the clue 
presented after initial work compared to both the before-due and the no clue conditions. 
Thus, it would appear that an implicit clue is more helpfd d e r  work on a problem has 
begun and problem-related spreading activation has k e n  initialized. Again, however, it 
appears that the predicted effect is indicated more strongly with the more sensitive the-to- 
solve measure than with percent of problems solved. 
The differences found between administering a clue after versus before problem 
presentation cannot be said to be due to differential amounts of time in contact with the 
dues thernselves, as there was no signifiant difference in the arnowit of time taken to 
complete the due  activity when presented after than before the problem. There was, 
however, a signifiant difference in whether the implicit clue task was noticed as a due to 
the problem when presented before vernis &et work on the problem began. The relation 
between the irnplicit clue task and the pmblem was noticed and reported more often when 
the clue task followed some initial work Furthemore, recopnizing the clue-value of the 
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implicit hint activity was signifkntly related to the percent of problems solved and speed 
of solving problems when the clue was completed after, but not befon, problem 
presentation. Thus, participants who had invested in some preliminary work on the 
problem spontaneously noticed and made use of clues, whereas those who were given the 
same dues before beginning the problem were l e s  Iürely to notice the clues ad, even 
when they did notice them, the clues did not benefit their problem solving performance. 
What implications do the present d t s  have for understanding of the mechanisms 
underlying incubation? Earlier in the thesis, I asked the question of whether an impücit 
due, in and of itseif, may be responsible for any beneficial effects seen after an incubation 
pend, or whether any other mechanisms are also involved. If we accept the above results 
as indicating greater facilitation when a clue is received after, as compared to before, work 
on a problem bas occmcl, then any theory of incubation must incorporate into its 
explmation more than just the beneficial effects received fiom a clue itse& such a theory 
will have to account for results varying with the timing of the clue. I would argue that a 
sub-conscious problem-related spreading of activation that continues d e r  the problem is 
no longer consciously consiâered plays a role in incubation. Consistent with the Memory 
Sensitization hypothesis, the role such continuing activation seems to play is to sensitize 
the problem solver to notice and gick up" on information related to the problem that is 
contauied in her or his surrowidings. As indicated by the r 4 t s  conceming noticing the 
implicit clue task as a clue, a clue p e n t e d  after original pmblern presentation is more 
likely to be noticed as a clue than the same due presented before work on the problem 
began. Moreover, when noticed, clues after, but not before problem presentation, resulted 
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in a greater percentage of problems solved and faster soiution times. Of course, it is oniy 
after problem-related activation has begun that the pb1em solver can be more respoI1Sive 
to environmental inputs that relate to it. At least one d e  of such automatic activation, 
then, is to help the problem solver to spontaneousiy notice availsble clues in his or her 
surroundings. 
One might also wonder whether a continuing spread of activation might, in and of 
itself, r d t  in problem solutions without the help of an implicit due. Conceptuaüy, the 
spread of activation to new associations in a network is M a r  to a due or other problem- 
related information found in one's environment, but exists intemaliy, tather than externaüy. 
Note, however, that the present results do not indicate this automatic spread of activation 
to be a very strong effect. Although, in the present study, the effect was revealed using 
the time-to-dve measure, it was not indicated by the less sensitive percent solved 
mesure. There are îikely good reasons for such a weak effect As noted by Olton (1979), 
laboratory studies are very poor approximations of the conditions under which incubation 
appears in the "ieal world." Anecdotai reports of incubation are usually given by very 
motivated people with developed knowledge and expertise in the p rdem area who 
stmggle with a problem of considerable importance to them over very long periods of 
time. It is quite possible, then, that the strength of problem-relate spreading activation 
woulci increase with increased motivation, an increased network of associations specific to 
the area of expertise related to the probiem and greater amounts of tirne. It is also 
possible, however, that spreading activation, even under more %ai world" conditions, is 
moderate at best. Such automatic activation pmbably does not converge on the problem 
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solution with sdk i en t  intensity to cross the a m n e s s  threshold in most cases. If it did, 
reports of incubation effects would be much more prevdent and there wouid be little 
difficulty in empiricaily âernonstrating the phenomenon. However, the faa tbat such 
residual activation does not always lead to succesdul problem completion does not, in 
itself, dispute its presence and the role it may play towaids that end. 
In summary, the emphasis hem bas been to suggest the d e  of a third mechanism 
in incubation, namely, continued problem-related spreading activation, or what Dorfinan et 
al. (1996) would tenn uautonomous activation." A type of automatic activation that 
continues after conscious work on the pmblem has terminated appeas to be weak, but 
present As a resuit, its investigation necessitates the use of quite sensitive measurement 
techniques. Although it is possible that such activation does, either alone or with the help 
of environmental inputs, resuit in the solution to a problem, its presence does not always 
guarantee the effect and thus wül be dificult to evaluate using blunt measures such as 
whether the problem is solved or unsolvd Instead, the burden wül be on the mative 
investigator to design tasks capable of seasitively testing autonomous activation. Yaniv 
and Meyer's (1987) pmcedme of measuring reaction time in a lexical decision task 




As already noteci, Yaniv and Meyer (1987) ptovided evidence that autonomous 
spreading activation can continue for some time afkr direct conscious work on a problem 
has terminated. Yaniv and Meyer found fastet reaction times (RTs) in a lexical decision 
task to words bat  were answers on a previous definition task, as compareci to matched 
control words, even when had previody been unable to genenite the answer 
in the word definition ta&. These facüitation effects for originally unretrieved words were 
demonstrated one, four, and 30 minutes after participants first attempted to generate the 
word in the definition task 
Shames (1994, Experiment 1; cf- DomOan, Sharnes, & Küilstrom, 1996) importeci 
Yaniv and Meyer's procedure to a study using RAT items as the problem solving task 
Participants first attempted RAT items for a fivesecond period and then indicated, by 
using a Yes/No response, whether they knew the answer to the puzzle. Thereafter, 
participants responded to a lexical decision task that included the answers to the previous 
RAT items, unrelated control words, and wnwords. Sharnes found a significant priming 
effect for oiginally wisolved RAT items in the lexical decision ta& but a smalier and 
nonsignificant priming effect for solved items. Sharnes (1994, Experiment V) replicated 
the priming effects for unsolved items ising a latger set of stimuli, but was unable to 
replicate the dflerential effects for solved vernis unsolved items. Dorfkm et al. 
interpreted Sharnes' finding in Experiment I in temu of a 2eignari.k-like effect of better 
memory for uncompleted than completed tasks. They proposed that before a problem is 
solved there exists a kind of cognitive tension due to continued activation relating to the 
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problem. Once the pmb1em is solved, however, cl- is achieved and the cognitive 
tension dissipates. 
Based on the above reasoning, one might expect a different pattern of continueci 
activation over time for solved versus unsolved problems, such that autonomous activation 
persists longer when a problem is urisolved tbaa when it hes been previously solved. The 
present study tested this assertion using Yaniv and Meyer's (1987) procedure and 
materiais. Participants were involved in a rare-word deet ion task where they attempted 
to generate a rare word, given its definition. After varying amounts of tirne, participants 
made lexical decisions to previous answer words and matched controis as well as to other 
unreIated words and nonwords. After completing all of the definitions and associated 
lexicai decisions, participants were given an 'OldFJew' recognition task where they made 
Yes/No decisions about whether the words had been seen in the previous lexical decision 
trials. The stimuli for this task included the target definition words as well as the matched 
control words used in the lexical decision trials. 
If an autonomous spreading activation process is involved in the incubation effect, 
one might expect that such sub-threshold automatic activation will perskt longer for 
unsolved than for solved items. That is, there should be a Merential rate of decline of 
activation for solved versus unsolved definitions, with activation of unsolved definitions 
persisting longer over time and activation relating to solved definitions dying off more 
quickly. nius, whereas 1 expected large facilitation for solved definitions when the rare 
words were presented very soon after being solved, 1 predicted this facilitation should 
decline when tested after longer delays. In contrast, for u<isolved items, the facilitation 
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effect may not be initially as great as for solved items, but it should be evident over longer 
delays d e r  iaitially attempting the definitions. 
Mettiod 
Particimts 
Ninety-two University of Waterloo undergraduate students, 41 males and 51 
fernales, volunteered to participate to gain partial d t  towards their introdiictory 
psychology course. Participants ranged in age fnnn 18 to 38 years, with a mean of 20 
years. To volunteer, participants were requiied to have normal or correcteci-to-normal 
vision and good familiarity with the English language. Participants were mndomly 
assigned to one of two lists of word &finitions. 
Materials 
One hundred and two of Yaniv & Meyer's (1987) definitions of rare words were 
used in the present study. These definitions were normed to produce a "tip-of-the-tongue" 
state in a coiiege population. The rare-word definition ta& requires words to be generated, 
given their definitions. For example, the corresponding word to the &finition, "a mail 
boat used in the river and harbour M c  of China and Japan, propeiied with an oar" is 
"sampan." The 102 definitions were divided into two lists, with 51 of the definitions 
s e d g  as the target items on List 1 and the other 51 s e d g  as the target items on List 2. 
Five mer items were added to each Ust so that, in total, each list contained 56 definitions 
Participants were assigned to complete one of the two lis& (see Appendix AC for the two 
lists of words and their definitions). 
A set of five lexical decision stimuli were developed to correspond to each 
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definition. An participants made lexical decisions to all of the items in each set, regardless 
of which definition list they were assigned to. Withh each set, one of the letter strings 
was the answer to its associated definition. A second letter s t ~ g  was a matched control 
word and was the answer to a p h d  definition h m  the second k t ,  that is, thc list not 
seen by the particulat participant. In this way, the same items çerved as both the target 
(answer) words and control words across participants. The third, fouah, and fifth letter 
strings in each set of lexical decisioos were an unrelated word and two nonwords; these 
stimuli were taken nom Stolz & Neely (1995). Ali letter string within each lexical 
decision set were matched for length (see Appendix AD for the lexical decision stimuli). 
The stimuli for the recognition test consisteci of the 51 target words, that is, the 
answers to the definitions previousiy seen by the participant, the 51 matched conml 
words, namely, the m e r s  to the definitions not seen by the participant, and 51 unreiated 
new words. Again, a l l  stimuli within each set of three words (target, control, and new 
word) were matched for word length (see Appendix AE for the recognition task stimuli). 
Procedure 
On entering the laboratory, participants were asked to read over the Information 
Letter and sign the Consent Form (see Appendix AF). They were told they would be 
asked to work on two separate types of problems, one k i n g  a fairly dficult word 
definition task and the second a more simple task where speed was Unportant. AU stimuli 
were presented using a 486 IBM compatible cornputer on a standard VGA monitor. 
Participants began by completing 20 practice lexical decisions. Each letter string 
appeared centraiîy on the screen for a maximum of 2000 m. Respoflses were made by 
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pressing a Y" for a word and W)" for a n o n w d  If the shident responded i n c m t l y  or 
did not respond within 2000 ms, an -ORn message was presented for 250 ms. A one- 
second &lay axxnred between the presentation of the lexical decision stimuli. After 
cornpleting the 20 leacal decision practice triais, participants completed three sets of 
practice definitions and lexical decision sets, presented in the same mannet as in the main 
experiment (see below). 
In the main experiment, each trial began with a fixation symbol, presented centraily 
for 2000 ms. Following this, the definition was presented, again centrally. Five seconds 
foliowing the definition presentation, the phrase, T h e  Word is" was displayed directly 
below the definition; at this point, participants could enter a response. To respond, 
participants typed their answer using the keyboarà. Asterisks appeared on the screen in 
place of the letters of the answer they were typing to prevent repetition priming h m  
affecting the lexical decision d t s  of solved &finitions. Regardless of whether the 
response was correct or incorrect, after typing a response and pressing the Enter] key, the 
screen cleared. However, to encourage participants to spend some amount of t h e  thinkllig 
of definitions dey were unsure of, they were prevented from simply hitting the pnter] key 
wiuiout first atternpting an answer. In ihis case, the definition mainexi on the screen and 
the trial continueci. Participants were given a maximum of one minute pet definition. At 
this point, the definition cleared automaticdy h m  the screen. After a 2000 ms delay 
elapseâ, the warning message, "Ptepare for the Word/Nonword Task" was presented for 
2000 ms and participants responded to a set of five lexical decisions. The order of 
presentation of the lettet strings within each set was randomized, with the constraùit that 
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either the unrelated word or a nonword was dways the titst string presented to serve as a 
"warm-up" stimulus. The lexical decisions proceeded exady  as in the practice aialS. 
Unlike Yaniv and Meyer's study, the lexical decisicm trials immediately following a 
word definition attempt were not the letter strings that conesponded to the particuiar word 
definition. Instead, to hvestigate problem-related activation levels over time, participants 
completed the set of leKical decisions comsponding to a parti& worà definition after 
varying amounts of tirne (see Figure 3). One third of the t h e  the lexical decision set for a 
particular word definition appeareâ in the aial following that definition, that is, one trial 
later. One third of the tune the lexical decisions were completed four trials after their 
corresponding definition was attempted. Finaiiy, one thûd of the time the lexical decisions 
associated with a word definition were completed seven trials after the definition attempt. 
In each case, however, the procedure appeared the same to participants: Attempt a word 
definition and respond to five lexicai decisions. Participants were not Uiformed about any 
relation between the word definitions and the lexical decision trials. After making lexical 
decisions to aii five lettet strings, a 2000 rns inter-trial interval occmd before the next 
trial began with a fixation symbol and definition presentation. 
After attempting all the definitions and lexical decisions, participants were asked to 
complete a 'surprise' Old/New recognition ta& Here, participants were told that all of the 
stimuli would be words and were aslted to indicate whether the word bad been piesenteci 
before as one of the stimuli in the lexical decision tasks, or whether it was a 'new' word, 
not seen as part of the previous lexical decisions. The order of p~sentation within each 
set of three words, consisting of a definition word, matched controI and new word, was 
EXPERMENT IV - PROCEDURE 
1 Defïnition 1 
1 
I The word is: I 
~ Lexical Decision stimuli associateci with so1uaOn word lrom 1 trial previous 
1. Solution W O C ~  i 4. N~nword 1 
2. Matched Control i 5. Nonwod 2 
3. Unrelateci word I  
I 
I The word is= I 
Lexical Decision stimuli associated with 
solution word h m  4 triais previous 
1. Solution word 1 4. Nonword 1 
2. Matched Control ( S. Nonwotd 2 
3. Unrelated word I  
I 
I Definition I 
1 
I The word is: 1 
I 
Lexical Decision stimuli associated with 
so1ution wod fmm 7 triais previous 
1 1. Solution word 4. Nonword 1 1 
1 2. Matched Control 1 S. Nonword2 1 
1 3. UnreIated word I 1 
1 Triai Delay 
4 Trial Delay 
7 Triai Delay 
Fgve 3. Tbe sequence of events of a trial in the main 
experiment in Experiment IV. 
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randomùed Each word was displayed for 2 0  ms and participants responded using "1" 
for an old won& that is, a word they had seen More in a previow lexical decision tasic, 
and "0" for a new word 
On average, participants took about 80 minutes to complete the entire task On 
completion, participants weie debriefed about the purpose of the study and received a 
written description (see Appendk AG). During the debriefing, participants were asked 
about whether they noticed any relation between the lexical decision stimuli and the word 
definitions 
Data Aaalysis 
To investigate the presence of residual problem-related activation, cornparisons 
were made beh~een responses to target (answer) words and the matched control words on 
the data h m  the lexical decision and recognition tasks. The presence of persisting 
activation is indicated by facilitation in responses to mget words over controls. 
To test predictions about the persistence and delay of activation relating to solved 
and unsolved problems, p h e d  trend analyses of facilitation were computed separately for 
each of the three solution states, namely, solved, unsolved, and incorrectly solved. The 
definitions were solved correctly 19 percent of the tirne, completed with a word other than 
the target word 35 percent of the tirne and left unsolved, or blank, 46 percent of the tirne. 
Within each solution state, m e r  analyses comparai hcilitation, that is, responses to 
target answer worck over control words, across the various trial delays. 
One participant had an errot-rate on the lexical decision trials in exces of 40 
percent and was elirninated h m  m e r  analysis. RTs were trimmed using a within- 
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subjects procedure developed by Van Selst & Joücoeur (1994) which takes uito account 
sample sizes in eIiminating out-of-range RTs. This procedure d t e d  in the elhination of 
1.76 percent of the total RT values. 
Results 
Table 14 presents the overall mean RTs and error rates h m  the lexical decision 
trials for the target and control words. Overd, tespo~lses to target words in the lexical 
decision task were faster than respoflses to control words [F(l,41) = 20.2, MS, = 1174.7, 
p c .O00 11. No overall signifiant differences were found in e m r  rates p(1,90) c 1, MS, 
= 30.4, p < -37, however. 
Table 14 
Overall RT and Error Data h m  M C 8 1  Decision Trials 
Mean RT (ms) Percent 
Emrs 
M SD M SD 
Target Word 830.0 166.4 20.6 9.9 
Control Word 863.6 168.9 21.4 9.9 
MANOVAS with solution state (solved versus m l v e d )  and trial delays (one, four, 
and seven) as within-subject factors were computed to test for interactions in the amount 
of facilitation for xilved vernis ullsolved definitions over the trial deiays. A solution state 
by triai delay computation of the facilitation in RT revealed a main effect of solution state 
F(1,49) = 2 1.7, MS, = 16829.7, p c .05] and a main effect of delay p(2,98) = 2 17. MS, 
= 12787.6, p c .0001], but a nonsignificant solution state x delay interaction E(2,98) = 
L 16 
1.1, MS, - 19283.3, p < 321. It is important to note, however, that the power for this 
andysis was very low (.24). 
A solution state x &hy computation of facilitation in enor rates again indicated a 
main effect of solution category F(1.62) 114.4, MS, = 280.1, p < .0001], but no main 
effect of the delay factor p(2,124) = 1.5, MS, = 132.8, p c 221. The solution x delay 
interaction was signifcant, however F(2,124) = 5.0, MS, = 118.8, p c .ûû8]. Given the 
significance of this latter interaction and the low power associated with the analysis based 
on RT, individual contrasts for each of the three solution States were completed, as 
pIanned. 
Correctly Solved Definitions 
Overail, responses to lexical decision words that had been previously solved were 
made faster p(1,43) = 23.1, MS, = 3292.2, p < -000 11 and more accurately @?(1,90) = 
1 14.1, MS, = 106.9, p < -000 11 than respoIlSeS to the matched control words. MANOVA 
contrasts were ais0 computed to compare ciifferences in responding to target and control 
stimuli at each of the individuai delay periods. No si@cant dinerenca between solved 
and control words in speed of responding were indicated when the solved and matched 
control word appeared on the very next trial, tbat is, one trial iater F(1,45) < 1, MS, = 
10335.6, p c -37.  SignSicant diffetences in RT were indicated, however, when the 
associated stimuli were presented for lexical decision four trials F(1,44) - 30.6, MS, = 
5897.6, p < .O0011 and seven trials v(l,44) = 2 1.8, MS, = 9967.7, p < .O00 11 after 
originally solving the definitions, with responses to the target words occurring faster than 
responses to control words. Finally, facüitation in responding to target words in the 
I l i  
recognition task was simüarly evaluated by cornparhg RTs to make Old,/New decisions 
about target and control words and indicated faster tespondhg to previously solved 
definition words than to controk p(187) = 163.2, MS, = 4368.4, p < .01]. 
Facilitation in the form of emn rates was also compared at each âelay. 
Signincantly fewer emrs were made in decisions about the word/nonword status or 
old/new status of ptevioudy solved wotds than of matched controis at the one E(1,88) = 
50.0, MS, = 202.9, p < .O00 11, four F(1.79) = 98.8, MS, - 13 lS, p < .O0011 and seven 
F(1,77) = 39.7, MS, = 2005, p < .O0011 aial delays, and in the recognition task E(1,90) 
= 273.2, MS, = 82.9, p .ûûû1]. 
To test predictions about the petsistence of residuai activation over tirne, trend 
analyses were completed to compare the degree and pattern of facüitation over the one-, 
four-and seven-trial delays. Facilitation was computed as the difference between responses 
to the target answer words and matched controis, with positive valws dways Uidicating 
superior peifonnance on the target stimuli. A MANOVA con- of the mean facilitation 
in RT across the trial delays of previously solved definitions indicated a siflcant effect 
of delay r(2,102) = 14.0, MS, = 18346.2, p < .0001]. Here, a quadratic enid was 
signifiant, [t = -3.5, p c .O0011 (see Figure 4a). Fuaher con- indicated a significant 
difference between the one- and four-trial delays [t - -4.7, p < .ûûûl], with a greater 
amount of facilitation in the four- than one-trial delay, but no significant difference 
between the four- and seven-aial dday conditions [t < 1, p < .85]. 
A MANOVA of facilitation in enor rates over the trial &lap revealed a significant 
delay effect for solved definitions F(2,128) - 4.0, MS, = 64.2, p < .ml. Similar to the 
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Figure 4a. Trend of mean facilitation in RT over 
t M  delays for wlved definiaons. 
trend data for RT, a quadratic trend was also significant for the mean facilitation in enor 
rates for previously solved definitions [t = 3.3, p c .O021 (sa Figure 4b). Firrther contrasts 
revealed no signifiant difierences in facüitation between the one- and four-triais delays [t 
= 1.4, p < .LA, but significantly reduced facilitation at the seven-trial delay fran the four- 
trial dehy [t = -2.6, p < .O LI. 
Unsolved Definitions 
Similar to the solved definition words, overall, lexical decisions to previously 
unsolved definition words were made significantiy €aster than decsions about the matched 
control words p(1,44) = 6.1, MS, - 27573, p < .02]. However, responsa were slightly 
4 
Trial Delays 
F i r e  4b. T m d  of mean faciütation in emr  
rates over triai delays for soived dehitions. 
less accurate to target words than to control words p(1,89) = 4-4, MS, = 82.7, p < -041 
when lefi unsolved. 
Again, MANOVA contrasts compareci differences in responding to the unsolved 
target and control words at each of the deky periods. Sunilar to the r d t s  with 
previously solved definitions, no signifiant differences in speed of responding between 
unsolved and control woids were indicated at the one-trial delay p(1,45) c 1, MS, = 
10829.4, p c -38). At the four-trial delay point, tesponses to unsolved target words weie 
signiflcantly fmer than respollses to matched control wods [F(1,44) = 10.5, MS, - 
5761.1, p < .OZ]. Decisions to target words in the seven-rrîd delay were also faster than 
those to matched controis and this Merence closely apprmched significance LF(1.45) = 
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3.6, MS, = 9127.0, p c .W. However, no significatlt differences in RT were indicated on 
the recognition task in making OId/New judgements about previously seen but imsolved 
definition words versus control wotds F(1,87) c 1, MS, = 4451.3, p < -741. 
Resuits conceming the acciiracy of responding indicated a higher proportion of 
errors when responding to unsolved target words than to control w d  at the one-trial 
delay p(1,89) = 6.6, MS, = 185.9, p < -011 and i o d a i  delay [F(1,89) = 7.0, MS, = 
199.8, p < .01]. No differences in accuracy of responding to unsolved vernis control 
lexical stimuli were found at the sewen-triai delay @?(1,89) c 1, MS, = 158.8, p < SI] .  On 
the recognition task, participants made fewer emm when making judgements about 
unsolved target words than control words p(1,89) = 42, MS, = 85.9, p < .05]. 
Again, the hypotheses regarding the rate of decline of activation related to unsolved 
problems were evaluated using trend analyses. A MANOVA con- of the facilitation in 
RT over the one-, four- and seven-trial delay conditions for imsolved definitions indicated 
a significant effect due to &lay p(2,72) = 3.6, MS, - 19115.2, p < .03]. A trend anaiysis 
of unsolved definitions indicated a significant linear, but not quadratic function, [t = 2.5, p 
< .O11 (see Figure Sa). Fwther contrasts revealed a signifiant increase in facilitation h m  
the one-triai to four-trïd delays [t - -2.4, p c .04; the ciifference between the four- and 
seven-trial delays did not reach significance, however [t - -35, p < .Ml. 
Simüar r d t s  were indicated in a trend analysis of the eror data. A MANOVA 
con- of the facilitation in error rates over the trial deiays revealed a significant delay 
effect F(2.172) = 7.9, MS, - 193.7, p < .001]. Here again, a linear, but not quadratic 
function was significant [t - -3.7,- p 4 .O0031 (see Figure 5b). Contrasts revealed greater 
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Figure Sa. Trend of mean faciiitation in RT over 
triai delays for unsoived dehitions. 
facilitation in the four-trial than one-trial delay [t = 2.3, p c .O21 and in the seven-trial than 
four-m delay [t = 3.2, p c .O021 in responding accumtely to the unsolved lexical decision 
target words. 
Incorrectlv Solved Problems 
Overall, lexical decisions to words whose definitions were completed with an 
incorrect word were no faster rF(1.44) - 1.6, MS, = 5006.7, p < .21] and had a tendency 
to have higher error rates F(1,90) * 3.1, MS, - 65.5, p < .O81 than decisions made to 
matched control words. In the one-trial delay condition, a ciifference between RTs to 
incorrectiy solved wods and control words approached significance [F(1,45) = 2.9, MS, = 
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Fiye Sb. Trend of mean facüitation in e m r  rates 
over triai delays for unsoived deonitions. 
11999.6, p < -101. No significant faditation for target words was indicated in either the 
four- F(1,44) < 1, MSe = 15095.6, p < .65l or seven- [F(1,4!5) ( 1, MS, = 4809.4, p < -721 
trial deiays for speed of responding. However, significant facilitation in RT for target 
words over controls was found for previously incottectly completed definitions on the 
recognition task p(1,87) - 8.3, MS, = 5094.6, p < .005]. 
With respect to the accuracy data, decisions to target words otiginally uicorrectty 
completed were more accurate than those to rnatched controis in the one-trial delay target 
F(1,87) - 9.9, MS, - 140.8, p < .003]. However, decisions to incorrectly-completed 
words were les accurate p(1,89) = 25.0, MS, - 210.7, p e .ûûûl] or no different [F(1,88) 
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< 1, MS, = 133.1, p < -951 than those to contmls in the four- and seven-trial delays, 
respectively. Similar to the RT data, however, signiticant hcilitation of target over contml 
woràs was iound on the recognition task iot incorrectly solved definitions F(l,!W) - 5.9, 
MS, = 82.2, p < -021. 
A MANOVA conmist of RT faciütation over the trial delays for definitions 
otigindy incorrectiy completed iodicated no significant effects due to delay F(2,156) = 
2.2, MS, = 27 150.3, p < .Il]. A signüïcant effect in delay was indicated for the acciwcy 
data here F(2,166) = 18.8, MS, = 240.1, p c .O 11. Trend analyses of the emr data 
revealed a sipnincant quaciratic trend for the accuracy facilitation data P = -5.6, p 4 .O0011 
(see Figure 6). Further con- revealed a significant demase in facilitation h m  the one- 
to four-trial delay [t = -4.6, p < .Oûûl], but a signifiant increase in facilitation in the 
seven-trial over the fourdial delay P = 4.0, p c .ûûûl]. 
Discussion 
The resuits concerning activation related to solved, uasolved, and inconectly solved 
definitions can be discussed in temis of the strength of activation indicated and the trend 
of activation across tirne- 
Strenpth of Activation 
Clearly, activation stemrning from previously solved definitions was quite strong. 
Facilitation in te= of the speed of respondùig to a solved target word over matched 
controls was strongly indicated in all trial àelays except the first, as weii as in the 
recognition task. Faciiitation in ternis of the accuracy of responding was also strongly 
indicated at ali delays. These d i s  replicate Yaniv and Meyer's bdings and are rather 
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Figure 6. Trend of mean faciütation in e m r  rates 
over triai delaps for hcorrectiy wived dehitioos. 
unsuprising. Although participants were prevented nom achially seeing the solution word 
by having asterisks displayed insiead of the word letters, they nevertheless generated the 
word and entered it via the keyboard. Further, after some time on the task, participants 
likely began to anticipate the later appeanuice of the solution word in the lexical decision 
triais. When asked during debriefing whether they noticed any relation between the 
definition task and lexical decision trials, almost all participants spontaneoudy reported 
that the m e r s  to some of the definitions appeared later on such trials. Thus, it is not 
uniikely that participants "held" their solutions to the definitions at some level of active 
memory, expecting their re-emergence later in the experiment. Having a stimulus "held" 
at some level of memory would be expected to speed its later identification. Thus, the 
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strength of activation relating to previously solved definition WC& would seem to be 
accounted for by participants' acts of generating the solution word, typing in the W O ~ ,  and 
their cognitive expectancies for its later presentatioa. 
Evidence was also indicated for the presence of residual activation relating to 
previously nnsolved definitions, dthough perhaps to a lesser extent tban tbat for solved 
definitions. Facilitation in the speed of responding to a &.finition word that had previously 
been left blank was indicated in the four- and seven-trial delay conditions, but not on the 
recognition task This last finding represents a failure to replicate Yaniv and Meyer, who 
did fùid facilitation in responses to imsolved definition words on a recognition task; the 
reasons for this faiiiire are unclear. Furthemore, the d t s  of the accuracy &ta do not 
consistently indicate facilitation in fesponding to the unsolved target word over matched 
controis. In fact, in the one- and four-trial delay conditions, the reverse is tme: 
Participants made slightly more errors in responding to the uasolved definition word. 
Given Uiis finding, it is important to considet whether the facilitation effwts in speed tbat 
were found on some trial delays are simply the result of a speed-accinacy trade-off. On 
closer inspection, however, this does not appear to be the case. In the one-trial delay 
condition, no facilitation effects in speed were found although more errm in responding to 
target words were made. Moreover, in the sevenaial delay, faditation in speed was 
indicated although no differences in error rates between target and control words were 
found. Furthermore, a facilitation in accuracy was indicated in the recognition ta& despite 
no difference in the speed of responding to target and control words king found here. In 
only one condition, the four-triai delay, was a significant facilitation in speed of 
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responding to target worrls combmed with a signifîcant maease in emirs in responding to 
those target words. 
Although, wlsu~prisin@y, the data from respotlses to u~solved definitions do not 
match the &gree of facilitation seen with solved definitions, they do indicate a significant 
level of continuing activation in several conditions, a counter-intuitive finding that 
repiicates Yaniv and Meyer's (1987) and Shames' (cf. Dorfinan et al., 1996) d t s .  In the 
present study, participants would have worked for one minute on the definition and then 
gone on, unable to retrieve the conect word. Later, however, on viewing the word, they 
were able to respond faster or more accurately to it. ûne might explain these bàings by 
proposing that participants did indeed have the conect solution to the definition, but 
refrained from entering it due to an uncettainty about its venicity, or that they solved the 
definition moments after the trial bad en& Although pon'ble, such expianations would 
not explain the failure to find facilitation eff- for unsolved words in the recognition 
task If participants had actually solved the definition at some point, residd activation 
from the solved word, combineci with the cognitive expectation for its re-appeaiance later, 
should have d t e d  in faciltation at ai l  delays, including the recognition delay, sirnilar to 
that found with solved words. Moreover, this account carmot explah the dinerential 
trends of activation over t h e  found for solved vernis imsolved definitions (see below). 
Thus, it would seem that residuai traces retnaining from the spread of activation initiateci 
during initial work on the definition are indicated, even when the problem is not originaiiy 
solved. Additionaiiy, the activation persisting fiom unsolved definitions differs than that 
from solved definitions, as  it is not the result of generating the words themselves or of 
127 
speciflc cognitive expectancies for @cuIar words to be presented later, given that, f a  
uosolved &finitions, the exact words were not generated in the nrst phce. 
The results concetning definitions answered incorrectly seem to indicate muiimai 
levels of any continuing activation d t i n g  h m  original work on the &finitions. A 
significant facilitation in speed was indicated kre only in the recognition taslc, whiie 
facilitation in responding to target over concrol words in accuracy was found in the one- 
triai and recognition conditions. The fact tbat faditation was found primarüy in the 
recognition task here might suggest that viewing the target word, when presented during 
the lexical decision trials, triggered participants to iîs solution vahie for a previous 
definition they had answered with a different worâ, and then se& to facilitate its 
identification on the sukequent recognition task. 
Activation Over Tirne 
Questions regarding the tiend of activation across time Mer from tests of its 
overall strength and are the important analysis for evaluating predictions about the rates of 
decline of activation of solved versus unsolved problems. 1 predicted that residual 
activation h m  unsolved definitions would persist longer over tirne, whereas such 
activation from solved definitions would "die ofP more quickly. 
A significant interaction between solution state (solved vernis unsolved) and delay 
was indicated for enor rates, although not for RT, possibly due to low power. Separate 
trend analyses for solved, unsolved, and incmectly solved definitions were üluminating in 
testing the changes in the degree of facilitation over t h e  within each of these solution 
states, however. Three equalinterval trial delays were represented in these analyses, 
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namely, the one-, four- and seven-triai dehys. Because a aiai took, on average, abut one 
minute to complete, the analyses represent the pattern of activation oawring thm one to 
seven minutes after initiai wotk on the definition. 
A trend analysis for solved definitions iadicated a quadratic function as the best fit 
for both the RT and the accuracy data. Here, facilitation either incteaSed or was 
maintained initialiy over time and then leveiied off or began to decline at later time 
intervals. In contrast, activation over the trial delays for uiw>lved problems was k t  
represented by an increasing linear function, again, for both the speed and accurscy data. 
Here, the degree of facüitation continued to inmase over the entire seven minute period, 
without levelling off or declining. Results h m  incomtly solved &finitions were mixed 
and present no clear picture. Trend analyses of the RT data indicated no significant linear 
or quadratic function; in contrast, the accuracy data revealed a quadratic function with 
activation initialiy declining and later increasing. These mixed results may reflect a rather 
diverse tesponse style in this condition. Some of the incorrect respouses likely represent 
participants who thought at some length about the definition and a p c h e d  the target 
word, but substituted a similPr but non-target woid in its place. Otber entries may reflect 
an impulsive %hot-in-thedatk" respome to avoid the frustration of spending prolonged 
periods of time attempting to recall wo& when there wss little confidence in being able to 
retrieve them. R d  tbat participants were prevented from prematurely encling the trial 
with no response. 
Consistent with the predictions, &dual activation relating to solved and unsolved 
definitions did indicate some evidence of differential trends over tirne. The trend analyses 
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indicated that, despite the strength of activation of solved definitions due to actually 
generating the s01ution word and expecting its later pmentation, the degtee of such 
activation leveiied off, or began declining, over the. In con- remliining traces of 
unsolved defmitions did not appear to decüae as quickiy, or at all, in the space of seven 
minutes. In fact, the predictions about the deciine of activation were unsupporteci by the 
trend &ta of unsolved definitions ûver the seven-minute period, such traces did not 
decline but rather, somewhat counter-intuitively, h c d  Supporthg the role of 
autonomous activation in the incubation effect, p e h p s  it is the case that, for unsolved 
problems, longer periods of thne off task aliow for a continueci spread and build-up of 
activation that more apprmches nodes relevant to the solution. 
General Discussion 
Given its unreIiable demonstration in the laboratory, this thesis began by 
questioning whether the incubation effm in p d e m  solving, the idea thnt problem 
performance can actualiy improve with an interpolateci period of t h e  off task, acnially 
does exist, or whether anecdotal accomts of its effwts given by great mincis and lay 
people aüke are a resuit of cognitive illusions, such as selective remembering and 
forgetting. If indeed such a phenornenon exists, the question of what mechanisms the 
effect may operate through was also raised. The two above questions were imited in this 
thesis to evaluate the existence of incubation by employing distinct methodologies to 
specifically investigate different proped mechanisms of incubation. To date, three main 
explanations of incubation have been proposed in the literature: the forgetting fixation 
hypothesis, the implicit clue hypothesis, and the role of unconscïous spreading activation. 
Expriment 1 investigated the d e  that fixation and encounters with implicit clues, 
and any interaction among these factors, rnight play in the incubation effkct. Participants 
were either correctiy or incorrectly fixated on word hgments, received an incubation 
period or no incubation, and were exposed to implicit clues to the fragments or nonclue 
nonwords in a lexical decision task. It was predicted that the incubation period should be 
particularly helpful when participanîs were incorrectly fixateci, as opposed to correctly 
fixated, on the fragments, and that the implicit clue would be most helpful for incorrectly 
fixated ffagrnents after incubation. Results indicated a fixation x incubation interaction, 
but not in the way predicted. The break h m  the problem failed to in- perfomiance 
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on incocfectly fixated hgments, but did significantly d u c e  the number of conectly 
fixated m e n 6  solved. Tbe failure to demonstrate improved penomuurce aftet 
incubation for incortectiy fixateci fragments was discussed with respect to the posibility 
that incorrect fixation was never successfuly rnanipdated Wts cancerning the role of 
impiicit ches indicated that ptesenting an impiicit clue word to a word fiagrnent 
significady improved the percentage of hgments solved, regardless of fixation or 
whether an incubation period o c c d  or not. 
Experiment II continued to investigate the forgetting fixation and implicit clue 
hypotheses, but replaced the multi-item task of Experirnent 1 with thnie insight-type 
problems: the Candle problem, the Radiation problem, and a series of ten RAT items. 
Participants attempted to solve two correctly fixated and one incorrectly fixated problems. 
Each problem was also presented in one of three incubation conditions, namely, no 
incubation, clue incubation, an incubation period in which participants wotked at a task 
containing helpful information to the pmblem, and no due  incubation, in which the 
incubation period was filleci with work on a task unrelateci to the problem king attempted 
According to the forgetting fixation hypotbesis, the no clue incubation should improve 
perfomance on the Uicorrectly fixated problems, but be l e s  helpful for c o m t l y  hateci  
cases. The implicit clue hypothesis would predict that the clue incubation period would 
benefit problem solving, regardless of the fixation condition. R d t s  indicated that 
performance was not benefited on any of the problems by the no clue incubation period, 
regardes of fixation. However, the no clue incubation did significantly impair 
performance on the Candie problem when participants were conectly fixated. Resuits 
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concerning the implicit clue hypothesis indicated that the clue incubation improved 
performance on all tht-ee problems; however, the benefit was circumscfl'bed to either the 
correct or incorrect fixation version of the pmblem in each case. Because each problem 
differed with respect to wbether incubation was most heIpful in the correctly or incorrectly 
fixated condition, it appeared that the effect of an implicit clue varied witb pmblem 
difficulty, with medium-level problerns mcst Wrely to benefit. 
In Experiment III the investigation of the mechanisms underlying incubation took a 
tum and began to focus on the thhd proposed explanahon, namely, the 'autonomous 
activation' or 'spreading activation' hypothesis. Specificdy, this study was a test of Yaniv 
& Meyet's (1987) 'Memory Sensitization' hypothesis, the idea that memory traces partially 
activated through initial work on a problem sensitize a person to encounters with 
uiformation relevant to these traces, and t'erefore the problem, during an incubation 
period. The interaction between the partial activation and related information in the 
environment can result in a conscious representation of the problem solution. Although 
this account identifies the role of the implicit clue, it recognizes the effects of incubation 
as due to more than the influence of a clue on performance. Indeed, ensuing problem- 
related partial activation over the incubation period &O plays a signficant role. It 
follows fkom this that an implicit clue would bave varying effects on performance 
depending on the timing of its presentation, that is, before or after partial problem-relateci 
activation exists. In a within-subjects design, Experiment III had participants attempt the 
Two-String, Hatrack, and Radiation problem. Each problem was attempted in one of 
three conditions: (1) clue before, where participants worked on a separate task with an 
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ernbedded clue before attempting the problem, (2) clue aHer, in which participants worked 
on the task with an embedded due after spending some initiai time on the problem, and 
(3) no clue, when no clue activity pceded or foîîowed the pblem. It was enpected that 
problem performance wodd benefit most fina an implicit clue when given a b ,  tathet 
than before, the initiai ptoblem pzesentation. Results ùidicated that when ptesented with a 
due  after initial work on the problem, participants solved the problems significantly faster 
than when introduced to the same clue before their work began, or when no clue was 
preçented at any point of problem solving. Furthemore, when presented &et, rather than 
before, initial problem presentation, an implicit clue was significantly more likely to be 
recognized as a clue, and there was a significant relation between recognizing the 'after 
due' as a due and problem performance, whereas there was no such relation with clues 
presented before the problem. 
F M y ,  Experiment N investigated the presence of problem-related activation that 
continues after termination of work on a problem and its role in the incubation effect. 
Simüar to Yaniv & Meyer (1987), participants completed a rare-word definition task where 
they attempted to generate a rare word given its definition, and then made lexical decisions 
to solution words from the task as well as matched conmis and other unrelateci words and 
nonwords. DifEerent fiom Yaniv and Meyer, participants in Experiment IV made these 
lexical decisions after varying amounts of tirne after tenninating their work on the 
definition If an autonomous spreading activation pmcess is involved in the incubation 
effect, it wouid be expecteâ that sub-threshold automatic activation would persist longer 
for unsolved than for solved items. Thus, 1 pndicted a differential rate of deche of 
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activation for solved vernis unsoIved definitions, with activation of unsolved dewtions 
persisting longer over tirne and activation relating to solved definitions dying off more 
quickly. Trend analyses were completed to compare the degree and pattern of facilitation 
over time (one, four and seven minutes after work on the definition) for solved and 
unsolved &finitions. Although the trend analyses for solved definitions indicated a 
quadratic function as the best fit to the data, the trend of uasolved definitions was best 
represented by an incteasing linear bction. Thus, activation related to solved problems 
appeared to level off or decline over tirne, whereas such activation for uosolved problems 
increased without levelling off or declining. 
Conclusions and ImDLications 
Littie empiricai support for the forgetting fixation hypothesis was indicated in the 
present thesis. Possible difficdties in manipulating incorrect fixation may have contributed 
to this result in some cases. Given these potentid diffculties and the previous empiricai 
demonstration of the role of forgetting fixation in incubation by othet investigators (Smith 
& Blankenship, 1989, 1991; Smith & Vela, 1991; Smith, et al., 1993 cf. Smith, 1995), 1 
m o t  make any conclusions about the fmgetting fixation hypothesis based on failmes to 
indicate such effects in this thesis. However, the possibility tbat there is a role of other 
mechanisms of incubation, besides that of forgetting one's initial incorrect fixation, became 
introduced. 
In contrast to the failm to validate the effects of incorrect fixation on the benefit 
of incubation, more stmngly Uidicated here were the debiitating effects of incubation when 
the problem solver is correctly fixate4 an o b a t i o n  that has not been previously noted 
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in the Iiterature. On some of the problems studied, providhg an incubation period after 
initially correctiy fixating participants significantiy decreased perfiimnance, wmpared to 
participants permitted to work continuously on the problem, with no interjected breaks. 
This suggests one possible explanation of the many previous failutes to empiricaily 
demonstrate signifïcant differences between incubation and no incubation control groups. 
On problems where fixation is left unmanipulateci, participants will u a d y  vary fiom 
king incorrectly to correctly fwted  Although a break fiom the problem may be 
beneficial to participants with incorrect representations of the problem, the same period off 
task may actuaiiy impair the performance of those who bad been correctly fixated. In 
merging these two groups of participants, the end result of no ciifference between groups 
would be indicated, and would appear to incorrectiy uidicate that incubation has no effect 
on performance. 
A second proposed mechanism of incubation, the impücit clue hypothesis, received 
fairly strong support in the present studies. Ahhough intdvely it would seem very likely 
that king presented with a clue to a problem, even if implicit, wouM benefit performance, 
such a prediction was certainly not guaranteed based on resuits of the spontaneous transfer 
literature (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 1983; Landnun, 1990; 
Perfetto et al., 1983; Weisberg et al., 1978). Nonetheless, it would appear that when 
people "bump into" related information after some initial period of work, they can pick up 
on this information and make use of it on ieturn to problem solving. Note, however, that 
we are stili lirnited in what we can conclude about the kal-world' incubation setting. At 
present, we can conclude that, under some conditions, people can make use of implicit 
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information availabie in their environnient afkr same prelimuiary work ai a problem has 
occurred. It is difficult to know, however, whether such clues are readily avadabIe in the 
naturaI environment and how much of the anecdotal incubation experiences can be 
accounted for by this fmding. hdeed, if ches or relateci infommtion are not readily 
available in the pmblem solvefs surroundings, it makes little Merence whether s/he can 
spontaneously notice and m e r  them to the pmblem. 
hplicit clues were found to be of most help on rneâiurn-level difficulty problems. 
This finding would seem to stand in contrast to andotal reports of incubation in which 
the problem solver is worbg  on very difficult, hovative and indeed previously 
'unsolved' problems. We must be carefiil to consider the context surrounding each of these 
observations, however. The reai-world problem solver has likely spent montbs thinking 
over the complexities of his/her situation, has a weii-developed knowledge base in the 
problem area, is very motivated to solve the problem, and may have incubated for days on 
end. Our laboratory participants, of course, corne with no specialized expertise in the 
problem area, some, but minimal, motivation to successfdly solve the problems we 
adrninister, and spend minutes initially working and incubating before we measure their 
succesç. Here, then, medium-difficulty level problems provide a more sensitive measure of 
the effect, an important component to laboratory investigations of incubation. 
The impact of the implicit clue does not appear to depend entirely on participants' 
conscious recognition and report of its relation to the problem at hand In two of the 
studies (Experiment 1 and Iï), benefits on performance were obsewed regardles of whether 
participants reported noticing the hint value of the clue. Such participants can be 
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consïdered to be unconscioudy influenceci with respect to a second order coasciousness 
(Bowers, 1987). Although performance can benefit h m  an 'uniecognized' clue, it is stin 
the case, however, that an explifit awareness of the clue as a due benefits perfomuuice to 
a greater extent. Ptevious research on spontaneous W e r  hasi indeed noted the p t  
discrepancy in solution rates of participants explicitly told of the chie compareci to those 
receiving ody its implicit presentation (Catrambone & HoIyoak, 1989; Gick Bc Holyoak, 
1980; Landnirn, 1990; Perfetto et al, 1983; Weisberg et al, 1978). Further, Experiment III 
here ùidicated that one of the primary advantages of initiaking problem-related activation 
before vernis after contact with an implicit clue is the role such activation plays in 
sensitizing the problem solver to the clue, helping him or her to notice it and its relation to 
the problem; in other words, making the clue more explicit. 
A third and fuial incubation mechanism under study hem was the 'autonomous 
activation' hypothesis (Dofian et al., 1990, which is the conceptualization of incubation 
most akin to the 'unconscious processes' hypotbesis, and involves the idea that krork' or 
problem-related activation continues during a period of thne when the task in no longer 
consciously considered. To my knowledge, thÛ mechansrn of incubation has never been 
directly tested. hdeed, the idea of testing for the presence of unconscious processes or 
unconscious spreading activation seems somewbat daunting. How can such internal 
processes be evaluated? 1 would argue that more sensitive measurernent techniques are 
required for its investigation in the laboratory. As noted above, the typical incubation 
laboratory setting has not been very representative of real-world incubation experiences, 
meaning that what effxts are present will be d e r  or weaker in the laboratory. 
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Attempting to measure continuhg problem-refated autonomous activation by exposing 
participants to a problem, inteuuptirig the& perfimmce with a break, rehnning them to 
task and uiereafkr mwwting their success dichotornoudy, in terms of solved or not 
solved, is thus too blunt an instrument. Such a procedure assumes tbat midual activation 
always leab to the successful solution to a problem, and Qes so in a matter of about ten 
minutes, the average incubation tirne in such expetiments. Tnstead, it may be that residual 
activation relating to a problem ofien exists, but sometimes in a weak fom, not strong 
enough to eventually converge on the problem solution. As weU, it may take a greatet 
amount of time than often pemitted for such spreading activation to lead to the fllial 
solution. 
Experiments III and N attempted to employ more specific and sensitive meames 
of autonomous activation. In Experiment III, residual activation on a problem interacted 
wiui an implicit clue before its success was measured on completing insight problerns. 
Here, the effects of partial activation and a hint were compared to the effects of a hint 
alone, and findings indicated that residual problem-related activation continuing over the 
incubation period adds significantly to success in problem solving. 
In Experiment N, reaction-tirne data h m  lexical decirions to solution wotds of 
previously attempteâ defi~tions proviâed a more sensitive test of the role of autonomous 
activation over tirne. Here, rather than measuring whether a problem is eventually solved 
or not, 1 tested directiy for the presence of continued activation. Evidence of such 
activation was indicated by greater facilitation in responding to unsolved target (solution) 
words relative to control words. Monover, the relevance of such continuing activation to 
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the incubation effect was tested by examining the trend of continuing activation over t h e  
for solved vernis ui~u>lved &finitions. Activation for insolved definitions appeared to 
actually increase linearly over thne, in a way me might expect when a solution is king 
approached As weli, the trend for unsolved activation Mered h m  that in which the 
definitions were originally solved; hem activation Ievelled off or decüned. 
One might question whether the results of Ekperiment III and IV a n  be explaineci 
or represented in terms of explaaations of incubation other than continuing autonomous 
activation tbat are more "testable," for example, the forgetting fixation hypothesis, as pet 
Woodworth & Schlmberg's (1954) early waming. However, the d t s  of Experiment III 
do not appear to be predictable €tom this h e w o r k ;  indeed, if anything, the reverse 
finding might be expected to occur. If one conceptualizes the implicit clue presented 
More contact with the problem as a type of implicit manipulation of correct fixation, then 
performance in the 'due before' condition should exceed that of the %lue afier' condition 
because participants are expected to be more successful when correctly fixated. 
Experiment III, however, found that a clue piesented after some preliminary work on the 
problem improved performance, whereas the sarne clue piesented before the problem 
presentation did not. In Expriment IV, facütation in identifying the target solution word 
occurred even when that word was previously not generated by the participant. According 
to the forgetting fixation hypothesis, an incubation period improves penormance by 
moving the problem solver away h m  an incorrect set. This hypothesis would not predict, 
however, that the problem solver moves towards the correct set in any way due to the 
incubation period; instead s/he rnight be best understood as king back at a h o  set' or 
neutral starting point. Thus, the forgetting fixation hypotbesis does not predict or explain 
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the trend of incteased faciltation for unsolved definitions indicating an approaching of 
solution-associated nodes. Therefae, although the forgetting fixation hypothesis m o t  be 
refuted baseci on any d t s  h m  the pre~etlt studies, b to methodological difficuities in 
some conditions and the clear empiricai validation it has received in 0 t h  experiments, the 
present work wouid seem to indicate the role of possible additional mechanisms of 
incubation, including a continuing spread of autonomous activation. 
Caution mirsi be advised in applying the d t s  of Experirnent IV k t l y  to the 
problem solving context, however. The word definition task in Experiment IV is better 
conceptualized as a memory test tban as a problem, and there are M y  important 
differences between tests of memory and tme problem solving situations. The d t s  of 
Experiment N therefore need to be replicated using a %me' problem set The RAT items 
that have been previously employed by Shames (1994; cf. Dorfinan et al., 1996) using a 
Yaniv and Meyer type procedure, might constitute a viable alternative set of materials for 
replication of the present work 
It may also be helpful for further research on incubation b be very m i n a  of the 
less than optimal laboratory representation of the real-world incubation setting, as 
discussed above, and to implement procedures to address the differences between these two 
contexts. In the laboratory, more sensitive measurement techniques to assess specific 
incubation mechanisms wiIl increase the 'testability' of different proposed processes of 
incubation. In addition, paralleling the laboratory incubation setting more closely with 
reai-world settings may help to increase effed sizes, if the effects of incubation are related 
to hawig expertise areas, high levels of motivation and long perîods of tirne stmggling 
with problems. Experimenters might make more use of participants with specialized 
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expertise in knowiedge areas who woufd be expected to have weli-developed networks of 
associations specinc to the pmblem. Methods of motivahg laboratory participants, such 
as paying people for problems solved, might be developed and employd Longer periods 
of working and incubating codd be used Of course, amther way to gain some advantages 
of the reai-world setting is to design ways to study incubation in its naturai envimament 
Another aspect iikely very hportant to the study of incubation, but overlwked by 
the present work, is that of individuai difierences. It is passible that people ciiffer in the 
extent of the benefit they receive ftom taking a break fiom their work and that these 
differences conelate with other important cognitive and personality variables. To my 
knowledge, there has been M e  work investigating such individuai merences in 
incubation. Murray Br Demy (1%9), Dominowski & Jenrick (1972) and Patrick (1986) 
investigated the effects of incubation for low- and high-ability participants, but the r d t s  
were mixed. Furthemore, there bas k e n  no more ment  work examining other important 
variables. It may also be the case that dBerent types of individuals benefit fkom 
incubation in different ways, for example, thiough a forgetting of then initial fixation, by 
king open to and making use of related information they find in their environment, or 
through a tesidual autonomous spreading of activation. Thus, studying individuai 
differences in incubation wouid seem to be a particuiarly productive area of research not 
only by ptoviding, again, a more sensitive method of investigatug mechanisms of 
incubation, by perhaps eliminating unrelateci variance, but also by futthering out 
understanding of the phenornenon with respect to what type of individuais might benefit 
most nOm incubation and how individuals with varying characteristics profit from it. 
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In coaclusion, the tesults of four experiments ieponed hem indicate support for the 
irnplicit clue and autonomous activation hypotheses of the incubation effect in pmblem 
solving. When presented with an implicit clue afkr some initiai work on a problem, the 
clue was spontaneously noticed and benefitted paformance, most often without 
participants' awareness of its impact. Resuîts also suppoaed the notion tbat an 
autonomous problem-dated sub-threshold spreading of activation continues after direct 
conscious work on a problem has bem temporariiy discontiuued. Ch some occasions such 
activation may interact with implicit mformation available in the problem solver's 
surroundings. In this case, the role such activation may play is to seIlSitize the petson to 
the problem rehted input in hisfher environment, so that such information can implicitly 
inform the problem solving, a la implicit due  hypothesis. On other occasions, the pmblem 
related spreading of activation may continue and converge on solution associated nodes 
without help fiom an extemal implicit stimuius. It would appear frwi the results of the 
above expenments, however, that, although present, the magnitude of such continuing 
activation may o k n  be weak. Thus, it may be the case that autonomous activation most 
often interacts with other mechanisms involved in incubation before it reaches sufficient 
intensity to C r o s  the awateness threshold. 
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Appendix A 
Word Fragments, Associate Words, and Clues used in Experiment 1 
-a-gs= 
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Appendix B 
Information Letter and Consent Form for Experiment 1 
INFORMATION CONSENT LETTER 
The following study investigates factors involved in problem-solving. The problem-solving 
task employed here is word-hgment completion. The study is k i n g  conducted by Ms. Julie 
Tomce  Perks under the supervision of Dr. Ken Bowers of the Department of Psychology at 
the University of Waterloo. 
You will be asked to cornpletc 50 word-fmgrnents. which will invnlve typing in misung 
letters to the figrnent of a word to genente the whole word. Before each word bgment is 
presented you WU sec an associate of, or word related to, the solution to the hgment The 
cornpletion of these tasks WU requin ;ippn)xirnately one hour, for which you wili receive 
parti J credit t o w d s  your htroductory Psychnlogy course. 
There is littie or no risk associated with participation in this study. AU Monnation coiiected 
as a result of p u r  participation in the study will be used for teaching or research publication 
purposes. In either case. your ûnonymity is gumteed. However. consent to participate, or 
for the use of the infnmation you pmvided, may be withdnwn at any tirne by indicating this 
to the researcher. 
CONSENT FORM 
This study hûs been reviewed and appnwed for ethics through the Offce of Human Research 
& Animd Care at the University of Waterloo. However, if you have any questions or 
concems resulting from your piutkipath in this study, please contact thïs office at 8885- 12 1 1. 
ext- 6005- 
1 gram permission to Julie Tormce Perks to collect data fmm my participation in this 
resemh being conducted by Dr. Ken Bowers 
I understand that the study will involve completing 50 word figments. 
I understand that di information gathered in this study wÏii be used for research purposes 
only and that rny monymity will be protected. I understand that I may withdraw this 
permission at any time and that recardings of  my participation will be destroyed rt my 
request, 




Written Feedback for Expriment 1 
Factors involved in the Incubation Effet  
This study ïnvestigates the "incubation effect" in pmblem solving, a condition in 
which taking one's mind off a difficult problem that one had k e n  prcviously wing to solve 
is followed by the successful solution to the probtem. This study investigated the incubaticm 
period by giving hdf  of the subjects a 10 minute rest period when solving word f igmenr ï  
while the remaining half received no LO minute rest petiad. We expect subjtcts who get a 
rest period in the middle of their pmblem solving to solve more word fragments dter this rest 
period than subjects who did not receive my such incubation perind. 
The study &O investigates the reasons why an incubation period might be helpful. 
One prciposed exphnûtim of the incubation effect suggests that one thing that may happen 
when people attempt to solve a dificuit or unique problem Ïs that they get "stuck in old and 
incorrect ways of viewing the pmblem. prevents them h m  coming up with different 
ways to view and therefore solve the problem. The incubation period, then. is helpful 
because it allows old ways of  thinking about the problem to die off* permittkg the person to 
return to problem solving with r fresh mind. To investigate whether an incubation period 
would be m o n  helpfbl when people are thinking of the problem in the wmng way, we 
attempted to get participants "stuck" in the wrong way of viewing a word fiagrnent by 
occasionally giving them misleading words as the associate word to word fragments. 
Another explmation of the incubation effect proposes that when a person dces their 
mind off a pmblem. this d lows  them to corne in contact with information in their 
environment that mûy actually be helpful or related to solving the problem. Thus. in this 
study. we dso investigated whether im plicit information related tc) the problem might better 
problem-solving performance, even when participants were not told of my direct relaticm 
between this information and the problem. Half of the participants were required to rniikr 
wordnonwc~rd decisions about words that were flashed on the screen whiie they worked on 
the word fragment Some of these flashed words were words related to the particular 
fragment solution. 
We predict thût the implicit information received through responding to flashed wïirds 
will be more helpful when participants who were previously stuçk in the wrong way of 
thinking about the word fragment bccûuse of a misleading associate word receive an 
incubation. or r a t ,  period than when such panicipints receive no rest period. Having an 
incubation period d o w s  old ways of thinking about the pmblem to die off, and permits the 
person to retum to problem solving with a fresh muid. With a f m h  mind, the helpful 
implicit information may lead the problem-solver to a new way of thinking about the pmblem 
and the correct solution. Without an incubation period, it is expected that the implicit 
information received through the flashed words wiU be simply integmted into the old, 
incorrect way of thinking about the problem. 
Appendix D 
Candle Problem - Correct fixation Version 
Below is a picture of some common household objects. You are to affix the candle to the wall 
so that it will bum properly. using only the objacts in this pictu=. The problem is considered 
solved when the candle can be W y  affixeci to the wall, burns properly and does not drip wax 
on the table or on the floor- 
. * 
Appendix E 
C a d e  Probfem - Incorrect fixation Version 
Candie Ptoblem 
Below is a picture of some common household objects. You are to affix the candle to the wall 
so that it will burn properly. using only the objects in this picture. The problem is considered 
solved when the candle can be f t m y  afixed to the wall. bums properly and does not dnp wax 
on the table or on the floor- 
Appendix F 
Candle Problem - Neutra1 Version 
Below is a picture of some common houshold objects. You are to affix the candle to the wall 
so that it will bum properly. usiog only the objects in this picture. The problem is considered 
solved when the candle can be fimily affixed to the wall. bums properly and does not drip wax 
on the table or on the floor- 
Appendix G 
RAT Items - Correct fvration Version 
Remote Associates Task 
FoUowing are uiree words. Find the word that is related to tiuee of these wotds. 





Following are three words. Find the word that is related to giJ three of these words. 





Remo te Associat es Task 
Following are three words. Find the word that is related to a three of these words. 
Note that the first letter of the solution word is provided 
Solution: c 
Remote Associates Task 
Foilowing are three words. Find the word that is reiated to &l thtee of these words. 





Remo te Associa tes Task 
Following are three words. Find the word that is relateci to & tbree of these words. 





Remote Associates Task 
Following are three words. Find the word that is reiated to Uuee of these words. 





Following are thtee words. Find the word that is related to & three of these words. 





Remo te Associa tes Task 
Following are three words. Find the word that is related to a thtee of these words. 





Remote Associates Task 
Following are three words. End the word that is related to three of these words. 





Remote a i a t e s  Task 
Following an three words. Find the word that is related to aiJ three of these words. 






RAT Items - Incorrect fixation Version 
Remote Associates Task 
Foiiowing are three words. Find the word that is dateci to & thne of these words. 
The words in parentheses are exarnples of correct so1utions to the problem. 
(Tongue) LXCK 
( f i n )  SPRiNKLE 
(Gold) MINES 
Solution: 
Following are three words. Find the word tbat is related to aJ three of these words. 





Following are three words. Find the word üiat is related to three of these words. 





Remate Associates Task 
Following are three words. Find the word that is related to & three of these words. 





Following are three words. Find the word that is related to a three of these words. 





Remote Associa tes Task 
Following are three words. Find the word that is related to & three of these words. 





Remote Associates Task 
Foilowing are three wordsC Find the word that is reiated to f l  three of these words. 





Remote Associates Task 
Following are three words. Find the word tbat is related to a three of these words. 





Remote Associates Task 
Following are three wofds. Find the word that is reiated to three of these wo&. 
The words in parentheses are examples of conect solutions to the problem. 




Remote Gssociates Task 
Following are three words. Find the word that is related to thme of these words. 






RAT Items - Neuttal Version 
Remote Associates Task 










Remote Associates Task 





Remote Associates Task 





Remote Associates Task 




Remote Associates Task 





Remote Associates Task 








Following are three words. Find the word that is related to k e  of these words. 




Remote Associates Task 






Radiation Problem - Correct fixation Version 
Radiation Probiem 
Suppme y«u are s d w t w  f x e d  with a patient who ha a mdignmt tumour in his 
srornach. I t is  impossi b k  to operate an the patient, but unles the tumuur is destn~yed the patient 
will die. ïhere is a kind of n y  that c m  be used to destmy the tumeur. If the mys reach the 
turnwr al1 at once at a sufficiently high intensity. the Nmour will be desmyed. Unfofiunately. 
nt this inrensity- the heülthy tissue chat the riys p a s  through on the wriy to the tumciur will nlso 
hc Jssrrityed. At hwer intensities the rays are h;irmles. ta healthy tissue. but thry will not affect 
the t i i i i i i l i i i -  cirlizr. What type of primdure niight bc uszd tu Jcstrity the tumwi- wirh the rdys. 
alid ;ir thc satue cime aviG.J desrriiying the hcdthy tissue? 
Think of: Multiple 
Appendix K 
Radiation Robtem - Incorrect fixation Version 
Radiation Problem 
Suppose you are a doctor faceci with a patient who has a malignant tumour in his 
stomach. It is impossible to operate on the patient. but unless the tumour is destroyed the patient 
will die. There is a kind of ray that can be used to destroy the tumour- if the rays reach the 
tumour al1 at once at a sufficientiy high intensity. the tumour will be destroyed. Unfominately. 
at this intensity. the healthy tissue that the rays pass through on the way to the tumour will also 
be destroyed. At Lower intensities the rays are hannless to healthy tissue. but they will not affect 
the tumour either. What type of procedure might be used to destroy the tumour with the rays. 
and at the same time avoid destroying the healthy tissue? 
Think of: [ntensity 
Appendix L 
Radiation Problem - Neutrai Version 
Radiation Problem 
Suppose you are a doctor faced with a patient who has a malignant tumour in his 
stomach. ft is impossible to operate on the patient, but unless the tumour is destroyed the patient 
will die. There is a kind of ray that cm k used to destroy the tumour- I f  the rays rexh the 
turnour ail at once at a sufficiently high intensity, the tumour will be destroyed. Unfortunately. 
at this intensity. the healthy tissue chat the rays pas  through on the way to the tumour will also 
be destroyed. At lower intensiries the rays are harmless to healthy tissue. but they will not affect 
the tumour either. What type of  procedure might be used ro destroy the tumour with the rays, 
and at the same time avoid destroying the healthy tissue? 
Clue Paired Associates Incubation Task 
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No Clue Paired Asaïates Incubation Task 










































Clue Story incubation Task 
for Radiation Problem 
Read over the following, keeping the main points of in mind. You will be Psked to recall 
and summarize the situation after mding it. 
The General 
A small country was nikd from a mong foctress by a king. The fortress was situated in 
the middle of the counky surrounded by famis and villages. Many roads radiated outward fiom 
the fomess like spokts on a w h d  A rebd generai vowed to capture the fortrcss. The generai 
knew that an anacL by hû entire acmy would capture the fortress. H e  gathcred his army at the 
head of one of the roads. However, the gcneral Iearned that the king had plancd mines on each 
of the roads. The mints were set so that srna11 bodies of men could pas o v a  them safely, since 
the king needed to move his uoops and workers to and €tom the fomess. However, any large 
force would detonate the mines. Not only would this blow up the road and render it impassable, 
but it would alsa destroy many neighbouring vülages. It therefore seemcd impossible to mount 
a fuii-sale attack on the fortress. 
The gened. however, knew just what to do. He divided his amiy up into srnail groups 
and dispatched each group to the head of a different road. When al1 was nady he gave the 
signal and each group marched d o m  a different road. Each gmup continued down its road to 
the fomess at the same tirne. The fortrcss fell and the king was forced to flœ into exile. 
Please give a summary of the story y m  just rad, in your own rords. 
On a scale of t to 7, rate this story's plausibility. 
On a scale of 1 to 7. rate this story's comprehensibility. 
No Clue Story Incubation Task 
for Radiation Problem 
Read the foUowing storg, keephg the main points of the story in mhd. You WU be 
asked to r d 1  snd summarizc the stocy ofter reading it. 
The Identical Twuis 
Once there were identical twi*ns who were continuaily playing pranks on their family, 
ftiends, and teachen. The annual schwl picnic was always a big event for the twins. There 
were races and other athletic events in which the twins won lots of prizes. One year a new 
student arriveci who was a star rumet. The twins wanted to win the main event: the 2-mite 
race through the woods behind the school. So they secretiy de- a plan which would 
enable them to outdo the newcorner. 
The &y of the race amived Each m e r  was to pick his own path through thé woods 
to a clearing, where a teacher s t d  posted to detemine the winner. One twin entered the 
race, while the other excused himself on the grounds that he had hurt his leg in an earlier 
broadjumping event. The race began and the students rushed into the woods. The twin 
nished into the woods and waited until the others had passed out of sight. Then he went back 
to the schooi using a path hidden h m  the picnic area. Shortly &et, the other twin, who had 
been hiding behhd a rock near the finish Iine of the race, burst out and ran into the clearing 
ahead of the other m e r s .  The teacher named Km the winner and marvelIed at the speed of 
his mnning. Next year the twins switched places and thereafier maintained their status of this 
event. 
Che Analogy Incubation Task 
for RAT Items 
Analoev Task 
In each of the following. fil1 in the blank with the appropriate word to cornpiete the analogy- 
An example of an analogy is "Mother : Father as Sistet: Broihçr." In the space undemeath. 
please briefly indicaie your reasoning for the word choice. 
SLEEP : BED as SIT : - - --- 
BLACK : WHITE as PEPPER : - - - - 
TELEVISION : CHANNEL as RADIO : - - - - - - - 
SUMMER : WINTER as HOT : - - - - 
OUTLET : ELECTRlClTY as FAUCET : - - - - - 
PHONOGRAPH : RECORD as RECORDER : - - - - 
MONEY : WALLET as SAWNGS : - - - - 
LIMB : BODY as BRANCH : - - - - 
CHALK : PENClL as BLACKBOARD : - - - - - 
GALLOP : TROT as RUN : , , , -
NEST : BIRD as WEB : , - - - - - 
SAD : CRY as FEELINGS : - -, _ - - - 
SCISSORS : HAIR as MOWER : - - _ - 
SHAMPOO: TOOTHPASTE as HAIR : - - - - - 
DIG : SWEEP as SHOVEL : - - - - - 
FOOT: SHOE as HAND : - - - - -  
PLlERS : SCISSORS as HOLD : - - - 
PLANTS : EARTH as FISH : - - - - - 
No Clue Analogy ùicubation Task 
for RAT Items 
In each of the following, fiIl in the Mank with the appmpriate word to complete the analogy. 
An example of an analogy is "Mother : Father as Sister: Brothcr." In the space undemeath. 
please indicate your reaïoning for the word choice. 
SLEEP : BED as SIT : - ---  - 
DiAMOND : HEART as SPADE : , -, -
COAT : WEAR as APPLE : - - - 
DROPS : RAIN as FLAKES : - - - - 
RUN : FAST as WALK : - - - - 
PEN : INK as PENCIL : - - - - 
CAN : METAL as BOTTLE : - - - - - 
OUTLET : ELECTRlCITY as FAUCET : - - - - - 
COLLAR : NECK as WATCH : - - - - - 
AUTHOR : BOOK as 5OURNALlST : - - - - - - - - 
PLIERS : SCISSORS as HOLD : - - 
PLANTS : EARTH as FISH : - - - - - 
CHALK : PENCIL as BLACKBOARD : - - - - - 
CAR : ROAD as TRAIN : - - - - - 
DIG : SWEEP as SHOVEL : - - - - - 
FOOT : SHOE as HAND : - - - - - 
SCLSSORS : HA[R as MOWER : - - - - - 
- - -  - - - - - - - - - pp - - - 
SHAMPOO: TOOTHPASTE as HAIR : - - - - - 









Rad'ition Roblem - 
Candle Pmblem - 
RAT Prob1ems - 
RAT Problem - 
Radiation Problem - 
Candle Problem - 
CandIe Problem - 
RAT Problerns - 
Radiation Problem - 
Radiation Problem - 
Candle Problem - 
RAT Ptoblems - 
RATProblems - 
Radiation Roblem - 
C a d e  Problem - 
Candle Problem - 
RAT Problems - 
Radiation Problem - 
Radiation Problem - 
Candle Problem - 
RAT Problems - 
RAT Problems - 
Radiation Problem - 
Candle Problern - 
Candle Problem - 
RAT Problems - 
Radiation Problem - 
Correct Fixation; No hcubation 
Correct Fixation; No Che Incubation 
Incorrect Fixation; Clue Incubation 
Correct Fikation; No Clue Incubation 
Correct Fixation; Clue Incubation 
incorrect F'ition; No Incubation 
Correct Fixation: Clue hcubation 
Correct Fixation; No hcubation 
Incorrect Fixation; No Clue Incubation 
Comct Fixation; Che Incubation 
Correct Fixation; No Incubation 
incorrect Fixation; No Clue Incubation 
Correct Fixation; No hcubation 
Correct Fmtion; No Che Incubation 
hcorrect Fixation; Che Incubation 
Correct Fixation; No Che hcubation 
Correct Fixation; Che Incubation 
incorrect Fixation; No Incubation 
Correct Fixation; No Clue Incubation 
Correct Fixation; Che Incubation 
Incorrect Fixation; No Incubation 
Correct Fixation; Che Incubation 
Correct Fixation; No hcubation 
Incorrect Fixation; No Clue Incubation 
Correct Fixation; No Incubation 
Correct Fixation; No Clue Incubation 
incorrect Fixation; Clue Incubation 
Appendk T 
Idormation Letter and Consent Form for Expriment II 
The fiillowing study investigates fûcturs invcdved in pmblem-sdving. The stiidy is hein= 
itliidiictsd by Ms. Julie Ti~rr~nce Peks under the supervision of Dr. Ken Bowers <if the 
Dcp;lniiisiir tif Psycholtlgy at the University tif Waterloo. 
Thers ù litrle cir no rïsk associaied with participation in this study. AU information çollected ï c  
3 result tif your participation in the study will be used for teaching or research publication 
purpBsrs. Iri either case. your monymity is guriranteed, However. consent to participate. CU- fur 
the use id the infocmation ycm pnwided. may be withdrîwn iit any tirne by indicating this t i t  riie 
~-cïe:l~-ch~r- 
CONSENT FORM 
I iiiidzrst;iiiJ that the study will i i ivdve  solving three differeiit pnlblcms. 
I uiidei-stand that ÜII information gathered in thk study will be used Ru- re-seuch purptws only 
aiid thar my anmyrnity will be prcmxted. 1 understand that I may withdraw this permisïim tit 
any time and thu reccdings ut' my participation will be desuoyed at my request 
Nanie (Please print): 
S i ~ r i a  Cure: 
Da te: 
Appendk U 
Written Feedback for Experiment II 
Factors hvolved in the incubation Effect 
This study investigares fxturs that mïy be involved in the "incubaticin effect" in  priiblrm 
solving. The incubation effect ircucs when tÿking one's mind of f  a difficult pnlblem that one 
had beeii previously trying tu snlve is followed by the successful sulution tu the pmblem. 
Participants in  the study attemptul to sdve  three insight-type problemr The study investigated 
rhe incubation p e n d  by giving participan~u an incubation pend  for two of the probkms they 
wiirkzd (III  and no incribation period Rir cine o f  the pmblems. 
One prtipowd cxplanation of the incubatiiin effect suggests thrit une thing that mïy  
happen when peciple rttempt tu siilve ii difficult or  unique pniblem is rhat they set "stuck' in d d  
and incurnct ways iif viewing the prtiblern. 73i.s prevents them h m  ciiming up with different 
ways tti vicw m d  therefure solve the problem. The incubation penctd. then. is helpful becriuse i t 
all i~ws old ways of thinking about the pmblem to die off, permitting the person ta return tu 
problem solving with a frwh mind. To investigaa whether an incubation period wcluld be more 
helpful when people are thinking of the pmblem in the wmng way, we attempted to get 
participants "stuck" in the wrong way of thinking about r pmblem by giving them a misleading 
hint tu ilne of the problems they attempted to solve. 
Anuther explmation o f  the incubation effect pmpcises that when e person talces their miad 
off tl prublern. this rillows them ts crime in contact with informaticin in their envircinment that 
iiiay actually be helpful or relüted to solving the problem. Thus. in this audy. we a h )  
investigated whether impliçit informaticin related tci the problem might beetter problem-solving 
perfunnmce. even when participants were ncit told o f  any direct relation between this 
iiif[)nnatir)n and the prciblern. During one of the two incubatirin periods that e x h  participant 
ircrived. they ci~mpleted ri task which ccintained information thrit çould be helpful for solving 
thc priiblzm they were working on. 
We przdict the beneiicial cffecrï of the incubation periud alocie wil l  be miist evident hi- 
pwhlci~is whcre pÿrticipan~s were previiiuïly stuck in  the wrong way of thinking about the 
problem because of the original misleading h in t  Having an incubatiiin period dlows cild wciys 
lit+ thinking about the pniblem to die off. u d  permits the penim tu retum tu prciblem scilving 
with ri frzsh mind. The incubation pericd done may have no effect on perf<,rmonce in  cases 
where participants were cwrectly thinking about the pniblem. due to the helpful hint. or 
incubation may actudly be unhelpful in  this case because it intempn a person when they are on 
the right w~ck to solving the problem. Findly. we would expect incubation to be helpful for 
both cases where people were thinking about the pmblem in correct and incorrect ways when the 
incilbation period also included implicit helpful information for scilving the problem. 
Thaiik you very much for participating in thLs study. If you have any funher questiims 
about the srudy. feel free ai contact Julie Tcirnnce Perks. XXS- 121 1. x ~ X  13. If yciu have any 
concems iesulting fnrm your participrtiiin i n  this study, please c.ont;ict Dr. Susan Sykes. Ottice 
c i f  Humm Research. University tif Writerlor). 888-4567, ext 600 5. 
Appendix V 
Two-String Pmblem 
Below is a picturc of two strings hanging fiom the ceiling. Your taslc is to rie together the two 
strings. When you try to do this. you find that the smngs arc hung too far apart to ailow one 
to k reachcd when ihe other is graspcd. Fuid a way to tic the two strings tûgethcr. You may 
use anything in the pi- to help you do so. 
Appendix W 
Hatrack Problem 
In the room below are two boards and a C ciamp. You arc to construct a stable coat-rack (Le.. 
something to hang a coat on) using these objccts. Oae board is 45 f i t  long and the othcr is 4 
feet long. The boards an both 5 inches wide and L inch chi& The C clamp is capable of 
opening to 4 inchcs wide. The m m  is 20 fat by 20 feet square and 8 feet h m  ceiliag to floor. 
Consmict the coat-rack in the centre of the mm. nie coat-rack must be swng enough to 
support a mat. Thercfore. it c~naot be baianceci in some flimsy way; it must be quik sturdy. 
Anaiogy Task - 
Clue to Two-String Problem 
Ln cach of the foliowing. ûii in the blank with die appropriate word to cornpletc the anaiogy. 
An example of an analogy is "Mother : Fa- as Sism: Brotha." h the spaoe underneath. 
please brieny indicau your rtasoning for the word choice. 
SINGLE : DOUBLE as ONE : - 
DROPS : EUfN as FLAKES : - - 
BOW : EUBBON as KNOT : 
GUN : SHOOT as NOOSE : - 
ZIPPER : FASTEN as SHOELACE : - - - 
ROLEX : WATCH as GRANDFATHER : - 
S A N D  : SANDBOX as SWING : 
Paired Asociates Rating Task - 
Clue to Hatrack Probfem 
Please rate the degcw of reiatedness of aeh of the Following pairs of words. 
Table - Chair 1-2-3--4-5---6---7 
Not retated Very related 
Black -- White 
House -- Pet 
Dog - Bone 1-2-3-4-5-6--7 
Not related Vay relatcd 
Start -- Stop 1 ---- 2 -- 3 - 4 - 5 -- 6 --- 7 
Not related Vey nlateû 
Pan -- Cook 
Telephone - Book 1 --- 2 ---- 3 --- 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 
Not related Very related 
Dove -- Peace 1 ---- 2 ----- 3---4-5--6--7 
Not related Very related 
Thread -- Needle 1 ---- 2 ---- 3 --- 4 -- 5 -- 6 ---- 7 
Not related Very relateci 
Doctor- Nurse 
Nest -- Bird 1 ----- 2 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 ---- 7 
Nor related Very related 
Rain -- Thunder 
Grass -- Green 1 ----- 2 ---- 3 --- 4 ---- 5 --- 6 ---- 7 
Nor related Very related 
Spider -- Web 
Boards -- Ceiling 1 ---- 2 ---- 3 -- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 ----- 7 
Not related Very related 
Counterbalanced Order of Administration - 
Expriment III 
Order One 
1. Hatrack Problem - No Hint 
2. Radiation Pmb. - Hint Before 
3. Two-String Rob. - Hint Afier 
Order Two 
1, Hatrack ProbIem - Hint After 
2. Radiation Prob. - No Hint 
3. Two-String Rob. - Hint Before 
Order Three 
1. Hatrack Problem - Hint Before 
2. Radiation Prob. - Hint After 
3. Two-String Rob. - No Hint 
Order Four 
1. Two String Rob. - No Hint 
2. Hatrack Problem - Hint Before 
3. Radiation Prob. - Hint After 
Order Five 
1. Two String Rob. - Hint After 
2. Hatrack Problem - No Hint 
3. Radiation Prob- - Hint Before 
Order Six 
1. Two String Prob. - Hint Before 
2. Hatrack Problem - Hint After 
3. Radiation Prob. - No Hint 
Order Seven 
1. Radiation Prob. - No Hint 
2. Two-String Rob. - Hint Before 
3. Hatrack Problem - Hint After 
Order Eieht 
1. Radiation Prob. - Hint Afier 
2. Two-String Rob. - No Hint 
3. Hatrack Problem - Hint Before 
Order Nine 
1. Radiation Prob. - Hint Before 
2. Two-String Rob. - Hint Afier 
3. Hatrack Problem - No Hint 
Appendix AA 
Information Letter and Consent Fonn for Expriment ïü 
INFORMATION CONSENT LETTER 
The foUowing study iavestigates fscton involved in problem-solving. The study is k i n g  
conducted by Ms. Julie Torrance Pcrks under the supervision of Dr. Ken Bowas of the 
kpamnent of Psychology at the University of Waterloo. 
You wüi be asked to wodc on scveral ciiffirent types of problems. Included with these are some 
iasks which are king used to collect normative data to dcvelop problems for future research. In 
al1 there are five ta&. The completion of these will rcquire approrimatdy one hour. for which 
you wiLi ceceive partial credit towards your Introductory Psychology course. 
There is liale or no ri* associated with participation in this study. A11 uifomiation coliected as 
a nsult of your participation in the study will be uscd for mching or iesearch publication 
purposes. In eitha case, your anonymity is guarantccd. However, consent to participate. or for 
the use of tk idonnation you providecl, may be withdrawn at any time by indicating this to the 
researchcr. 
CONSENT FORM 
This study has k e n  reviewed and approved for ethics through the O&ce of €hnian Research & 
Animal Gare at the University of Waterloo. Howcva. if you have any questions or concef~l~ 
resdting h m  your participation in rhij snrdy, plaise contact Dr. S m  S y k .  OBa of Human 
Research. University of Waterloo. 8884567. CXL 6005. 
1 gant pamission to Julie Torranœ P a k s  to colkt data kom my participation in this nsearch 
king conductcd by Dr. Ken Bowers. 
[ understand that the saidy wili involve working on five differtnt problcms 
1 undentand that aU infomation gadicnd in rhis study wiii be used for research purposes only 
and that rny anoaymity will be protecttdc 1 understand that L may withdraw this pmnhion at 
any time and rhat ncordings of my participation will bc dcsmyed at my requcsr 




Written Feedback for Experiment III 
The Rde of Im~licit Clues in the Incubation Eff- 
This study investigrtes factors that may be involved in the "incubation effcctt in probim 
solving. The incubation cffect occurs when taking one's mind off a difficult problem that one 
had been previously aying to solve is followed by the successfui solution to the pmbIcm. 
One explanation of the inaibation effect proposes that when a pecson taLes their mhd off 
a probkm. this allows them to corne in contact with information in th& surroundings that may 
actually be helpful or rclated to solving the problcm That is. they may. by chana, "bump into" 
an implicit clut to the pmblem in thch environ~l\eni One specific hypothesis ftlatcd to this idea 
is the 'Memory Sensitization' hypothesk devclopcd by Yaniv & Meyer (1987). lhey pmpose 
that initial work on a problan begias to activate ideas or knowlcdge structur~~, callad memory 
traces, relateû to the problem in the problem solva's mind. During the the  off task in the 
incubation paiod, this parthi activation sensirizes the person to information or inputs in th& 
surroundings that might be nlatcd to the problan they had pmiously been wodOng on. In 
otha  words. af'ter having spcnt some tirne worbg on a problem, but not achieviag a solution. 
people rnay be likely to notice extanal information which might help them solve i t  At present. 
ihere has beea very ütde rescarch that has investigated the implicit due  hypothesis of incubation. 
Thae has. howeva, been a substantial amount of research investigating whether people 
can spontaneously transfa their pnvious experiences. or information they have previously 
lemed to help them solvc a problan. This nsearch almost always takcs the ionn of p r e s e n ~ g  
a helpful d u e  or analogy to a problem to subjects before they attcrnpt to solve the problcm The 
general conclusion fiom this rcscarch is that people do not spontaneously make use of helpful 
information or "clues" to help them solve a problem. that is, people perfom no bettcr on a 
problem whcn given an implicit d u e  to the problem immcdiately before trying to solve it than if 
they had not been given the clue at all. The nsults of this research would seem to cast doubt on 
the implicit due hypothesis of incubation. 
Recall. however. Yaniv & Meyer's emphasis on the prelUninary p d  activation relathg 
to the problem in the problem solver's mind. It is this partial activation which leads a person to 
notice the due or helpN information in his/her surroundings. Thus, according to this 
perspective. information p f ~ ~ t n t e d  during an incubation period. afar some partial work on the 
problem. may be more h l y  to be 'picked up' by the problem solver and have greater benefits 
on performance than when the same information is presented before attempting the problem. 
The present study investigatcd this very hypothesis. Participants received information 
that provided a clue to a problcrn either before or a k r  attempting the problem. As weU. on a 
third control problem. participants nccived no due to the problem We predict that raxiving 
the hint a& some initial work on the problem will cesult in more problems solved than when 
receiving the same hint befon attempting the problem. 
Thank you very much for participating in this study. If you have any further questions 
about the study. feel fret to contact Julie T o m c e  Perks, 885-121 1. x 2813. If you have any 
concems resulting from your participation in this study, please contact Dr. Susan Sykes. Office 
of Human Research. University of Waterloo. 888-4567. x 6005. 
Appendix AC 
Word Definitions used in Experiment IV 
1. A navigational instrument used in measuring anguiar distances, especialiy the altitude of 
the sun, moon and stars at sea. (sextant) 
2. A smaii boat irsad in the rivet and harbour trafic of China and Iapan, pmpeUed with an 
oar. (sampan) 
3. An infectious and usually fatal bacterial disease of animals, especially cattle and sheep. 
(an*) 
4. A person who believes that nothing can be known about God; expressing ignorance of 
God; not an atheist. (agnostk) 
5. In old Gleek stories, the food of the Gods; supposed to give immortality to any human 
who ate ic  anything that has a delightfd taste. (ambrosia) 
6. An animal able to live both on land and in water; aircraft designed to take off from and 
land on either land or water; flat bottomeci vehicle able to move in water and on land- 
(amphibian) 
7. A small planet; one of the thousands of small planets between Mars and Jupiter with 
diameters €mm a fraction of a mile to nearly 500 miIes, (asteroid) 
8. A style of artistic expression prevalent in the 17th century that is marked generally by 
extravagant fom and elaborate ornamentation, esp. in music and architecture. (baroque) 
9. The Capital of Syria. (damascus) 
10. Building in which Muslims worship Allah. (moque) 
11. A Soviet traveller beyond the earth's atmosphere. (casmonaut) 
12. Ilkgal trade; smuggling goods into or out of a country, contrary to the law. (contraband) 
13. A state of king wable to feel pain, heat, etc; branch in chemistry concemed with 
substances producing this state. (anesthesia) 
14. A word made by changing the order of the letters in another word; e.g. plum-lump. 
(anagram) 
15. The first narne of the character "Scrooge" in Dickens "A Christmas Carol". (ebenezer) 
16. Goblet, consecrated cup, wine cup, esp. one used in chinch for communion. (chalice) 
17. A new convert, esp. a newly baptized Christian; generally, a beginner or novice. 
18. A mixture of metals, esp. a metai of low quality with a metal of higher value. (aiioy) 
19. A grotesque c d  or sculpted figure pmjecting at the upper part of a buüduig, usually 
from a roof gutter. (gargoyle) 
20. A fanatical partisan; one who is carrieci away in his pursuit of a cause or object (zealot) 
2 1. An object believed by primitive people to have magical power to protect or aid its 
owner; an object of special devotion. (fetish) 
22. Authorized period of dehy in performance of a legal obligation or the payment of a debt; 
a waiting period set by an Authority; a suspension of activity. (moratorium) 
23. Officer who acts as a go-between for two annies. (liaison) 
24. Picture writing lsed by Ancient Egyptian priesthood. (hîeroglyphic) 
25. Any of the numerous extinct Pleistocene elephants distinguished from recent elephants by 
large size, very long tuslcs that curve upwards, and weiIdeveloped body hait. (mammoth) 
26. The technical terminology or characteristic idiom of a special activity or group; an 
obscure and ofien pretentious language marked by circumlocutions and long words. (jargon) 
27. Puale; an obscure speech or writing; something haid to understand or explain; an 
inscrutable or mysterious person. (enigma) 
A style of cooking; manner of preparing food. (cuisine) 
Trunk of a statue with head and limbs missing. (torso) 
S trength, staying power, endurance. (stamina) 
Fiftieth a~iversary  of an event; its commemoration, or celebration. (jubîlee) 
Combat between mounted hights with weapons such as lances, swords, or battie-axes, 
as part of a touniament. (ioust) 
Branch of m l o g y  dealing with birds. (omithology) 
A person who appeals to people's prejudices, making false claims and promises in order 
to gain power, false leader of people. (demagogue) 
35. A track contest consisting of ten different track-and-field events. (decathlon) 
36. To place side by side; put close together. (juxtapose) 
37. The first artificial sateliite put in orbit by Russia h 1957. (sputnik) 
38. The author of the book "1984". (orweu) 
39. The Apoilo lunar module that landeci the fint man on the mon. (eagle) 
40. One of the two times in the year when the sun crosses the equator and day and night are 
qua1 everywhere: March 2 1 and September 23. (equinox) 
4 1. The country of which Bagdad is the Capital. (iraq) 
42. Last name of Batman's seaet identity in the Batman comics. (wayne) 
43. Sediment deposited by nmning water. (silt) 
44. The chape1 whose ceiling was pinted by Michelangelo. (sistine) 
45. Opposition to war or violence as a means of settling disputes; rehisal to bear arms on 
moral or religious grounds. (pacifism) 
46. A government ban on shipping through a port; a govemment act forbidding commerce 
with another nation. (embargo) 
An expert in c hildren's diseases. (pedia trician) 
Pertaining to or used in common speech. (colloquial) 
The capital of Australia. (canbem) 
Listlessness; state of apathy or indifference. (lethargy) 
Formation of words in imitation of natural sounds. (onomatopoeia) 
An institution for the care or relief of the insane; a refuge, protection. (asylurn) 
To bestow by will; to hand down to descendants. (bequeath) 
A regional form of language. differing from the standard. (dialect) 
A going forth from a place or country; deparhue of the Lsraelites €rom Egypt; second 
book of the Old Testament. (exodus) 
56. An apparatus for beheading condemnad petsons by means of a heavy knife sliding 
beh~een uprights. (guillotine) 
2. Horizontal sounding box, and played with picb and fingers; not a harp. (zither) 
3. The capital of Burma. (rangoon) 
4. The well k ing  and happiness of otheis first; unseIfishness. (altruism) 
5.  The capital of Finland. (helsinki) 
6 .  With identity conceded; disguised (incognito) 
7. Large bright coloured handkerchief. Brightiy coloured square of material with red or 
yellow spots usually wom round the neck. (bandanna) 
8. The act of an authority by which pardon is granted to a large group of individuals; general 
pardon, esp. for offenses against the state. (amnesty) 
9. Fissure, nanow opening in a rock, w d ,  etc., resulting from a split or crack (crevice) 
10. The French author of "The Plague". (camus) 
1 1. Incapable of king expresûed in words; indescribable; unspeakable or unutterable; 
inexplicable; inexpressibte. (ineffable) 
12. To expose milk, cheese, or fermenteci liquids to a high temperature but below the boiling 
point for a given period of time. killing bacteria and arresting fermentation. (pasteurize) 
13. Made or done on or as if on the spur of the moment; improviseci; composed or uttered 
without previous preparation; extemporaneous. (impromptu) 
14. Hardened unfeeling, or indifferent to hults and the suffering of others. (callous) 
15. A monster, half buil, that was confineci in a labyrinth where it consumed its tribute of 
Athenian youths and maidens, untii slain by Theseus. (minotaur) 
16. A rigid airship of a large dirigible type. (zeppelin) 
17. Bestowal or invocation of divine favow. (blessing) 
18. A hiding place used by explorers for conceaiing or preseMng provisions or implernents. 
(cache) 
19. Belief that events are determined by force beyond human contml; a doctrine that events 
are fixed in advance for dl time in such a manner that human beings are powerless to change 
them. (fatalism) 
20. The dense, fibtous. opaque. white, outer coat of the eyeball. (sclera) 
2 1. The capital of Thailand (bangkok) 
22. Manual sk iU neatness. deftness, admitness. (dexterity) 
23. A ceremonial embrace; A ceremony or salute to mark the confening of knighthood, or 
rnarking the recognition of special me* a d .  An expression of praise. (accolade) 
24- The science of coins. (numismatics) 
25. A connaisseur of food and drink (gounnet) 
26. Sorcerer; one skiiled in magic; magician. (wizard) 
27- Shallow body of watet, near or comected to a Iarger body of water. (lagoon) 
28. Homesickness; an excesively sentimental condition yeaming for retum to or of some 
past period or irrecoverable condition. (nostalgia) 
29. Sm& group, often of military officers, that d e s  a country afier a coup d'etat and before 
a legitimate govenunent is formed; used esp. in Central and South America. (junta) 
30. A mythical figure. hdf man, half horse. (centaur) 
3 1. A statement that is seemingly contradictory or opposed to common sense and yet is 
perhaps tme. (paradox) 
32. Dwarf; an ageless and often defomed man of folklore who lives in the earth and guards 
precious ores or treasures. (gnome) 
33. Right to exercise legal authority or the territory over which authority is exercised. 
(jurisdiction) 
34. CoUector and disposer of rehise; animal that devours refuse and carrion. (scavenger) 
35. Cleansing agent; any of numerous synthetic-water soluble or liquid organic preparations 
that are able to emulsify oils, and hold dirt in suspension. (detergent) 
36. The act of talking to oneself; a dramatic monologue that gives the illusion of king a 
seties of unrpoken reflectiorrs. (soliloquy) 
37. False testimony while under oath. (pejusr) 
38. Yearly calendar with detailed information on yeafs ticies, events, etc. (almanac) 
39. Socrates' most famous student @Mo) 
40. The authot who wrote under the pseudonym of Mark Twain. (clemens) 
4 1. Chief and lowest timber or steel plate of a vesse1 extendin8 fiom stem to stem dong the 
bottom and supporting the whole hune. @el) 
42. The rubber d e r  on a typewriter. (platen) 
43. Heathen; idolater or wotshipper of many gods. @aga.) 
44. Animal or plant living on another; toady; sycophant. (parasite) 
45- The three-leaf clover that is the emblem of Ireland. (shamrock) 
46. The country of which Budapest is the capital. (hungary) 
47. The proper name for a badminton bird (shuttlecock) 
48. The mountain range in which Mount Everest is locatd (himalayas) 
49. The kind of poison Socrates took at his execution. (hemlock) 
50. Large tent, esp. one supported on p t s  or a temporary open building for shelter, 
entertainment etc. (pavilion) 
5 1. The process by which plants make their food. (photosynthesis) 
52. An institution for the c m  or relief of the insane; a refuge; protection. (asylurn) 
53. To bestow by wül; to hand d o m  to descendants. (bequeath) 
54. A regional fonn of language, differing fiom the standard. (dialect) 
55. A going forth €rom a place or country; departwe of the Israelites €rom Egypt; second 
book of the Old Testament. (exodus) 
56. An apparatus for beheading condemned persans by means of a heavy knife sliding 
between uprights. (guillotine) 
Appendix AD 
Lexical Decision Task Stimuli used in Experiment N 
Lexical Decision Task Stimuli 
bonow revolve hidden code Iystem 
mountain proclaim innocent peverend lovernor 
garbage number ostrich inhobit inivide 
anthrax rangoon analyze dericit gomplex 
window d e y  ashore manter ringle 
sampan zither entity nostral infome 
am phibian incognito professor intenesly rifficult 
sextant vertigo whistle feapure aderage 
arnbrosia helsuiki camival cohereng dostance 
damascus crevice acrobat risgust morling 
agnostic altniism triangle approash cafteine 
baroque amnesty ampli@ koward fiscuit 
contraband pasteurize coilective cohsistent lomething 
asteroid bandanna adorable herecent tegither 
cosmonaut ineffable lightning fepresent sipuation 
ebenezer minotaur epidemic congider specfnun 
moque camus figure buchet motine 
anagram caI1ous imitate hebause proglem 
alloy cache seize podel much 
anesdiesia impromptu direction compocent fonscious 
neophyte blessing mahogany somution h i m i  
fetish bangkok temper jolder lottir 
chalice zeppelin blanket scenfle selated 
zealot sclera gallop symgol g m l  
hiemglyphic numismatics delinquency refrimenator sentitentai 
gargoyle fataiiim juvenile kequence matogony 
liaison accolade neglect durakle hariest 
enigma lagoon velvet lecond tegori 
moratorium dexterity difficulty pargicuiar secnmary 
jargon wizard island napure sambol 
starnina centaur plester amitate inxiety 
mammoth gourmet opinion arournal endorge 
tors0 junta cease speef plean 
omithology juridiction organization pergonnance restansible 
cuisine nostalgia shortcut auditoxy acaderic 
joust gnome cable Mme dresk 
juxtapose soliloquy adventure ignoyance tanderine 
jubilee paradox package dashier exomple 
decathlon detergent magnitude defermine spructure 
eag le plato flask nasis slobe 
demagogue savenger universal hotmation knowsedge 
onuell almanac larynx larrow ramily 
W a y n e  platen globe slong cheif 
sputnik perjury message gederal brimary 
iraq keel drab pata gour 
pacifism shamrock bacteria finasaur peantime 
equinox clemens ta& sactioin moiship 
sistine parasite divate faisure sucround 
coUoquial himalayas embanass adandoned parchsent 
silt Pagan dcer kreak mact 
pediatrician shuttlecock mathematics prolabüity tedimentary 
onornatopoeia photosynthesis tepercussion recommentation sultiplication 
embargo hmgary oatmeal pushion econofy 
lethargy pavilion pendulum benerage splendit 
derogatory franchise obedience pronision sornethere 
canberra hemlock antenna capsute fredict 
Appendix AE 
Recognition Task Stimuli used in Experiment IV 
Recall Reconaition Task Stimuli 
anthrax rangoon teachet 
sampan zither needle 
amphibian incognito disembark 
sextant vertigo pepper 
ambrosia helsinki ancestor 
damascus crevice bungdow 
agnostic altruism d a g e  
baroque amnesty tobacco 
contraband pasteurize helicopter 
asteroid bandanna remember 
cosrnonaut ineffable geriatric 
ebenezer minotaur sickness 
moque camus lawyer 
anagram callous thunder 
dloy cache major 
anesthesia impromptu poinsettia 
neophyte blessing innocent 
fetish bangkok cliche 
chalice zeppelin student 
zealot sclera sorrow 
hieroglyphic numismatics disreputable 
gargoyle fatalism hyacinth 
liaison accolade plaster 
enigma lagoon secret 
moratorium dexterity restaurant 
jargon wizard church 
stamina centaur forehead 
rnarnmoth gourmet citadel 
tors0 junta decay 
ornithology jurisdiction intelligent 
cuisine nostalgia extinct 
joust gnome robin 
juxtapose solüoquy afiemoon 
jubilee paradox ancient 
decathlon detergent fluctuate 
eagle plato lemon 
demagogue scavenger supenise 
orwell almanac fiidge 
Wayne platen heavy 
sputni k perjury diamond 
iraq keel silk 
paci fism shamrock elephant 
equinox clemens rubbish 
sistine parasite seafood 
coiloquial himaiayas hemisphere 
silt Pagan loud 
pediatrician shuttlecock fnistration 
onomatopoeia photosynthesis incompatible 
embargo hungary soldier 
lethargy pavilion marriage 
canberra hemlock subtract 
Appendix AF 
Information Letter ami Consent Form for Expriment N 
INFORMATION CONSENT LETTER 
The foUowing study invesrigatcs fanors involveci in problem-solving. 'Ihe snidy is king 
conducteci by Ms. luüe Torrance Puks under the supcmSion of Dr- lemifer Smiz and Dr. Ken 
Bowers of the Deparmmt of Rychol& at aie University of Waterloo. 
Thae is liale or no risk associatcd with participation in this smdy. Al1 informarion coUccted as 
a result of your participation in the study witi k used for tcaching or research pubkation 
purpases. ui eitha case, your anonymity is guafantcedd However. consent to participate. or for 
the use of the information you providai. may be urithdrawn at any t h e  by ind ica~g  this to the 
cesearc her- 
CONSENT FORM 
This mdy has been reviewed and approved for ethïcs chou@ die O&ce of Hunian Research & 
Animal Care at the University of Waterloo. Howdver. if you have any questions or contais 
r d ~ g  ûom your participation m tt& stuciy, picase contact Dr- So~an S y b .  Ofnce of Human 
Research, University of Waterloo, 888-4367, ext 6005. 
1 gant pamiuion to Julie Torrancc PakP to coUcct data fkom my pmicipaaon in this research 
king conducmi by Dr. lcnnifu Stoiz and Dr. Ken Bowers. 
1 undentand that the smdy wiU involve compieting word dcfialtions and wordlnonword 
discriminations tasks. 
[ undcistand that all infotmatioa g a t h d  in this sûdy will be w d  for resean'h pirrposes only 
and that my anonymity MU be pro& 1 andastand that 1 may withdraw this permisSon at 
any timc and that rccordings of my participation wil l  k desrroyed at my wumt- 




Written Feedback for Expriment IV 
Factors Invdved in the Incubation Effect 
This smdy investigatcs factors that miy be involveci in the "incubation effcct" in problm 
solving. The incubation effst accurs when taking one's muid off a dIff idt  problem that one 
had been prcviously trying to solve is foiiowcd by die succc&hi solution to the problem 
One explanation of the incubation effcct pmposcs that movement towards a solution can 
occur. without a ptson's awarcness and withwt the p«son chialong upticidy of the pmbkm 
This idca has been discusscd in the fitaam in rams of "spreading activation". a proocss 
whereby king presentai with a probian activates ideas or icnowlcdge structures* calIed rnernory 
traces, relevant to the problan in the pcoblcm solva's mùd. Thk activation then spnads to 
other knowledge in mmory relatai to the problan One way of investiga~g whether 
movement towards a solution has k n  made. in the absence of a solution itseif,, is to detcrmiae 
whether a person. afm worlrllig on a pmbIem, can rcspond more quickîy a> the prcscntation of 
the amiver to the problcm thaD to oaier mniilp words that arc not solutions to the problem. 
Such a methad was employai in the prrsent smdy usïng the wotd/nonword discrimination taslu 
Some of the words in this ta& wen the answcrs CO prcvious word deüxütioas, while some w a e  
unreiatcd words. hnkipants respoaded to the answcrs to the pmious w o d  definitions in the 
word/nonword discnminatr . . *  'on ta& afm vsryùig arnounts of ame delays. One-third of the time 
the answa to the previous word dcEinition was one of the words in the wordlnoaword 
discrimination rask on the vay next trial. Ose-diird of the time the answa to the previous word 
definition was one of the wonis in the wod/nonword task 3 dais  later. Fdy. the answer 
word to a previous word definition came as one of the words in the word/nonword task 7 niais 
later one-third of the tirne. 
if movemair towards a solution. through a process of activation qr&g to relevant 
informaaon in memory* is indeed a factor involvcd in the incubaaon effect, one would expect 
that such activation would k more apparent for yet unsolved item than for items already 
solved. Thus. it was pdicted that when the word definition task was not solved. people would 
respond equaiiy as fast to the answa words in the word/nonword task in the 1.4 and 7 trial 
delay conditions (indicating continueci activaaon of nlated problem eltmcnts over this time 
period). However. for the solved word ûagments. activation should "die off' more quicidy. 
Thus. in cases where the word definition was initialiy solved. response tirne to the answer words 
should become longer as more tim passes. that is, people should respond inaeasingly siower to 
the answer word over the 1.4 and 7 trial delays. 
Thank you very much for participaring in this study. If you have any funher questions 
about the saidy. fccl fiec to contact Suiie Torrance Perks, 885-1211. x 2813. If you have any 
concems radring from your participation in this smdy. please contact Dr. Susan Sykes. Office 
of Human Rescarch. University of Wattrioo. 888-4567. x 6005. 
